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Abstract 
The very concept of a “medium” has been called into question by emergent technologies 
that convert all media phenomena into digital quanta. In this context, the dissertation 
investigates the entanglement of war and media technologies across photographic, 
cinematic, televisual, textual, and digital interfaces from the 1960s to the present.  
From the early “camera bombs” used in the Vietnam War to the recent Gorgon Stare 
drone program, visual technologies have served to both document and implement acts of 
war. At the same time, artists, filmmakers, and writers have sought ways to reframe and 
disrupt these militarized screens. I describe these imbricated screenworlds as screenic, 
wherein complex technological, social, and corporeal operations are transformed into a 
surface of perceivable events. I develop the notion of the screenic as a phenomenological 
and ecological concept for thinking about and through the convergent and divergent 
interfaces of war. Extracting from the iconic photographs of the Vietnam War, CNN’s 
orgiastic televisual spectacle of the Gulf War, and the Abu Ghraib photographs that both 
pictured and perpetrated torture, each chapter focuses on literary and visual objects that 
elucidate the use of screens as both a weapon and a record of war. Through close 
readings of various texts including the digital flows of artist Wafaa Bilal’s “Shoot an 
Iraqi” web-performance, the digital epistemologies of Errol Morris’s documentary 
Standard Operating Procedure, and the more durable analogue substrates of Larry 
Burrows’ Vietnam War photographs, I seek a critical phenomenology of the surface at 
the juncture of human sensoria and technological media.  
Many media theorists of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have identified in 
emergent technologies both the potential for new social formations and the perils of new 
kinds of catastrophe. Expanding upon this discourse – a discourse haunted by the 
interpenetration of war and media technologies – I argue that these bodily and social 
concerns are screenic problems situated in an expanding nexus of interfaces from 
television to hand-held devices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Interfaces of War: Media Aesthetics, Media Ecologies, and the Screenic 
 
I like to think 
 (it has to be!) 
of a cybernetic ecology 
where we are free of our labors 
and joined back to nature, 
returned to our mammal brothers and sisters, 
and all watched over 
by machines of loving grace.   - Richard Brautigan1 
 
So cyberspace is real.   - Barack Obama 
 
The Screenic 
The two epigraphs above, from Richard Brautigan in 1967 and Barack Obama in 
2009, both come from texts that engage human-machine interaction in the rhetoric of 
technological utopianism while also relaying a darker subtext. The speaker in Brautigan’s 
poem may have been earnest in the halcyon days of cybernetic-ecological wish-making 
of the 1960s and 70s. But heard skeptically here in the twenty-first century, he sounds 
like someone already “all watched over.” His optimistic dreams of reunion with nature 
and freedom from labor seem like the coerced enthusiasm of someone already living 
under totalitarian machine rule, where “loving grace” is the necessary the doublespeak of 
a surveilled subject. President Obama’s claim that “cyberspace is real,” however, comes 
in the more measured and modernist rhetoric about the promise and peril of new 
technologies. They are the words of a Commander-in-Chief who has overseen a dramatic 
expansion of the use of military aerial drones – machines that literalize the concept of 
                                                
1 Recently, the filmmaker Adam Curtis made a brilliant, if not problematic, documentary film 
series for BBC2, All Watched Over By Machines of Loving Grace (2011), which he titled after Brautigan’s 
poem. In it he explores the ways in which humanity is colonized by machines. He casts a wide net covering 
Ayn Rand’s philosophy and its connections to Silicon Valley titans, the machine fantasy that informs 
ecological science, and the machine fantasy that that structures global politics.   
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being “all watched over.” They are also the words of the “Internet President” who was 
elected twice in large part by his ability to harness social media and big data. In the 
“cyberspace is real” speech (from which the epigraph is taken) he seems to ventriloquize 
the French disaster theorist Paul Virilio when he talks of the paradoxical promise and 
peril of Internet technologies. “It’s the great irony of our Information Age –,” the 
President says, “the very technologies that empower us to create and to build also 
empower those who would disrupt and destroy” (Obama). In this speech the President 
uses the promise of technology to emphasize the attendant perils that legitimize new 
government programs of cybersecurity, cyberweaponry, cyberwar, and more specifically 
in this instance, a new cabinet-level office led by a Cybersecurity Czar. Obama argues 
that the United States’ digital infrastructure needs to be treated as a strategic national 
asset.2 In other words, due to a technologically perilous world, the United States itself 
needs to be an arbiter of peril via weaponized networks. This May 2009 speech lands in 
the historical vicinity of the public hacktivism that would come in the following years 
including the Wikileaks diplomatic cable releases, the LulzSec and Anonymous hacks 
and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, as well as the emerging public 
revelations about complex cyberweapons like Stuxnet, Conficker, and Flame, which were 
all funded, created, and/or deployed by the United States government.  
                                                
2 Obama is not the first president to call for heightened cybersecurity and protection of the digital 
infrastructure. In 1998, Bill Clinton recognized this is Presidential Directive 63 and in February 2003 
George W. Bush released a National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (NSSC). Under Obama, however, 
cybersecurity has become more of a presidential priority than ever before. 
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 It may be that the President was giving a war speech disguised as a technology 
speech, but he is right, cyberspace is real.3 It is this fact (which Virilio and Obama, for 
different reasons, seem to agree is “philosophically vertiginous” and which Brautigan 
insists “has to be!”) that opens my own investigation of the screen in the context of war 
and war in the context of the screen (Virilio, Desert 45). Situated dialectically somewhere 
in between Brautigan’s cybernetic dreams and Obama’s perilous realities, this 
dissertation is an attempt to grapple with recent entanglements of war and media 
technologies and the resulting media-aesthetic and techno-ecological ramifications of 
those entanglements in theory, photography, literature, and art. The endeavor here is to 
elucidate the making and unmaking of the world on screens in the context of war.  
 A fundamental issue facing current media studies is the very concept of a 
“medium.” As media objects shift from things that are somewhere (i.e. light emulsions 
imprinted on stock) into nothing that is everywhere (i.e. the intangible flow of digits in 
the ether), once distinct boundaries between media have eroded. Media objects that were 
once pieces of the world and continuous with the world are now discrete pieces of code, 
discontinuous with the world, digitally stored, and episodically articulated via graphic 
                                                
3 The statement “cyberspace is real” is not particularly epiphanic. Though the idea of the ‘virtual’ 
has been often lazily conceptualized in opposition to the idea of the ‘real,’ especially in discourse around 
digitality and cyberspace, the current modes of telepresence, tele-action, and tele-existence that have been 
integrated not only into the dominant modes of war-making, but into everyday living, provide a common-
sense indication that no such strict opposition exists. For revisions and recoveries of the concept of the 
virtual see Vivian Sobchack (The Address of the Eye and Carnal Thoughts), Anne Friedberg (The Virtual 
Window), Pierre Lévy (Becoming Virtual), and David Rodowick (The Virtual Life of Film). All of these 
scholars seek to liberate the concept of the virtual from a strictly digital environment. For example Anne 
Friedberg makes the following useful definition in The Virtual Window: “Once the term ‘virtual’ is free 
from its enforced association with the ‘digital,’ it can more accurately operate as a marker of an 
ontological, not a media-specific, property” […] For the purposes of this study, then, the term ‘virtual’ 
serves to distinguish between any representation or appearance (whether optically, technologically, or 
artisanally produced) that appears ‘functionally or effectively but not formally’ of the same materiality as 
what it represents” (11). 
   4 
 
and haptic interfaces. Simultaneously, as network technologies, robotics, and algorithmic 
software agencies become increasingly integrated into the practices of everyday life, the 
boundaries between humans and technologies have also eroded, raising questions about 
what some theorists refer to as the posthuman condition.4 
 In the context of recent wars, this dissertation critically engages these 
technological and theoretical transformations, which are rapidly resituating all forms of 
media and social practices. It explores the ways in which the apparent matterlessness of 
emergent media forms do, in fact, matter. The digital turn introduces profound changes to 
the imbricated aesthetic conditions and means by which the world appears to us, from the 
internet of information to the internet of things, from ambient intelligences to 
commodified social networks, from iPhone images to networked drone surveillance, from 
Call of Duty simulations to the Wikileaks Apache helicopter footage.5 How do we make 
sense of the problem of perception and all the sensory faculties that underpin perception? 
What is the meaning of experience, perception, sensation, and subjectivity under these 
emerging media conditions? Media aesthetics – the conditions of technologically-
mediated perception – and media specificity – the idea that these perceptions change as a 
media alters – are fundamental problems within media studies. And given that media 
aesthetics are the phenomenological representation of complex, interconnected, 
                                                
4 See the excellent anthology edited by Judith Halberstam and  Ira Livingston , Posthuman Bodies 
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995) as well as N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual 
Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995). 
5 For a fascinating set of essays and artworks that deal with lives of objects and internets of things, 
see Paola Antonelli’s Talk To Me: Design and Communication Between People and Objects, the catalog for 
the 2011 exhibit of the same name at The Museum of Modern Art. 
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networked sensory environments, the media-aesthetic problem is simultaneously a 
phenomenological and techno-ecological problem.  
My exploration of the screenic conditions of American wars in Vietnam and the 
Persian Gulf aims to elucidate these co-constitutive elements of media aesthetics: the 
phenomenological and the ecological. The following chapters delve into various 
iterations of the representational regime of war as it has been developed and deployed by 
the United States military apparatus from the War in Vietnam to the present. In particular, 
I trace the emergence of the screen as both the literal and figurative site for both waging 
and witnessing war, unfolding moments that anticipate or implement what I call screenic 
modes of perception. The neologistic concept of the screenic is developed here in a 
somewhat Deleuzian spirit – resonant with more familiar media terms such as 
informatics, filmic, haptic, and, of course, machinic – to connote the assemblages of 
social, bodily, and technological systems that mediate war.6 The concept of the screenic – 
as both noun and adjective – refers not only to the particular screens of film, video, 
television, and computational media but also encompasses the sites of contact and 
overlap – the interfaces – between bodies, things, and images across photographic, 
cinematic, televisual, and digital representations of war. Beyond the technological 
                                                
6 In particular I’m drawing from the broad systems theory put forth in the fifth chapter Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari’s Thousand Plateaus, “Nomadology: the War Machine,” which develops a concept of 
the nomadic war machine and its incorporation into and “striation” by the state. This concept gets at the 
ecological and phenomenological assemblages of human and machine in war that I intend the concept of 
the screenic to invoke in the more delimited context of screen media. “The notion of a machinic phylum,” 
writes Manuel De Landa, calling forth Deleuze and Guattari in War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, 
“blurs the distinction between organic and non-organic life […] both human and robot bodies would 
ultimately be related to a common phylogenetic line: the machinic phylum” (De Landa 7). Elsewhere, in a 
more strictly digital context, Anna Munster says that “considering the digital as machinic, then, means that 
we think about technology as part of an ensemble that differentially combines the capacities and functions 
of its matter-flows in relation to the other elements in that assemblage […] These other modes include, and 
indeed foreground, the relatively unexplored terrain of embodied digital experience” (16). 
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interfaces of war, this screenic mode of inquiry also looks to the sensory and bodily 
surfaces of war including the spectators, combatants, and the dead, disarticulated, and 
detained bodies of war. Each subsequent chapter charts a constellation of war images, art 
objects, and literary narratives that elucidate the ways screenic phenomena serve as both 
a weapon (through surveillance, targeting, and tele-control) and a record (through 
documentary, journalism, and art) of war’s destructive power. 
The screenic, then, is a concept for thinking about, in, and through screens. 
Despite my indebtedness to the many ‘theories of the virtual’ that emerged in the 1980s 
and 1990s in the work of Paul Virilio, Jean Baudrillard, and many others, this project 
does not purport to offer a new thesis on the spectacularization or virtualization of war. 
Rather I am interested in theorizing the distributed entanglement of electronic signals, 
materials, and human sensoria at and across the interfaces of war.7 
To begin as I have, with talk of ambient technologies and algorithmic software 
agencies, situates this project in the middle of the emerging transdisciplinary and 
microhistorical discourse on digital aesthetics. But I could just as well have framed this 
project around a more “old-fashioned” object: the photograph. Whether through Eddie 
                                                
7 Friedrich Kittler famously opens Gramophone Film, Typewriter by declaring that “media determine our 
situation” (xxxix). Kittler’s outright technological determinism here is perhaps a little troublesome, but his 
inversion of Marshall McLuhan’s famous maxim usefully changes the terms of this discourse from a 
humanist one to a post-humanist one. For Kittler, technology is not “the extensions of man” as McLuhan 
would have it. Rather, man is the extension of technology. In other words, one does not “understand 
media;” one understands in media. This decentering of the human can also be seen, for instance, in Manuel 
De Landa’s figure of the robot historian in War in the Age of Intelligent Machines in which he imagines a 
post-humanist future in which the history of technology is told by technology itself. My attempt here to 
sketch the screenic ecologies of war is indebted to this shift in perspective, which flattens the interrelations 
of human-machine interaction and thus challenges the Enlightenment understandings of intelligence, life, 
and agency that inform the utopic global village-ism of McLuhanesque media theorizing. Kittler words, 
from an interview with John Armitage: “The development of the internet has more to do with human beings 
becoming a reflection of their technologies … after all, it is we who adapt to the machine. The machine 
does not adapt to us” (Armitage, “From Discourse Networks” 35-36).   
   7 
 
Adams’ iconic photograph from the War in Vietnam, Michal Rovner’s distorted 
photographs of Gulf War television coverage, or the Abu Ghraib photographs 
themselves, each of the following chapters takes the photograph – particularly its 
technological transformations and its convergence with other media – as the critical 
portal into an investigation of the screenic. The surface of the photograph is a receptive 
surface on which to locate the transformations of what Lev Manovich called the "Western 
screen-based representational apparatus" (104). The photograph – particularly war 
photographs – are, of course, part of the “representational apparatus” Manovich refers to, 
but they can also provide a picture of that apparatus. However, before previewing the 
ways each chapter looks at how photographs screen and are screened within media 
ecologies of war, I first want to trace out a brief history of screenic theorizing. 
 
Portholes, Windows, Screens 
Reading through the Oxford English Dictionary’s multiple entries for screen, one 
encounters a number of often contradictory definitions. In the verb form to screen means 
to secure from attack, to shield, to protect; but also to hide from view, to conceal, to 
mask. To screen is also to sift, to filter, to select, to separate; but, additionally, to show, to 
present or to project (onto a surface). The screen shields, filters, and presents. It is a 
surface that receives images or luminously emanates them – it withholds and allows, 
conceals and reveals.8 
                                                
8 We can locate this dialectical tension between protective opacity and exposed translucency, 
among other places, at the turn of the last century in Sigmund Freud’s 1899 essay “Screen Memories.” In it, 
he describes the psychoanalytic phenomena he calls “screen memory” in which a seemingly insignificant or 
fantastical childhood memory acts as a cover for other repressed memories. Screen memories, he argues, 
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The screen, then, as the site of screening and as a condition of our perception, is a 
phenomenologically bifurcated space where perception intersects multiple temporalities 
and spatialities in a tenuous encounter (that is represented, simulated, interacted, tele-
presented, etc) with other worlds that are yet this world (i.e., screenworlds). In The 
Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau, pondering the perceptual experience of 
riding a train, invokes the porthole of Jules Verne’s Nautilus, which, like the train’s 
windowpane, serves as the “transparent caesura between the fluctuating feelings of the 
observer and the moving about of an oceanic reality” (112). Verne and de Certeau are 
both conjuring screenic experiences, an essentially phenomenological interaction 
between the embodied senses and the screen/world it perceives. For de Certeau, the 
porthole and train window are “at once incarcerational and navigational”; we are 
separated from and moving through the world via an interface that “combines dreams 
with technology” (113). The porthole today is screenic, and, more than a passive 
transparent layer between us and the oceanic depths, this screenic environment becomes 
the world, not just a window onto it.  
De Certeau is not the alone in using the window as a figure of the screenic. In 
“The World As Interface,” for example, curator and theorist Peter Weibel extends de 
Certeau’s porthole into the screenic era: “The media are providing the technology for the 
extension of dimensions of here and now. The promise is the fulfillment of a yearning for 
the eternity of now” (346). This yearning for now, he says, is no longer “a limited, 
                                                                                                                                            
act as a cover to protect the subject from repressed trauma or desire. The screen memory can have little or 
no correspondence to external reality and thus, his concept takes on the characteristics of medium wherein 
a fantasy is projected over a trauma. In other words, screen memories are, like all screens, sites of 
mediation. 
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localized experience, but rather a simultaneous, non-local, universal experience” (346). 
Borrowing from the field of endophysics – “a science that explores what a system looks 
like when the observer becomes part of this system” – he calls for an “endoapproach” to 
electronics that understands the world as an interface and, resonant with de Certeau, sees 
the “comprehension of the world” as “an interface problem” (341, 346-347). Likewise, in 
What Do Pictures Want, the art historian WJT Mitchell takes a sweeping view of 
interface history that begins with the window: “From the grillwork of Islamic ornament 
to the stained glass windows of medieval Europe, to the show windows and arcades of 
modern shopping and fláneurie, to the Windows of the Microsoft user interface, the 
window is anything but a transparent, self-evident, or unmediated entity” (Pictures Want 
214). Lev Manovich, too, in The Language of New Media, observes, “if computers have 
become a common presence in our culture only in the last decade, the screen, on the other 
hand, has been used to present visual information for centuries – from Renaissance 
painting to twentieth-century cinema" (94). Later, in the same chapter, Manovich turns to 
the French semiotician Roland Barthes for a broader metaphorical understanding of the 
screen. Manovich attempts to further unravel the relationship between “the space of the 
viewer” and “the space of representation” by exploring the relationship between the 
screen and the body of the viewer. He turns to Barthes’ essay “Diderot, Brecht, 
Eisenstein.” “For Barthes,” he writes, “the screen becomes an all-encompassing concept 
that covers the functioning of even non-visual representation (literature), although he 
does make an appeal to a particular visual model of linear perspective" (104). Manovich 
reads this screenic concept at work in the following passage by Barthes: ”The scene, the 
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picture, the shot, the cut-out rectangle, here we have the very condition that allows us to 
conceive theatre, painting, cinema, literature, all those arts, that is, other than music and 
which could be call dioptric arts” (Image/Music/Text 70). 
The late Anne Friedberg, in her brilliant book, The Virtual Window: From Alberti 
to Microsoft, also takes up the window as a screenic metaphor of her investigation of the 
perspectival paradigms that shape contemporary screenic encounters. She traces a logic 
of visuality that has its roots in Cartesian space and Leon Battista Alberti’s single-point 
perspective, continues through the age of mechanical reproduction, and reemerges in the 
command line terminal of MS-DOS and its reconfiguration as the desktop GUI of 
Microsoft Windows.9 Along the way, she develops the window as powerful metaphor for 
elucidating the screenic. Like the film theorist Vivian Sobchack, she approaches the 
screen through the metaphors of window, frame, and mirror, all while expanding the 
concept of virtuality. In doing so, she finds a kind of language for the post-cinematic 
visuality of the twenty-first century.  
In between the chapters of The Virtual Window, Friedberg inserts vignettes, which 
she calls “Lenses.” In “Lens IV: Virilio’s Screen” she turns to Paul Virilio – the 
philosopher of speed – in order to more fully elaborate the screen itself as a metaphorical 
object. She captures something here about Virilio and his mode of theorizing (which I 
develop further in the second chapter) that is important to how I am framing this project. 
                                                
9 Friedberg traces the mixed metaphor that Windows introduced. On the one hand, it was the 
window through which the user and the machine could interact. On the other hand, a whole other metaphor, 
the desktop (files, folders, documents, etc.), created another kind of virtual logic for this interaction.  
An aside: the names of Microsoft products consistently seem to speak to the media zeitgeist. When 
I began this project they had just come out with the Kinect, which so perfectly combines human kinesis and 
technological connections. Recently, they’ve released their tablet, which is simply called Surface. 
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“If Virilio does not theorize the technological differences between film, television, and 
the computer,” she writes, “it is because, for him, the screen remains in a metaphoric 
register, a virtual surface that overrides any specificities of its media formation” 
[emphasis mine] (183). Before Henry Jenkins attached the term “convergence” to 
thinking about the interrelations and merging of various media forms, Virilio, in both 
content and form, was moving fluidly between war machines and cinema machines, 
between photographs and munitions, between painting and film, in a phenomenological 
approach to media flows that took the screen as its primary metaphor. Indeed, his writing 
on the shared genealogy of military and mass media technologies leaps from medium to 
medium and from military complex to cinema multiplex without holding sacred the 
notion media specificity. He has been criticized for this impressionistic writing, yet this 
fluidity is the point he is trying to make. Unlike the modernist and materialist media 
theories of the earlier twentieth century (embodied most completely in the work of 
Walter Benjamin), which emphasized the radical potential of an emerging apparatus of 
delivery, Virilio’s “discourse of dematerialization and disappearance” emphasizes the site 
of display (184). He casts the screen as the site of “the passage from something material 
to something that is not” (Live 116). For Virilio, the focus shifts from modes of 
conveyance to sites of appearance and the screen is the metaphor that illuminates this 
emerging logic of perception. 
 Even in this brief sketch of the figures of window and screen, one can see two 
kinds of tendencies emerge in the discourse about screens: the ecological and the 
phenomenological. The screen is the site where complex self-regulating systems appear 
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to embodied, sensory human experience. In other words, the screen is the intersection of 
ecological and phenomenological concerns. For Weibel, the interface is the primary site 
of this intersection. “The boundaries of the world are the boundaries of our interface,” he 
says. “We do not interact with the world—only with the interface to world” (343). In 
What Do Pictures Want?, the figure of the window leads Mitchell into an exploration of 
systems theory and the cybernetic ecology theories of the 1960s and 1970s. Manovich, 
via Barthes, dwells on the dialectical tension between screen space and viewing space, 
between the ‘face’ of a networked techno-ecology and its interface with human 
perception. This tension is a reiteration of de Certeau’s recognition of the separated-
from-and-moving-through-ness of the screenic. That same tension pervades all of Virilio 
(a student of the phenomenologist philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty), and that tension 
seeps into The Virtual Window as well. How do we negotiate the embodied experience of 
screenic phenomena, especially when (to cite Virilio once more) the flickering image on 
the screen comes to dominate “‘the thing’ of which it was, until now, only the ‘image’”? 
(Desert 57). 
As I have attempted to highlight above, I situate the concept of the screenic, in the 
tradition of screen theorizing that Friedberg has described as being concerned with “the 
changes in scale, time, space, and consciousness produced by technological 
enhancements to human vision” (4). It is a tradition that, even when it has a primarily 
materialist set of concerns, often finds itself turning toward ecological and 
phenomenological modes of inquiry.10 I want to continue to highlight some of the work 
                                                
10 The list of theorists in this tradition includes Friedberg, Weibel, Sobchack, Mitchell, Manovich, 
Benjamin, and Barthes along with Aristotle, Karl Marx, Siegfried Kracauer, Raymond Williams, Marshall 
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in this tradition to further situate the screen and my approach to it, particularly where 
phenomenologies and ecologies emerge both implicitly and explicitly in relation to 
theorizing the screenic.  
Early in her book, Touch: Sensuous Theory and Multisensory Media, Laura 
Marks writes, “By staying close to the surface of an event, I hope to trace a connection 
between the event’s material history, the event itself, me, and you” (xi). Throughout this 
dissertation, I too, attempt to stay “close to the surface” of events with the same hope. 
This hoped for connection is phenomenological through and through. In the most basic 
sense, phenomenology is concerned with what appears in lived, sensory experience. 
Moreover, it is concerned with the space of that experience. In other words, under 
phenomenology, space is first and foremost that which is experienced. “Space is limited 
to the world of sensible experience,” writes Virilio in The Art of the Motor, “and beyond 
that there is no longer any space worthy of the name” (141). For Marks, who is 
attempting to theorize haptic technological encounters, and for Virilio, who endeavors to 
conceptualize speed as the phenomena par excellence of the information age, the screen 
is a primary space-as-experience.  
Like Virilio and other phenomenological theorists, Marks has been criticized for 
engaging in “impressionistic” criticism (read: phenomenological criticism). Much of the 
introduction to Touch is a defense of her methodology. “I dislike the term 
[impressionistic],” she writes, “because it implies that impressions will eventually give 
way to a coherent and removed critical structure.” Rather, Marks turns to a 
                                                                                                                                            
McLuhan, Guy Debord, Gilles Deleuze, Lewis Mumford, Nicholas Negroponte, Donna Haraway, Susan 
Buck-Morss, Judith Butler, David Rodowick, Katherine Hayles, Anna Munster, Matthew Fuller, and Rita 
Raley to name a few others. A proper literature review of this tradition would be another project altogether. 
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phenomenological approach to create a flow between sensuous closeness and symbolic 
distance (xiii). Similarly, the film theorist Vivian Sobchack sees phenomenological 
criticism as the best approach to theorizing the entanglement of social, material, and 
technological entanglements of the screen. She argues in Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment 
and Moving Image Culture that “the co-constitutive, reversible, and dynamic relations 
between objective material technologies and embodied human subjects invite a 
phenomenological investigation” (139). She defines this approach as not “merely 
subjective” but rather as “focused on the relations between the subjective and objective 
aspects of material, social, and personal existence” and sees these relations as 
“constitutive of the meaning and value of the phenomena under investigation” (139-140). 
In other words, she is concerned with investigating the spatial and temporal structures 
that are co-constituted by human subjects and material objects. She calls this “existential 
phenomenology,” which she differentiates from Edmund Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology by focusing on the embodied nature of human consciousness – what she 
calls the “material premise of sense and signification” (140). Like Marks, Sobchack 
endeavors to approach the screen through a kind of materialist phenomenology.  
The phenomenological approach is both a curse and a necessity. As W.J.T. 
Mitchell observes, “We not only think about media, we think in them, which is why they 
give us the headache endemic to recursive thinking” (215). Our critical position in the 
face of the screen is always phenomenological because the object of our thought is also 
the space of our thinking. We cannot separate from an embodied screenic experience of 
the world. As media theorist Anna Munster argues in Materializing New Media: 
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Embodiment in Information Aesthetics, “New media are not simply changing older media 
forms, they are altering the conceptual taxonomies and paradigms for thinking about 
them” (24). Echoing Marks and Sobchack, she argues that “in order to think productively 
beyond the closed space of the Cartesian cogito and the reductive cyberfantasy of flesh-
machine fusion, we need a way to conceive of the relay of connections and disjunctions 
that is set off between the sensate and code in engagements with digital technologies” (9). 
This conjunction of sensate and code, in other words, is the meeting of a fundamentally 
phenomenological experience with a technological ecology.  
To recapitulate the terms: 1) ecology is a concept that describes complex, 
interconnected, coded systems; 2) phenomenology is a concept that describes the sensate 
encounter with those systems; and 3) the screenic is the concept that describes the 
intersection of the other two. So, even as media theorizing drifts necessarily into 
phenomenological realms, it also encounters ecological ones. They are different gradients 
of the same questions: how do we talk about complex networks of human and non-human 
agencies? How do we talk about the lives of objects? How do we describe the 
assemblages, convergences, and shifting boundaries that make up these constellated 
human-machine networks? Phenomenology and ecology are the imbricated terms used to 
think about large, complex networks and the posthuman condition at the site of embodied 
experience. This project, therefore, is about the embodied, sensory experience of the 
interfaced world, or, said another way, it is about the phenomenology of media ecology. 
And if phenomenology is a loaded term, ecology is overloaded. I am not going to 
disentangle the sordid histories of ecological thought here. Matthew Fuller has already 
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done this in his marvelous book Media Ecologies. Why use such a troubled concept? 
Because, says Fuller (and he is right), “it is one of the most expressive [words] language 
currently has to indicate the massive and dynamic interrelation of processes and objects, 
beings and things, patterns and matter" (2). He traces the life of the ecological concept 
through various iterations: its application in corporate environments, where it is used to 
naturalize the “dimensions of class composition and command in a workforce”; as a way 
of promoting a media environmentalism of the kind Neil Postman calls for in the tradition 
of Marshall McLuhan; as “some of the most interesting parts of literary studies in recent 
decades” found in the work of N. Katherine Hayles, Friedrich Kittler, and Joseph Taibbi 
(4); and, lastly, as a mode of rhizomatic philosophy as developed by Felix Guattari, his 
collaborator Gilles Deleuze, as well as Manuel De Landa. It is this last ecological 
endeavor that Fuller finds most promising for the kind of inventive rigor demanded of 
“life among media” because “the stakes [Guattari] assigns to media are rightly perceived 
as being profoundly political or ethico-aesthetic at all scales” (5). Moreover, it is Guattari 
and company that lend the kind of poetics that Fuller wants a concept of ecology to 
contain. "All objects have a poetics,” Fuller writes, echoing with my own working 
definition of the screenic, “they make the world and take part in it, and at the same time, 
synthesize, block or make possible other worlds" (1-2). 
I have attempted to show here how theorizing contemporary media aesthetics 
requires a concept of a phenomenological ecology; I have named that concept the 
screenic. In many ways this is not a new endeavor and or a new concept. We find it in the 
work of Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin, for example. What follows here is in a 
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way a reiteration of their concerns in the light of new surfaces. This project, like theirs, is 
concerned with the consensual realities that are produced when social relations are 
translated into a surface experience. In the introduction to his 1995 translation of 
Siegfried Kracauer’s The Mass Ornament, Thomas Levin argues that Kracauer’s Weimar 
essays attempted to develop “a critical phenomenology of the surface,” which is exactly 
what I’ve tried to outline here. Instead of the Tiller Girls and other mass spectacles of 
interwar Germany, I am focusing on a more recent “cult of distractions” (what Friedberg 
would have called a “cult of surfaces”) in the context of recent American wars, which, 
like the picture palaces of Kracauer’s Berlin, features its own “elegant surface splendor” 
(Kracauer 323, Friedberg 168). Likewise, as David Rodowick observes in The Virtual 
Life of Film, Benjamin didn’t ask “Is film art?,” but rather “Has film changed the concept 
of art?” (131). The networked and fluid screens of this moment merely beg us to do the 
same. Like Kracauer, Walter Benjamin (whose influence here is monumental) also 
sought to elucidate the overlap of art, technology, and everyday life in the decades 
leading up to fascism. He too saw in mass media (film in particular) the possibility for the 
screen experience to produce promising new social relations as well as the threat of new 
ways to aestheticize and anaestheticize social relations. In “The Work of Art in the Age 
of Mechanical Reproduction,” he identifies a connection between changing modes of 
perceptions, changes in media, and their connection to war. He saw in mechanically 
reproduced art a radical change. The ‘original’ was no longer an authentic, auratic object. 
The destruction of aura was for him filled with liberatory potential because it signaled the 
destruction of the oppressive ideologies empowered by aura. This emancipation of art 
   18 
 
signaled the potential emancipation of masses. Essentially, “The Work of Art” essay puts 
forth a liberatory media theology at the same time that it foretells a potential and looming 
disaster – a disaster that would later cause post-war theorists like Virilio and Kittler to see 
disaster and war looming everywhere in media.  
This project focuses on aesthetics because, as Benjamin saw, politics have been 
aestheticized – have become screenic. I share with Benjamin a tendency toward the 
theological. I also ascribe to a belief, as Benjamin did, in the liberatory potential of our 
media (as social practice). However, largely because of Benjamin, I do not maintain his 
messianic hope that such liberation will come to pass. Rather, for me, this potential 
always remains potential. In other words, insofar as this dissertation examines the 
potentially liberatory screenic practices of various artists, it does so only to the extent that 
they momentarily point to a liberatory potentiality. As I demonstrate throughout the 
following chapters, the screenic regimes of war can only be temporarily disrupted by a 
minor glitch, a bit of static. There are only fleeting portholes of critical reflection to be 
glimpsed. Still, in the spirit of Benjamin, this dissertation seek the discernible 
interrelations between disparate objects – to collect diffuse bits and pose them not as 
Benjamin did, a potentially liberatory mode of delivery, but as a phenomenological mode 
of encountering the world, screenically. 
 
Slides & Accidents: Pictures of a Screenic Ecology 
As a way to anchor the phenomenological and ecological concepts I just outlined 
and to begin a preview of the chapters that follow, I want to look at two somewhat 
disparate events – a friendly-fire accident and a single PowerPoint slide – that help to 
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picture the concept of the screenic in the context of war. The former, a friendly-fire 
accident, took place without much media attention in Northern Iraq in 1994. Two United 
States F-15 fighters shot down two United States Blackhawk helicopters killing all 
twenty-six people aboard the helicopters in one of the worst friendly-fire incidents in 
military history. Six years later at the International Conference of the System Safety 
Society, Nancy Leveson, professor of aeronautics and astronautics at MIT, used the 
accident as a case to demonstrate her new systems model of accidents. 
Figure 1. Figure from "Analysis of a Friendly Fire Accident Using a Systems Model of 
Accidents." © Nancy Leveson 
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The latter, a PowerPoint slide, first appeared in Kabul, Afghanistan in the summer 
of 2009 during a presentation to General Stanley McChrystal (a year before Matt Taibbi’s 
fateful Rolling Stone interview, in which McChrystal’s criticism of President Obama 
forced the General into early retirement). The slide depicts a baffling yet beautiful 
flowchart that was meant to represent the complexity of American military strategy in 
Afghanistan. It is an undulating color-coded collection of arcs and arrows that illustrates 
the entanglements of various Afghan communities (“human terrains”), institutions, 
coalitions, feelings, beliefs, infrastructures, tactics, strategies and oppositions into an 
indecipherable web of interrelations. “When we understand that slide,” General 
McChrystal reportedly said, “we’ll have won the war.” 
Figure 2. The McChrystal PowerPoint Slide. © PA Knowledge Limited, 2009. 
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By spring of the following year, it had become a popular symbol in the columns 
of the New York Times, The Guardian, and elsewhere of the failures of the War on 
Terror. It became a visual joke, both of military strategy in Afghanistan and of the 
PowerPoint-ization of military command under McChrystal, David Petreaus, and the rest 
of a new generation of military leaders who regularly used PowerPoint presentations to 
render complex strategy into an illusively simplified sequence of slides.  
The friendly-fire accident and Leveson’s analysis of it sparked my initial inquiry 
into the concept of the screenic. While immersed in Paul Virilio’s work on the 
imbrication of war and media technologies in War and Cinema and Desert Screen, I 
stumbled on Leveson’s analysis, which attempts to disentangle the human and machine 
failures that led to the accident. According to Leveson’s paper, “Analysis of a Friendly 
Fire Accident using a Systems Model of Accidents,” during a fighter sweep to “sanitize” 
the NFZ (no-fly zone) in Northern Iraq during Operation Provide Comfort, “the lead F-15 
picked up hits on its instruments indicating that it was getting radar returns from a low 
and slow-flying aircraft” (2). The F-15s contacted the unknown aircraft using their “air-
to-air interrogator” to query the IFF (Identify Friend or Foe) code. The scope showed that 
the unknown targets returned no IFF signature. “The F-15 then executed a visual 
identification pass to confirm that the target was hostile. [The lead pilot] pulled out his 
‘goody book’ with aircraft pictures in it, checked the silhouettes, and identified the 
helicopters as Hinds, a type of Russian helicopter flown by Iraqis.” He armed his 
missiles, checked IFF response once more and fired. The wingman followed suit – 
destroying both Blackhawks. 
   22 
 
What is remarkable about this accident – and what Virilio finds remarkable about 
all militarized screens – is that the accident was not an event with a singular place of 
occurrence, but rather it was a distributed event. It occurred within a complex network of 
technological and human-sensory perception. It was an accident of representations and 
simulations – a screen accident of signal confusion, misread blips, and systemic glitches 
– that was inextricably tied to the physical destruction of these lives and these machines. 
This is exactly what Virilio means when he sees the screen as the site of “the passage 
from something material to something that is not” (Live 116). “It’s extraordinary!,” he 
says in Desert Screen, “that the remote image of an object should have an effect on the 
object itself is a very important event in the history of the image” (45). It is a situation in 
which the virtual enacts the actual. Even though this fantasy has become the stuff of 
everyday life in the drone era of warfare, this shift from the screen's pastness (cinema) to 
what Manovich has called the screen's "infinite present" still seems “extraordinary” (99).  
Like Leveson’s analysis, which attempts to reveal the human-machine ecologies 
that enable friendly-fire accidents (and other military events), the equally extraordinary 
McChrystal slide also attempts to render complex systems of imbricated human and 
technological terrains. The slide not only epitomizes the PowerPoint-ization of military 
leadership (already borrowed from American corporate culture), but it also reveals a 
parallel anthropologization of battlespace. Here we have social relations, military tactics, 
technologies, and all strata of institutions – a mess of seemingly incommensurable and 
often tenuous relationships – held together by flowing arrows. The arrows are so hopeful, 
even in their overwhelming crisscrossed paths, because they reduce impossible power 
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differentials and human factors into neat reconciliatory paths. It is a visual facepalm – a 
brilliant picture of the unconscious colonial buffoonery of United States military social 
science in Afghanistan.  
I use these two illustrations not only to picture the ecological and 
phenomenological characteristics of the screenic, but also in part to answer the question 
‘why war?’ War is and has been a computational effort and effect. It is brought about 
through logistics, strategy, and navigation, through moving and combining people and 
things at the right times and into the right spaces. These computational tasks, which were 
once calculated by human computers, are now heavily outsourced to machine computers. 
This assemblage of human, machine, and material is the war machine; and war is the 
spectacular output of this machine. 
Many of our everyday technological systems from the Internet to the computer 
interface to the mouse have their genesis in military research and development and were 
often first deployed in military contexts.11 Yet I remain skeptical of any essentialist 
claims that say media technologies are, by nature, always already militarized. Any 
technology has potential military use and many technologies have genealogical ties to the 
military, but that does not mean they are inherently militarized in every possible 
application of them (and emerging domestic drone applications will play this out). Still, 
most major technological shifts in optics, screens, interwebs, and social networks are, if 
not developed and implemented by the military, adopted by them for weaponized and 
militarized purposes. Clearly, this project shares Virilio's and Kittler’s obsession with war 
                                                
11 For a brief overview of the military history of the computer screen see Manovich, 94-103. 
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machines, which, for them, stands contra to McLuhan’s global village. While I am not 
committed to their shared view of media technologies as inseparable from war, I do find 
that questions of war are increasingly questions of media. I divert from them when they 
claim the inverse as well. I do not agree that questions of media are always questions of 
war. 
•   •   • 
The first chapter, “Photographs & Other Tombs of the Unknown: The Proto-
Screenic Bodies of the War in Vietnam,” looks at several representations of the Vietnam 
War as proto-screenic images, that, while still rooted in media specificity, reveal ways 
media are already enmeshed within each other. Using documentary filmmaker Trinh T. 
Minh-ha’s concept of the ‘superfilm,’ I put into conversation a number of physical 
surfaces that form the connective tissue between machine, body, and image in wartime. 
In particular, this chapter focuses on the desire to mythologize both the photographs and 
the photographers of the Vietnam War. Among the surfaces I attend is Larry Burrows’ 
photographs, which ruminate on the damages of war by entangling cameras, weapons, 
and bodies of war; the comparative visions of Eddie Adams photograph of the 
assassination of a Viet Cong prisoner and Chris Burdens photo documentation of himself 
shooting a pistol at a commercial airline; Michael Herr’s poetic, fetishistic approach to 
the photographs and photographers of war in his memoir Dispatches; and, lastly, the 
literal and cinematic tombs of war – Maya Lin’s polished granite chevron, the Tomb of 
the Unknown Soldier, and the headstones of Sergio Leone’s Sad Hill Cemetery. 
Throughout the chapter I use the work of Roland Barthes, Susan Sontag, and Jacques 
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Lacan to unravel the co-constitutive desires of photography and death. I argue that these 
physical surfaces hold within them not only positions toward and memories of war that 
are literally bound to a material substrate, but also expressions of a fluid, screenic quality 
that, despite their material fixity, overlap and echo each other. 
The second chapter, “Desert Screens & Desert(ed) Bodies: Traversing the Gulf, 
1991” focuses on the first large-scale screenic war: the Persian Gulf War. Beginning with 
one of General Norman Schwarzkopf’s multimedia press-briefings, this chapter 
investigates the pictorial processes through which war bodies both appeared and 
disappeared on the screens of the Gulf War. Through a comparative reading of Paul 
Virilio’s Desert Screen and Jean Baudrillard’s The Gulf War Did Not Take Place as well 
as the more corporeal considerations of Judith Butler’s “Contingent Foundations” and 
Steven Connor’s The Book of Skin, I look at how various images interrelate the screen 
and the skin. These images include Schwarzkopf’s television briefing itself; artist Michal 
Rovner’s Decoy series of reprocessed Polaroid pictures of Gulf War television coverage, 
which highlight the bodies appearing on television as well as the ones that watch 
television; the carbonized flesh of the victims of the Basra Road massacre captured by 
photojournalist Ken Jarecke; the organ-level view of bullets piercing bodies in David O. 
Russell’s film Three Kings (1999); and the vulgar, vulnerable body of the male soldier 
recalled in Anthony Swofford’s memoir Jarhead. I contend that these images express a 
troubled relation to an emerging war image that not only represents war, but also enacts 
it. 
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In the third chapter, “Picture Torture: Abu Ghraib & the Frames of Digital 
Photography,” I focus on the reemergence of the photograph at Abu Ghraib prison. 
Whereas the Vietnam War photographs of the first chapter served as an analog and iconic 
index of war, at Abu Ghraib they were digital entities, differing in many ways from their 
analog predecessors, yet photographs all the same. This chapter explores this 
transformation of the photograph from a piece of the world, continuous with it, into a 
piece of code, discontinuous with the world, digitally stored, and screenically articulated. 
To explore this screenic turn in photography, I draw on Errol Morris’s documentary, 
Standard Operating Procedure (2008), Judith Butler’s critical engagement with Susan 
Sontag’s Regarding the Pain of Others, and Iraqi-born artist Wafaa Bilal’s performance 
piece, Domestic Tension, in which internet chat room visitors could remotely control a 
paintball gun in Bilal’s apartment, aiming and shooting at Bilal as they wished. Morris’s 
film addresses the consequences of photographic digitality and experiments with the 
digital photograph as a new kind of filmic object, Butler revisits Sontag’s changing 
perspective on the uses and abuses of photography in the context of Abu Ghraib, and 
Bilal invites us to consider the linkages between violence, humiliation, and our viewing 
practices. Through these instances, I elucidate various forms of reenactment – the digital 
reenactment of the analog photograph, the filmic torture reenactments in Morris’s 
documentary, the restaging of the act of torture as a tableau for the camera in Abu Ghraib 
prison, and the reenactment of these humiliations in Bilal’s apartment. I argue that 
reenactment is symptomatic of the screenic era, where images are no longer merely the 
evidence of what-has-been, but risk being tacit co-perpetrators of it.  
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In a brief coda, “No Human Occupant: Toward Autonomous Tactical Weapons 
and Anonymous Tactical Media,” I sketch the future of the screenic in the context of 
proliferating drone strikes as well as recent hacks and other media interventions. The 
coda speculates on the future of media theorizing. As continuing advances in machine 
intelligence and robotics shape the current and future mediascapes of war, new forms of 
experience and perception, both digital and analog, affect how we watch, wage, and resist 
war. The interpenetration of humans and machines raises important questions about the 
relations between organic and non-organic life forms, about the nature of perception and 
experience, and about the extensions and limits of human perception – questions that 
belong not only to the discourses of technology, robotics, and media studies, but 
increasingly, I argue, to the core of the humanities. This dissertation examines the screens 
that enact destruction, the screens that record it, and the screens that re-imagine it in order 
to map the ways that the interfaces of war integrate and disintegrate the human 
sensorium. Each chapter rethinks the representational conditions that shape the 
relationship between technological media (the screen) and corporeal media (the human 
sensorium). The aim is to elucidate the emerging screenic modes of visibility and 
disappearance that shape the representation of war within an increasingly consolidated 
media ecology. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Photographs & Other Tombs of the Unknown: The Proto-Screenic 
Bodies of the War in Vietnam 
 
The Superfilm 
On 6 June 1944, Robert Capa, one of the inventors of twentieth-century war 
photojournalism as we know it, boarded one of E Company’s landing crafts and joined 
the American troops headed for Normandy Beach. He was photographing the D-Day 
invasion for Life magazine. Of all the photographs he took on that day only ten distorted 
photographs remain in existence. Most of his photographs were accidentally destroyed by 
a darkroom technician back in London. Unlike his photographs, Capa did survive the 
deadly invasion. Twenty years later, however, in May 1954, he was killed by a landmine 
in the prelude to another war, this time in Southeast Asia. His final rolls of film consisted 
of decidedly mundane images of men walking through a field. The photographs are 
noteworthy only because of the proximity to their taker’s death. According to some 
accounts, the darkroom technician that destroyed those earlier D-Day photographs was a 
young Larry Burrows, who would go on to become one of the most mythologized 
photographers of the Vietnam War. He, like Capa, was also killed in Southeast Asia in a 
helicopter crash in 1971 along with other photographers.  
On the surface, this chapter is about the death of photographers, but more to the 
point, it is about the death (and life) of photographs and in photographs. It is about the 
wounded American romance with the Vietnam War’s photographic record – not so much 
the taking of photographs, but being taken by them.  
   29 
 
The Vietnam War (or the American War as it is known in Vietnam) has the 
tendency, often through the work of pictures, of persisting symbolically in the American 
national psyche as a monumental event. There appears to be a kind of narcissistic 
pleasure that Americans sometimes take in being haunted by the War in Vietnam. Part of 
the pleasure and part of the haunting dwells in the physical surfaces and substrates that 
retain remnants of the war, whether it be the American names inscribed on The Wall or 
the heroic sadness of soldiers and the suffering bodies of Vietnamese “others” made 
iconic by the photojournalistic practices that shaped the aesthetic and ideological 
conditions of perception of the Vietnam War era. This futile woundedness takes shape in 
the fetishized substrates of photographs and monuments, surfaces that are able to mean so 
much because on their own they don’t really mean anything in particular. It is not only 
the lives of these surfaces, but the lives (and deaths) of their creators, like Larry Burrows, 
that get interpellated into this mythologizing machine. This collection of surface and 
substrate helps comprise what filmmaker Trinh T. Minh-ha identified as the ongoing 
“superfilm” of the War in Vietnam: not any single literal film, but a set of screenic and 
narrative practices that fuel the beloved woundedness. 
Toward the end of Trinh’s documentary Sur Name Viet, Given Name Nam, as the 
sounds of helicopters play in the background and photographs of Vietnamese women and 
children flash on the screen, she theorizes the entanglement of the war and its mediated 
image in a voiceover paraphrasing of Baudrillard: 
War is a succession of special effects. The war became film before it was shot. 
Cinema has remained a vast machine of special effects. If the war is the 
continuation of politics by other means, then media images are the continuation of 
war by other means. Immersed in the machinery, part of the special effect, no 
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critical distance. Nothing separates the Vietnam War and the superfilm that was 
made, and continues to be made, about it. It is said that if the Americans lost the 
other, they won this one.  
 
Trinh’s documentary is an attempt to oppose the very superfilm she describes, a 
superfilm that continues to superimpose itself on the present through all modes of 
spectacle, monument, and memory. Sur Name Viet achieves its oppositional stance by 
disrupting Western expectations of documentary film viewing and, in particular, the 
latent and persistent colonial fantasy that, through the filmed testimony of native 
informants, one can (cinematically) come to “know” an-Other as ethnographic object (in 
this case both Vietnam and woman). As Paula Rabinowitz observed in They Must Be 
Represented, the title Surname Viet, Given Name Nam creates a “neat equation of gender 
and national identity,” an equation that the film quickly complicates and upends through 
asynchronous sound, elaborate mise-en-scene, dialectical archival images, and layers of 
translation and reenactment of interview transcripts originally conducted in Vietnamese 
later translated to French then to English and performed by Vietnamese-born American 
women (199). Through these techniques, the film intentionally and effectively “fails” to 
meet the expectations of the Western documentary gaze.   
This chapter, through occasional encounters with Roland Barthes, Susan Sontag, 
Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida, collects and examines various pieces of the 
superfilm and its oppositions, including the work of Burrows, Eddie Adams, Chris 
Burden, Michael Herr, Maya Lin, and even Sergio Leone. I argue that the monumental 
surfaces of these images, sculptures, and tombs, while still rooted in analogue media 
specificity, reveal ways media are already enmeshed within each other. These physical 
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surfaces and texts form the connective tissue between machine, body, and image in 
wartime: the photochemical surfaces of Larry Burrows’ photographs, which ruminate on 
the damages of war by entangling the cameras, weapons, and bodies of war; the 
mythology of the photographer, himself, as it emerged after Burrow’s death in Laos; 
Eddie Adams’ iconic photograph of the moment of death; Michael Herr’s poetic, 
fetisthistic approach to the photographs and photographers of war in his memoir 
Dispatches; and the tombs, memorials and sculptures upon which memory is engraved – 
Maya Lin’s polished granite chevron etched with the names of American dead, the Tomb 
of the Unknown Soldier, and the fictional grave-markers of Sergio Leone’s Sad Hill 
Cemetery. I argue that these physical surfaces hold within them not only positions toward 
and memories of war that are literally bound to a material substrate, but they also hold 
expressions of a fluid, screenic quality that, despite their material fixity, overlap and echo 
one another. 
 
The Death of the Photograph(er): Larry Burrows’ “One Ride with Yankee Papa 13” 
Photographs are monuments to death – always an act of return, troubled duration, 
and obsession, always, as Barthes would say, what has been.12 Barthes encounters what 
he calls “the flat Death” of the photograph as he wrestles with the memory of his dead 
mother while looking at a photograph of her as a young girl.13 He is unable to “get to the 
                                                
12 Roland Barthes, La chambre claire: Note sur la photographie (Paris: Gallimard, 1980) 133; 
Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981) 85.  
Camera Lucida, the English translation of La chambre claire, was published shortly after Barthes’ 
tragic death. Where relevant I will include citations for both the original and the translation. 
13 Barthes, La chambre claire 145; Camera Lucida 92. Part II La chambre claire focuses on the 
“Winter Garden Photograph” (1898), an image of Barthes’ mother, Henriette, as a young girl. She died in 
1977 and much of Barthes ‘notes on photography’ are about death and mourning in respect to his mother. 
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heart of it, to transform it.” The “only way [he] can transform the Photograph is into 
refuse: either the drawer or the wastebasket.” 
At the War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, the ‘remnants’ on 
display are of two species: images and munitions. From the museum proper, if one walks 
through the garden of rusting war machines – carcasses of tanks, planes, and helicopters, 
piles of artillery – one enters a shed devoted to war photography. On display are the 
recognizable and iconic pictures of the Vietnam War era – the naked, girl fleeing napalm 
attack, the execution of a Viet Cong prisoner, the aftermath of the My Lai Massacre.14 
The room honors those photographers killed in action, listing their names and touting 
their “noble” vocation and sacrifice. At the entrance hangs a photograph of a camera that 
had been penetrated by a bullet; an image in which two primary technologies of war (the 
camera and the gun) meet each other. 15 Western visitors to the museum, myself included, 
commonly take pictures of these pictures? What is the appeal? Does it fascinate me 
because it promises to hand over to me some otherwise invisible moment that, by luck 
and skill and magic, was captured in light, emulsified, and made reproducible? Or does it 
simply celebrate the fact the viewer remains alive, ‘here now’ instead of stuck in the 
having-been-there of the photograph?  
                                                
14 Respectively, AP photographer Huynh Cong “Nick” Ut’s Pulitzer prize-winning photograph of 
Kim Phuc; AP photographer Eddie Adams’ picture of police chief General Nguyen Ngoc Loan executing 
Vietcong prisoner Nguyen Van Lem; and U.S. Army photographer Ronald L. Haeberle’s images of the My 
Lai aftermath in 1968. 
15 No information about the camera was provided at the War Remnants Museum, but the image 
also appears on the back cover of Horst Faas and Tim Page, eds. Requiem: By the Photographers Who Died 
in Vietnam and Indochina (New York: Random House, 1997). The caption reads: “the camera of Taizo 
Ichinose, 1996. The bullet-pierced camera that the Japanese photographer used in Vietnam is now 
preserved as part of a family shrine in Kyushu, Japan.” 
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War photographs are difficult documents. Their seductive aura – what Susan 
Sontag called their “challenging beauty” – exposes their often incommensurate artistic 
and documentary ambitions (Regarding 75). Photography’s power to fascinate stems 
from the truth-value it claims for itself. “Photographs furnish evidence,” Sontag argued. 
“In one version of its utility, the camera record incriminates…In another…it justifies” 
(Photography 5).  Despite photography’s evidential mandate and its apparent “certificate 
of presence,” photographs are highly mutable and can be mobilized to articulate any 
number of ideological and political aims (Barthes, Camera 87).16 A photograph’s 
meaning depends completely on the modes of its production, dissemination, and the all-
important caption. The photograph demands that we bear witness to war, but with 
uncertainty as to whether, by looking, we are protesting or collaborating. The scene of 
war photography always trades in what Sontag described as the “shady commerce 
between art and truth” (Photography 6). War photographs create a haunted fascination in 
the viewer because they, themselves, are haunted by their tenuous relationship to war – a 
peculiar economy of shooting. 
This economy emerges in Larry Burrows’ well-known photo essay, “One Ride 
with Yankee Papa 13,” which first appeared in the April 16, 1965 issue of Life 
magazine.17 In it, Burrows accompanies the crew of the UH-34 helicopter YP13 on a 
                                                
16 Barthes, La chambre claire 135. (Throughout this section, when relevant, I will also provide 
footnoted citation for the original French text).  
17 Larry Burrows, “One Ride with Yankee Papa 13,” Life (16 April 1965: 24 – 34C). 
Larry Burrows (1926-1971), a British-born photographer, began working at Life’s London office 
in 1942, during the blitz, as a photo lab assistant. He went to Vietnam in 1962 and became the signature 
photographer of the Vietnam War. See photographic retrospectives of Vietnam War including David 
Halberstam, introduction, Vietnam, by Larry Burrows (New York: Knopf, 2002) and Horst Faas and Tim 
Page, eds. Requiem: By the Photographers Who Died in Vietnam and Indochina (New York: Random 
House, 1997). 
   34 
 
harrowing airlift mission outside of Da Nang, South Vietnam. The images of the 21-year-
old crew chief Marine Lance Corporal James Farley and his men as they encounter the 
horrific violence and death of that day are awful – and irresistible.  
On its surface, this photo essay contains a predictable visual and textual narrative 
logic depicting how young American men are broken by war. “All is Shipshape” early in 
the essay where we see the jocular war boys, Farley and his gunner, Hoilien, goofing 
around Da Nang’s markets while on liberty. The next day, just before the mission 
commences, Farley dons his flight helmet with the heroic innocence of a 1950s ‘all-
American’ high school football portrait. The mission: insert ARVN (Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam) troops into a strike zone 20 miles out of Da Nang. The narrative 
warns us that these Marines, who, just the day before, were in such “high spirits,” are 
now “caught up in the business of war, on a trip from which they’d return much older.” 
On the following page the bullets begin to fly as we learn that this is no “milk run.” The 
landing zone is ‘hot.’ YP13’s sister ship, YP3, goes down. Farley and his crew set down 
next to the damaged helicopter and try to help. Under heavy fire, Burrows follows Farley 
as he tries to rescue the pilot. “Should I try to find another foothold alongside Farley and 
help him lift the pilot out?” Burrows wonders. Farley decides that the pilot is dead and 
returns to his own ship, having already rescued the badly wounded co-pilot, 1st Lt. James 
Magel, and gunner, Sgt. Billie Owens. (The pilot, it turns out, was still alive and was 
rescued by another helicopter). Farley and Hoilien tend to the wounded, but Magel dies 
on the bay floor of the UH-34. In one photograph Farley stands over the Magel’s 
bloodstained body with a look of intense desperation and shock. Here Life editors altered 
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the picture to hide the face of death. In the original image, one of Magel’s glazed-over 
eyes ‘looks’ at the camera. As it appeared in Life, his flight vest covers his face. 
The final pages depict Farley’s response to the traumatic events. The final image 
shows Farley in a supply shack where he collapses in anguish onto wooden crates. The 
jovial Marine from a few pages back is now crushed under the weight of what he had 
witnessed. This final image, in many ways, marked the transfer of that weight onto an 
American public who, in 1965, still thought that the burden of the war was light. 
Death, in this photo-narrative, is the transformative event taking Farley from 
boyhood to manhood. Photographic death is the memory and monument of this 
transformation. When life “slips away” under the watchful lens of the camera, the 
headline informs us it is “Not for a Long, Long Time Forgotten.” One could read so 
many things from this photo-narrative: the construction of the somber yet heroic 
masculinity of war; the perversity that attends viewing death and injury; the invasive 
voyeurism of sharing in Farley’s private anguish (to which Burrows himself had 
reservation, saying, “And so often I wonder whether it is my right to capitalize as I feel, 
so often, on the grief of others”); how photography purports to provide evidence as it 
simultaneously capitalizes on its ability to aestheticize violence; how photography frames 
memory under the regime of an endlessly reproducible instant that should have otherwise 
passed un-captured like so many other instants; or how photographic death is softened by 
editorial choices in the interest of ‘good taste’ (Faas 98). 18  
                                                
18 Cited in Horst Faas and Tim Page, eds. Requiem: By the Photographers Who Died in Vietnam 
and Indochina (New York: Random House, 1997) 98. Originally spoken by Burrows on the BBC film 
Beautiful Beautiful (1969). 
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All these aspects could be expanded upon, but I want to take up another thread. 
Read in another way, this photo essay is a meditation on shooting. The problem of 
shooting – always a preoccupation of the camera at war – takes precedence in Burrows’ 
work. Rather than look at those images that literally depict death, I want to instead return 
to an image that appears earlier in the photo essay. I do this in part because the explicit 
images of violence and death can be sadly routine and their auratic power is depleted by 
our own habituation to depictions of wartime death. The image appearing narratively 
before everything falls apart may have more to tell us about the symbolic and material 
propinquities of the camera and the gun. 
In one shot, Burrows mounts a motorized Nikon with a 21mm lens on the end of 
Farley’s M-60 machine gun, positioning it to face back toward the helicopter. Burrows 
operates the camera from remote control. Swiveling with the gun barrel as Farley shoots 
the M-60 at the Viet Cong, Burrows’ camera shoots back at Farley. It contains no 
‘graphic’ elements of violent death – no blood and no corpses. However, it does ‘point’ 
(so to speak) toward photographic death and the spectator’s precarious encounter with its 
alterity. 
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The punctum of this photograph – if we venture into Barthesian territory – 
involves Burrows himself, the photographer. It could be the fingers we see on the upper 
right-hand side of the frame. Or it could be the contraption of the shot (Burrows’ own 
inventive gadgetry). It involves the invisible presence of the photographer – of Burrows 
himself. Although unseen, we know he is concealed somewhere in the frame, hiding. 
This concealed presence is not just any photographic ghost; it is the author himself. The 
caption informs us that he conceals himself behind Farley in the cramped bay of the UH-
34 leaving the viewer to plumb the dark spaces of the photograph for a peek at Burrows. 
That Burrows is concealed in his own photograph – that, in essence, he is on the wrong 
side of the camera – upsets the symbolic order of the photograph. It destabilizes Barthes’ 
Figure 3. One Ride With Yankee Papa 13. © Larry Burrows. Licensed through Getty Images. 
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triadic structure of photography – the Operator (Burrows) conceals himself in the 
Spectrum (Farley and scene), leaving the Spectator (us) seemingly alone on the other side 
of the apparatus (9-10).19 
Barthes defined the photographic punctum as that accident of the photograph that 
“pricks” or “wounds” the viewer; that aspect which, according to Barthes, is “poignant to 
me” (27).20  It could be a missing shoe, a bandaged finger, or a pearl necklace. Barthes 
contrasts the punctum with the studium, which, he says, “is of the order of liking, not of 
loving” (27). The studium “mobilizes a half desire” (27) The studium is an encounter with 
the intentions of the Operator; the punctum is an accident of the photograph. In this photo 
– taken by remote control – intention and accident collude. The shot is both intricately set 
up and wholly contingent on the mechanism. Here, the punctum closely follows the 
studium. Yes, we encounter the intentions of the Operator (the studium), but we also 
encounter the Operator as photographic object, or at least his concealed presence (for me, 
the punctum).  
One wonders if Barthes foresaw the double entendre that appears in the English 
translation of Camera Lucida. He continuously describes the punctum as the ‘prick’ of 
the image – that which ‘pricks’ the viewer.21 If we consider the more vulgar colloquial 
use of this word, we find a supplemental aspect of the photographic desire. Looking at 
images of injury, anguish, and death fosters a desire that is not only maddening, but also 
                                                
19 Barthes, La chambre claire 22 - 24. 
20 The full discussion of punctum and stadium is found in Barthes, La chambre claire 47-96; 
Camera Lucida 25-60. 
21 “Pricks me” appears first as a translation of “me point” (La chambre claire 49) and later in 
quotation marks as the translation of Barthes’ word-play, “me ‘poindre’” (poindre: to burgeon; to bud) 
(79). The word (une) piqûre (49) is translated as “sting” but also means “bite” and “prick.” 
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perverse. As Sontag noted, we want our photographers to be “spies in the house of love 
and death” (Regarding 55). In these images the punctum is what ‘arouses’ our desire, 
even our love, of that which should not be desired or loved – war, injury, death. 
Photographic death carries this perversely erotic quality, (not far removed from the 
pornographic ‘death’ – the money shot). The image can doubly ‘prick’ the viewer. The 
viewer is both wounded and fucked in the seductive economy of the photograph. This 
desire takes on both feminine and masculine symbolic currency: the prick as that which 
penetrates, and the prick as the wound itself. We might even consider how this economy 
is reciprocal – just what kind of ‘pricking’ is perpetrated by the spectator back toward the 
image? 
This wounding and wounded spectatorial subjectivity leads us back to the 
question of shooting – that homology between the camera and the gun. The gadgetry 
behind this shot is not simply a whimsical coincidence of shooting. Rather, it brings into 
sharp focus the material and semiotic propinquity war photography has with the war 
machine itself. In this image the precarious intimacy of the camera and the gun is fully 
exposed. Burrows’ camera is only three inches from the muzzle (after 11 missions the 
lens shook loose and fell to its own ‘death’). More than just physical proximity, this set-
up points to other intimacies of the camera and the gun. The war camera always has had 
an affinity for the gun. The gun is, after all, a key player in the Spectrum on offer to the 
camera. In a way, the camera has always wanted to shoot and the gun has always wanted 
to see. They are mechanical relatives. They both take at the level of the instant. They 
share a vocabulary. They trade in apertures and gauges. The image pines after the 
   40 
 
certainty of the bullet, and the bullet wants the duration of the image. Burrows’ desire to 
put the camera with the gun is no accident or trick. His images exemplify the opto-centric 
fetishism endemic to both war and image. Their cooperation, albeit tentative, traps the 
spectator within a mode of perception, more so, an epistemology, wholly invested in 
shooting. In other words, it structures a way of seeing that is always aiming.  
Burrows’ images foreshadow what we saw only fleetingly in the Persian Gulf 
War. There in the Gulf, the guns could finally see for themselves. The weapons 
themselves did the reporting. The spectator’s knowing-through and being-toward the 
image was unified with his knowing- and being-toward war. In the Gulf, images were 
munitions and munitions were cameras. The televisual madness and the electromagnetic 
orgy of images and weaponry created a regime of always already militarized perception. 
The question is whether Burrows’ camera, in its attachment to the gun, foretells what was 
to come or resists it. The weapons that shoot both images and munitions outward, at the 
enemy ‘Other,’ structure seeing as always already targeting – an act of aiming. Burrows’ 
camera, however, is always looking back at the shooter. What is the significance of this 
shooting-back-at? How does it speak to the always already aiming and armed gaze on 
offer? Burrows’ ‘trick’ perspective on shooting asks these questions of our visual 
practices. Burrows’ images, like all war images, challenge the interpretive subjectivity of 
the viewer and risk co-option into the war machine – a machine that, in its will to 
militarize perception and to monopolize vision, constantly threatens to turn the camera 
into an implement of war and images into munitions. The question becomes: How do we 
see without shooting? 
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The economy of shooting – an economy of death – extends beyond the 
photograph. These confluences between the camera and the gun, images and munitions, 
extend to the photographers themselves. In addition to his photographs, Burrows himself 
became a kind of icon. As part of the ideological work of war photographs, the war 
photographer himself is also mythologized. In the introduction to Larry Burrows: 
Compassionate Photographer, Ralph Graves’s gushingly praises Burrows like a character 
from The Manchurian Candidate: “I do not think it is demeaning to any other 
photographer in the world for me to say that Larry Burrows was the single bravest and 
most dedicated war photographer I know of.” He goes on to write, “Despite the risks he 
took to get his pictures, he was no hell-for-leather, gung-ho photographer. He was a 
deeply compassionate and thoughtful man, always conscious that he was working on the 
rim of tragedy.” Martha Rosler, in her 1981 talk titled “The ‘Look’ of War Photography” 
takes Graves to task. She argues that the enduring myth of compassion that Graves 
sustains is an insidious element that is meant to elide the fact that war photography and 
the war photographer represent a troubling “ideological stance to the third world.” In this 
case, Burrows represents the kind of condescending compassion that the West still 
reserves for the Global South, wherein the word compassion is code for having a vague 
emotional experience that validates our own privilege – a kind of satisfying feeling-bad 
about the suffering of others. Caroline Brothers echoes Rosler’s sentiment when she says 
of the war photograph that “The evidence it provides, like all images of injury and death, 
has little to do with its particular contents, or with any notion of photographic truth; it 
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bears witness instead to the ideological currents which produced it and the collective 
imagination it inflected and to which it contributed” (emphasis mine) (185).  
Upon returning from the Yankee Papa mission the squadron commander awarded 
Burrows his airmen’s wings for courage under fire. In 1971, along with other legendary 
photographers Henri Huet, Kent Potter, and Keizaburo Shimamoto, Burrows was shot 
down while flying over Laos in a helicopter (Faas 268-271). They all died; left to 
mythmaking.  
As spectators, though, we always survive photographic death. That is the perverse 
‘prick’ of our photographic desire. Looking at the what-has-been of the photograph 
reifies our status as the what-is. What a strange relief. After all this shooting we are the 
only ones left. And we are left looking. In a sense, we are left shooting. This is the 
catastrophe of the photograph. 
 
The Inscrutable Immutable, or Roland Barthes & “The Photographic Paradox” 
Photographs owe their existence to a reality that once took place before a camera 
lens and a kernel of this reality persists in the photograph – “the referent adheres” 
(Barthes, Camera 6). Therefore, photographs depend on language to frame them, tame 
them, and to render them legible, which is to say, for all that is held in the photograph, 
more is withheld. By “withheld,” I am not necessarily referring, spatially, to all that exists 
outside the frame of the photograph, or, temporally, to everything that happens before 
and after the photograph is taken. I am not referring to what has been cropped out, but 
rather to what crop up. I speak of that which evades us but remains there, in the 
photograph, nonetheless. This simultaneity of the assimilable and the unassimilable in the 
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photograph plays between the sayable and seeable, the verbal and visual, the visible and 
invisible and the nameable and un-nameable that we encounter in face of the photograph. 
Given the photograph’s bond with contingency, photography cannot signify except by 
assuming a mask. For Barthes, (riffing on Marshall McLuhan’s famous maxim?), “the 
mask is the meaning” (Camera 34).  
This is, in part, what Barthes calls the “photographic paradox”: “the co-existence 
of two messages, the one without a code (the photographic analogue), the other with a 
code (the ‘art’, or the treatment, or the ‘writing’, or the rhetoric, of the photograph)” 
(“Message” 19). The “message without a code” is the denoted message – “the scene 
itself, the literal reality” (17). The “analogical plenitude” of the denoted message is so 
great that, in one sense, the photograph is unreadable. The attempt to read the 
photograph, then, is a move to a “second-order message” – the connoted message, which 
is always incomplete and can only “signify something different to what is shown” (17).  
I align the notion of capture with the procedures of connotation. Capture goes 
beyond the mechanism of the camera to include all the levels at which the photograph is 
produced. What remains beyond this apparatus of capture is of the denoted order. To the 
extent that the photograph captures something, it can be put toward knowledge; to the 
extent that an “intractable reality” persists in the photograph, it remains mystical and 
mythical in its denoted message (Camera 119). To the extent that we are able to possess 
– to take hold of – a photographic object, we enact the connoted order; to the extent that 
the photograph object possesses us, we encounter the denoted message. Capture is a form 
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of mastery; evasion is the sign of loss. The denotative order is the raw record; the 
connotative order stabilizes it into an archive-able record.  
Thus photography represents a mode of perception that simultaneously captures 
what would otherwise escape our view and, yet, escapes our capture, which is to say that 
it emulsifies and reifies a fleeting instant (that which would have otherwise escaped our 
view were it not for the work of the camera) and yet its indelible link to that past instant, 
to the that-has-been – the presence of the contingent past – remains unrepresentable. 
Photographs need language and yet are so resistant to it.  
This is what makes photographs a dumbfounding thing to talk about. They are 
representations bound to their referent. Like Barthes, Susan Sontag notes this apparition 
of the real: photographs “do not seem to be statements about the world so much as pieces 
of it” (Photography 4). Photographs are both a record of the event and a piece of the 
event. This characteristic is the very thing thought to be “under threat” with the rise of 
digital photography. However, whether digital or analog, this process of capture goes 
beyond the camera’s mechanism; it includes all of the discursive apparatus we bring to 
bear on the photograph. All the cultural and symbolic associations that the photograph 
awakens in the spectator, all the intentions of the photographer, and all the captions that 
are deployed to further capture the image, help to render it knowable, assimilable, and 
consumable. The caption shores up the excess in the photograph; it supplements the 
photograph with language in order to render it legible. Yet an excess remains – that 
extension of the real, that which remains unnamable, that ‘prick,’ that thing that continues 
to wound, scratch, and cut the beholder.  
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The contingency of the photograph – the capturing of what would otherwise 
escape and the escaping of what is captured – as Mary Ann Doane observes, is both 
“threat and lure” and conjures in the spectator both “fascination and anxiety” (144). This 
fascination and anxiety stems from the presence of absence in the photograph – the 
reality that was once present remains as a death mask in the photograph. Sontag describes 
it as both “a pseudo-presence and a token of absence” (Photography 16).  
Of course, to even talk of the denoted order of the photograph is always already of 
the connoted order. The denotative does not exist as such; it persists. Or as W.J.T. 
Mitchell puts it, “what we take it to represent is never free from what we take it to mean” 
(Picture Theory 284). This is to say that the two orders of the photographic message can 
be differentiated through language, but not disentangled. 
Michael Herr perceives this photographic paradox amid all the other paradoxes of 
the Vietnam War. In Dispatches, he recounts his experience as a reporter in a war he 
refers to as the “Inscrutable Immutable” (56). As he reflects on the violence and death he 
has witnessed in Vietnam, he recalls his childhood encounter with war photographs in 
Life: “You know how it is, you want to look and you don’t want to look…Even when the 
picture was sharp and cleanly defined, something wasn’t clear at all, something repressed 
that monitored the images and withheld their essential information” (18). Like the war 
itself, these photographs of violence appear to Herr as the Inscrutable Immutable – that 
tinge of the real. Sontag, too, in her reflections on the photography of violence and the 
violence of photography notes the tinge: “There is the satisfaction of being able to look at 
the image without flinching. There is the pleasure of flinching” (Regarding 41). 
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The violence of photography rests in the photographic paradox and the 
paradoxical reactions it engenders. It arises out of the contingency of the photograph. 
One kind of violence proceeds from capture, a kind of targeting that renders the 
photographic object legible – that which enables the satisfactions of not flinching. The 
other kind of violence arises out of the unknown of the photograph, the unassimilable, the 
inscrutable, and the unnamable, which invites the pleasures of flinching. The former is 
the violence that the photograph invites the beholder to perpetrate: its enabling of our 
desire to possess, to be captivated, and to be shocked. The latter is the violence the 
photograph perpetrates on the viewer – its capacity to wound. 
Violence lurks on all sides of photography – in taking the photograph, in looking 
at the photograph, and in loving the photograph. This is true of any photograph. What 
amplifies the danger of violence for Herr and Sontag is that not only are they 
encountering the violence of pictures, they are also looking at pictures of violence. These 
types of photographs layer violence upon violence, shifting and blurring figurative and 
literal violence. 
Shooting Shooting: Eddie Adams & Chris Burden in the Moment of Capture 
On February 1, 1968, Nguyen Ngoc shot Nguyen Van Lam in the head, point 
blank. And, on January 5, 1973, Chris Burden shot at a Boeing 747 commercial jetliner 
as it flew overhead.  
These moments might have passed unnoticed, except they were photographed. 
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Figure 4. Execution of a Vietcong Prisoner. © Eddie Adams / Associated Press  
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On the previous page: Eddie Adams’ iconic, Pulitzer prize-winning photograph 
depicting the Republic of Vietnam police chief General Nguyen Ngoc executing Nguyen 
Van Lam, a Vietcong prisoner on the streets of Saigon during the Tet Offensive. 
On this page: Chris Burden’s 747, the photographic record of his performance art 
piece. The caption reads: “LAX, January 5, 1973. Los Angeles, California. At about 8am 
at a beach near the Los Angeles International Airport, I fired several shots with a pistol at 
a Boeing 747.” 
Figure 5. 747. © Chris Burden. Courtesy Gagosian Gallery. 
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Adams’ photograph immediately grabs hold of you. It induces a captive viewer. It 
raises a morbid curiosity because we see in it the very boundary between the living and 
the dead rendered brutally and beautifully. The image causes us to flinch and even to find 
the flinching pleasurable. There is another flinch, too: the flinch of guilt. The I-need-to-
look-at-this is policed by the I-should-not-look-at-this. The scene is too perverse and 
exploitative and yet too irresistible. Sontag observes of this image that “one can gaze at 
these faces for a long time and not come to the end of the mystery, and the indecency, of 
such co-spectatorship” (60). Another layer of guilt arises out of the aesthetic pleasure we 
might derive from the photograph. The photograph may awaken our outrage or our 
revulsion to war and violence, but the photograph itself does not protest the scene. It 
records it, embraces it.  
This picture is iconic in part because it can be mobilized again and again to speak 
to the atrocities of war. It is also specific insofar as it is linked to a particular war – the 
Vietnam War. It seems to both embody the contradictions of that war and all war in one 
glance. The Inscrutable Immutable on display. Perhaps it even embodies all the tumult of 
1968 or all the sins of colonial imperialism. It depends on how far we want it to connote.  
Burden’s photograph, even more so, opens itself up to all kinds of connotations. 
His photograph is not horrifying like Adams’, but rather subtly terrifying. It looks like a 
movie poster for a 1970s political thriller – like a still from Three Days of the Condor or 
The Parallax View. That could be Warren Beatty there, in a desperate battle with the 
clandestine powers that be – one man against the system. Without the caption, though, I 
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might have assumed he was pointing a finger, not a gun, at the airplane, perhaps 
celebrating the wonders of aviation. Look! There it is!  
But the idea that he is shooting at the plane is where the image derives its 
provocation. The chance of catastrophe lurks in the image. Its matter-of-fact caption only 
creates more questions. Is he close enough to actually hit the plane? Or is it too far away? 
Is this a picture of criminal/artistic aggression? Or an expression of futility in face of the 
machine? The image is ripe for associations. In 1973: a commentary on the nightmare of 
the Vietnam War. Now: 9/11’s terrifying airplanes.  
Adams’ photograph bears witness to violence whereas Burden’s photograph 
suggests violence. Both enable a kind of violence of perception, but they do so in 
different ways and to different ends. Their relation to violence varies because their 
relation to contingency varies, which is to say their connotative procedures (their 
methods of capture) differ greatly. Adams’ photograph records a chance encounter with a 
violent event – the execution of a prisoner. Burden’s photograph records a moment of 
performance that suggests a kind of violence – shooting at an airplane. In Adams’ 
photograph the violence is immediate, immanent, nearly palpable. The violence in 
Burden’s photograph, however, lurks as a threatening potentiality, a possibility – it could 
be catastrophic.  
Not only do the two photographs document different kinds of events, they do so 
under opposing auspices. Adams’ photo reaches us under the guise of journalism and its 
guarantees: accuracy, newsworthiness, and objectivity. We look upon the horrific 
brutality because the photograph purports to say something, to represent something, 
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about war – it reports. Burden’s photograph comes to us as an artistic statement. The 
photograph itself, in fact, is not the art piece, but rather a piece of the art. The art object is 
Burden’s act of shooting at the 747 – the photograph stands as proof of the act. Adams’ 
photograph asks us to engage the scene; Burden’s photograph asks us to engage the artist.  
Their many differences aside, these photographs share the trait of double 
shooting: the camera shooting at the shooting gun. The camera invites comparison with 
the gun and the image invites comparison with the bullet. In most contexts the 
comparison is strictly metaphorical and tends to hyperbolize the violence of photography. 
After all, while both technologies shoot, only one has the capacity to kill, which leads 
Sontag to conclude that “the ominous metaphor seems to be all bluff” (Photography 14). 
Despite the bluff, though, even she continues to invoke the camera/gun metaphor. “[A]t 
the farthest reaches of the metaphor,” she argues, the camera can “assassinate” (13) and 
that insofar as photography is a means of symbolic possession, shooting a camera is a 
kind of “soft murder” (15). She maintains a distinction between the symbolic violence of 
photography and the real violence of the gun, but implies through her metaphors that the 
barrier between them is not absolute. Sontag’s weaponization of the camera is not 
specifically linked to guns, however, but to any weapon of aggression. Referring to Diane 
Arbus’s own camera/weapon fantasy, for example, Sontag declares that “to understand 
the camera as a weapon of aggression, implies there will be casualties” (39). This 
implication of casualties turns her thoughts toward the scene of war. She observes that 
“[o]nly war photography combines voyeurism and danger.” This combination is linked to 
both symbolic and real violence, the violence of voyeurism and the violence of warfare.  
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The photographs of Adams and Burden have gun fantasies. In each photograph 
the gun speaks to the camera and the camera speaks to gun. This is a conversation 
between two apparatuses of capture. The camera lens takes in order to leave (a record, an 
index) and the bullet leaves the gun in order to take (life, limb). The former is a 
technology of introception and the latter is one of projection. Between the two is the 
exchange of symbolic and real violence. The power of Adams’ and Burden’s pictures 
derives in part from their proximity to this other kind of shooting. Whenever the shutter 
and the bullet coincide, the resultant photograph assumes a special status. Adams’ 
photograph, in particular, achieves iconic status because the camera executes time in the 
very same instant that the General executes Lam. The photograph’s mode of operation is 
to capture the elusive and singular moment – a slice of time – and render it permanently 
fixed and static. What makes Adam’s photograph special is that it captures two 
singularities that elude human perception: a speeding bullet and the moment of human 
death. 
Bullets do not actually appear to our eyes in either Adams’ or Burden’s 
photograph, but we assume they are there. In Burden’s photo we assume it because the 
caption tells us that he is shooting at the 747, in Adams’ photo we see its effects – the 
index of the bullet in Lam’s body. Because the camera is in the business of capturing 
contingency, it is not surprising that it has a fascination with the bullet. A whole genre of 
photography is devoted to capturing the elusive bullet. In 1887, Ernst Mach first captured 
the bullet in a shadowgraph. In 1964, Harold Edgerton captured a bullet traversing 
through an apple using his stroboscopic method of photography. Like Eadweard 
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Muybridge’s chronophotographic studies of motion, Mach and Edgerton made it possible 
to see what the naked eye could not. These kinds of photographs purport to advance 
scientific knowledge about movement, aerodynamics, and not least, about photographic 
technologies. They render the imperceptible world legible in light and thus on some level 
master the contingency bound to the bullet. In targeting that which targets, they 
anesthetize and aestheticize the bullet. They render the shock waves of a bullet more 
absorbable by paralyzing them in a photographic image for scientific study and aesthetic 
enjoyment.  
The shock waves in Adams’ photograph are a source of fascination too, but not 
like those in Mach and Edgerton. Here the bullet is not traversing empty space in a 
laboratory, or piercing an inanimate object like an apple. Rather, it is piercing human 
flesh in the political space of war with the aim of taking life. His photograph stands 
among other iconic photographs that capture the bullet’s deathblow, most notably Robert 
Capa’s “Loyalist Militiaman at the Moment of Death, Cerro Muriano, Sept 5, 1936” 
a.k.a. the Falling Soldier, which was widely distributed during and after the Spanish Civil 
War, or the photograph depicting the assassination of Lee Harvey Oswald by Jack Ruby 
in 1963. In these photographs we see the effect of the bullet. We read the bullet in the 
contortions of the body it penetrates. These photographs take us to the limits of 
representability. For this reason they are iconic. What they capture captures us. They 
capture the ultimate event (death) under violent circumstances and thus mobilize both the 
spectator’s revulsion to violence and fascination with it, and therefore, they alert the 
spectator to his/her own violence – the violence that attends the looking at these 
   54 
 
photographs – the violence of seeing the ultimate event as an aesthetic object. The cruelty 
being perpetrated in the elsewhere of the photograph is tempered by the future-anterior 
cruelty of voyeuristically spying on what-will-have-been, taking it in as an aesthetic 
pleasure. The photograph makes the throes of death seem like a brutal, still ballet.  
The powerful simultaneity between the shutter of the camera snapping and the 
shudder of the body dying achieves iconic status only if it really happened. For many 
years controversy surrounded Capa’s Falling Soldier because there was evidence that it 
was staged. Photographic detectives enlarged and enhanced and compared and looked 
and looked for the proof of its occurrence. Why? Because without the real death event the 
photograph is just another photograph. In fact, it is worse because it deflates the 
credibility that we like photographs to have. Such tricks – such stagings and doctorings – 
“utilize the special credibility of the photograph,” Barthes observes, “in order to pass off 
as merely denoted a message which is in reality heavily connoted” (“Message” 21). 
Especially in depictions of death, we want to imagine we encounter the thing itself – pure 
denotation. To stage death violates the most basic illusion of the photograph. Such 
stagings are particularly disconcerting because they utilize the photograph’s own special 
relation to death. 
Mary Ann Doane, in a discussion of Thomas Edison’s “execution films,” wonders 
if perhaps death functions as a kind of cinematic Ur-event because it appears as the zero 
degree of meaning, its evacuation.22 With death we are suddenly confronted with pure 
                                                
22 Although Doane is addressing cinema here, in speaking of contingency, she is also addressing 
the photographic base of cinema. See also Chris Kamerbeek’s brilliant reading of Thomas A. Edison’s 
1903 film “Executing of an Elephant” in his dissertation “The Ghost and the Corpse: Figuring the 
Mind/Brain Complex at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,” (U of Minnesota, 2010).  
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event, pure contingency, what ought to be inaccessible to representation (hence the 
various social and legal bans against direct, nonfictional filming of death) (164).23  
In an apparatus bound to contingency, pure contingency (death) is the big catch. 
Barthes sees death at the heart of every photograph. For him every photographed subject 
is haunted by the he-is-going-to-die (96). Even if we know the subject to still be alive or 
to be already dead in historical time, Barthes argues, in photographic time, the subject of 
the photograph is perpetually going-to-die. Barthes posits that “every photograph is this 
catastrophe,” but the photograph he uses to illustrate the point is, interestingly, linked to 
execution: 
 
In 1895, young Lewis Payne tried to assassinate Secretary of State W. H. Seward. 
Alexander Gardner photographed him in his cell, where he was waiting to be 
hanged […] I read with horror an anterior future of which death is at stake. By 
giving me the absolute past of the pose […], the photograph tells me death in the 
future (96). 
 
Execution photographs like Eddie Adams’ photo collapse the space between he-
is-going-to-die and he-is-already-dead into a single view, thus showing us the essence of 
photography in the essence of human finitude. 
For theorists like Paul Virilio and Friedrich Kittler cameras do execute. The 
relation between the camera and gun, for them, is not just a metaphor. Both of them see a 
deep level of cooperation and collusion between photographic image and warfare.24 In 
the context of war, the difference in shooting a camera and shooting a gun is less 
                                                
23 It is interesting to note that there is NBC TV news footage of both the execution of Nguyen Van 
Lam and of the assassination of Lee Harvey Oswald. While the still photographs remain iconic, the moving 
footage remains culturally taboo. 
24 Virilio and Kittler focus almost entirely on film and cinema, but, like Doane, maintain the 
photograph as the base element. Virilio, moreover, shifts freely between all kinds of images and image-
machines. 
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discernable because, insofar as it is part of the war machine, the camera is an instrument 
of surveillance, reconnaissance, and sighting. Cameras function to locate targets in space 
and time, and this serves well the weapons that do the same. In these instances images are 
just one weapon among many, which leads Virilio to posit that, in war, “the function of 
the weapon is the function of the eye” (3).25 As more cameras get placed on more 
weapons, Virilio argues that “[t]he projectile’s image and the images’ projectile” begin to 
“form a single composite” (83). So to observe that “[t]he industrial production of 
repeating guns and automatic weapons was thus followed by the innovation of repeating 
images” (Virilio 4), or that “[t]he history of the movie camera […] coincides with the 
history of automatic weapons” – that “the transport of pictures only repeats the transport 
of bullets” (Kittler 124), is not simply to observe a historical coincidence, but to observe 
the logic of a militarized mode of perception. Whereas Kittler and Virilio warn of this 
mode of perception, Ernst Jünger – the preeminent connoisseur of war as aesthetic 
experience – celebrates the fact that “it is the same intelligence, whose weapons of 
annihilation can locate the enemy to the exact second and meter that labors to preserve 
the great historical event in fine detail” (“War” 24). For him, the camera “eye registers 
just as well a bullet in midair or the moment in which a man is torn apart by an 
explosion” (“Photography” 208). 
However, there is a difference between cameras that do the work of war and those 
that document war, even if that difference is blurred. Adams’ camera is not helping to fire 
the gun, it is not sighting for the gun, but rather, it is citing the violence of it. The 
                                                
25 This has never been truer than in the recent drone era. See essays by Virilio, Harun Farocki, and 
others in the excellent collection Serious Games: War/Media/Art (Hatje Cantz, 2011). See also Farocki’s 
2011 installation at MoMA, Images of War (at a Distance).  
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violence implicit in the act of taking a picture stems from the fact that it does not partake 
in the violence it captures – it stems from its non-intervention in the scene, from its cold 
detachment. Its violence is that it stands apart, voyeuristically, and thus tacitly agrees to 
the violence being perpetrated. When preying on violence, the camera always says “yes” 
to it.  
Still, Adams feels that his camera has killed. He regrets the saying yes of his 
camera. For him the idea that the camera is a predatory weapon is very real. In 2001, he 
eulogized General Loan in TIME. To Adams, the General was a war hero whose life was 
destroyed by the Pulitzer winning photograph: “The general killed the Viet Cong; I killed 
the general with my camera. Still photographs are the most powerful weapons in the 
world. People believe them; but photographs do lie, even without manipulation. They are 
only half-truths”.26 
With his camera, Adams exploited a target of opportunity. For Samuel Weber this 
is the crucial similarity between seeing-machines and killing-machines. They are 
technologies designed to overcome distance and assimilate alterity (Weber 6). Weber 
sees the new technologies of seeing and shooting as couched in a lineage of the West’s 
optocentric episteme. He reads the concept of the target-as-knowledge from Odysseus’ 
bow to Freud’s drives to Rumsfeld’s ‘singular strikes.’ Targeting, Weber argues, is “a 
means of overcoming spatial and temporal dislocation, especially with respect to human 
finitude” (12). Because ‘target’ is both a noun and a verb, “the goal is designated by the 
same word as the attempt to reach it” (viii) – it is both object and desire. A targeting 
                                                
26 Time, 24 June 2001.It is interesting, too, that even in 2001, Adams refuses to see the victim. To 
Adams, Lam is still “the Viet Cong” – an enemy other, an anonymous target of the camera and the gun. 
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mode of perception always takes place at a safe and privileged distance – one that seeks 
to conquer and master. It aims to capture. For Virilio, this is the essence of the camera, 
which cultivates an always-already targeting perception. Benjamin, too, noted this 
tendency at work in the technology of the camera: “Everyday the urge grows stronger to 
get hold of an object at close range in an image” (“Work of Art” 105). This urge to get-
hold-of, for Weber, is imbued with violence: “the act of targeting is an act of violence 
even before any shot is fired. It is this act of violence that registers as ‘guilt’ – which 
consists in the denial of indebtedness to an alterity without which nothing could be 
identified, no aim taken, no target hit” (105). 
This is the violence that structures taking and looking at photographs. In taking 
and looking at pictures we are not always shooting, but we always aim. 
 
Triggers of Desire: The Lacan Can & the Tuché of the Photograph 
Of all the innumerable switches, buttons, and triggers that activate the 
technologies of modernity, that activate the fascination and anxiety that attend these 
technologies, and that activate a targeting mode of perception, Walter Benjamin argues 
that “the ‘snapping’ of the photographer has had the greatest consequences.” “A touch of 
the finger,” he says, “now sufficed to fix an event for an unlimited period of time. The 
camera gave the moment a posthumous shock, as it were” (“Motifs” 174-175).  
To Barthes’ ears, this snapping is soothing. “For me,” he says, “the 
Photographer’s organ is not his eye (which terrifies me) but his finger: what is linked to 
the trigger of the lens, to the metallic shifting of the plates (when the camera still had 
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such things)” (15).27 Barthes is drawn to the trigger of the camera, and moreover to the 
finger of its operator, because it, more than the eye, marks the fixing, the capture of the 
event and thus most closely connects him to what he is seeking in the photograph – death. 
In other words, the photographer’s finger triggers his photographic desire (premised on 
loss, separation, absence, and the link to the unknown of death). His obsession with the 
finger carries over into the photograph itself. A photograph, as index, is a kind of finger – 
it points – it says “this (has been).” For Barthes, the photograph is “neither image nor 
reality,” but rather “a new being, really: a reality one can no longer touch” (87); 
meanwhile, the photograph’s reality continues to touch him. This touch of the photograph 
is not the violence it engenders in the spectator – not the violence of targeting or of 
assimilating violence as aesthetic pleasure – but a violence that it enacts on the spectator. 
Sontag argues, “To possess the world in the form of images is, precisely, to reexperience 
the unreality and remoteness of the real (Photography 164).” This touch, this spark, is an 
encounter with that remoteness (that is nonetheless present in the indexical essence of the 
photograph). This raises the “irrepressible feeling that the photographic process is 
something magical,” as Sontag puts it (Photography 155). Or what Benjamin calls the 
“magical value” within the photograph that compels the viewer “to seek the tiny spark of 
accident, the here and now” (“Short” 202). This spark of magic stems from the fact that 
“everything is given” in a photograph, which is why Barthes “must” address “an intense 
immobility” (an Inscrutable Immutability?) in the photograph that is “linked to a detail 
(to a detonator), an explosion makes a little star on the pane […] of the photograph” (49). 
                                                
27 It is worth noting that on most digital cameras users have the option of turning on a mechanical 
‘clicking’ sound effect. As a sort of ghost of the camera’s mechanical past, it assures the user that the 
camera is still taking pictures. 
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The fact that he must address this leads him down a different path than the one he 
travailed in “The Photographic Message.” 
In “The Photographic Message,” Barthes, the semiotician, classified the 
photographic message as pure denotation, which left him no option, semiotically 
speaking, except to deal only with its connoted message, since its denoted message stands 
outside of the sayable. The specter of the denoted message, the codeless message, haunts 
his ability to address the photograph. He feels the “pressure of the unspeakable that wants 
to be spoken” (Camera 19). So when he returns to the scene of photography in Camera 
Lucida he does so not under the guise of a semiotician, but under the guise of an 
autobiographical I/eye – a subjective spectator looking at photographs. Although Camera 
Lucida has many critics precisely because it fails to place the photograph within a 
semiotic system, it does what semiotics cannot: it abides the denoted message. Barthes 
cannot speak it directly, but the subjective I/eye allows him to say how it speaks to him. 
Moreover, his autobiographical I/eye can say how it affects him – how it wounds him.  
He does this by moving away from connoted and denoted messages, and enlists 
instead concepts discussed earlier in this chapter: the studium and punctum. The studium 
is linked to all the connotative messages of the photograph. The punctum is the detail that 
opens up to the unspeakable of denoted message. In one of his photographic encounters – 
Duane Michals’ portrait of Andy Warhol hiding his face behind both hands – Barthes 
identifies the punctum in Warhol’s fingernails. The photograph seems to literally scratch 
him: “I have no desire to comment intellectually on this game of hide-and-seek (which 
belongs to the Studium); since for me, Warhol hides nothing; he offers his hands to read, 
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quite openly; and the punctum is not the gesture but the slightly repellent substance of 
those spatulate nails, at once soft and hard-edged” (45).  
On a Lacanian register, the punctum is tychic – in other words, it is the touch 
(Tuché) of the real, where the real glimpses us. It locates the gaze in the object, not the 
observer. It places the observer in the picture. We do not trap the picture, the picture traps 
us. In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, Lacan tries to explain this by 
looking focusing on a detail in a painting by Holbein:  
In [this] picture I showed you at once […] the singular object floating in the 
foreground, which is there to be looked at, in order to catch, I would almost say, 
to catch in its trap, the observer, that is to say, us. It is, in short, an obvious way 
[…] of showing us that, as subjects, we are literally called into the picture, and 
represented here as caught (92).  
 
It is hardly obvious, but it introduces to the desires we project on pictures the 
demands the picture has on us. It is the things in the world that look at us. For Lacan the 
gaze is not the purview of the subject, but rather we are gazed at by things. And this is 
where he locates the unassimilable, codeless message. “In our relation to things,” he 
posits, “in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and ordered in the 
figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from state to state and is 
always to some degree eluded in it – that is what we call the gaze” (73).  
Lacan’s notion of the gaze unveils a radical absence and disrupts any notion of 
self-presence. He does not gaze upon the object; the object gazes at him. He attempts to 
illustrate this point by telling the story of a time when he was on fishing boat with a 
simple man named Petit-Jean: “Petit-Jean pointed out to me something floating on the 
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waves. It was a small can, a sardine can […]. It glittered in the sun. And Petit-Jean said to 
me – You see that can? Do you see it? Well, it doesn’t see you!” (95). 
Petit-Jean finds this humorous, but Lacan does not:  
 
[I]f what Petit-Jean said to me […] had any meaning, it was because in a sense, it 
was looking at me all the same. It was looking at me at the level of the point of 
light, the point at which everything that looks at me is situated – and I am not 
speaking metaphorically (95). 
 
Lacan feels “out of place” in the picture because he cannot look at the picture 
from where it looks at him (95). There is something of this split and fractured looking – 
this Lacan can – in Barthes’ punctum. When the punctum – which is like a shiny can 
floating in the photograph – suddenly reaches Barthes and not only does he “animate it,” 
but “it animates” him (20). “[T]he photographed body touches me with its own rays,” he 
feels. For Barthes, “the pose” is “what founds the nature of Photography” (78), but this is 
not the pose of the subject being photographed, or the technique of the photographer – it 
is not the pose in front of the camera, but rather how the photograph poses the spectator.  
Throughout his reflections on photography, Barthes is looking for his mother. 
Every photographic punctum – every prick – becomes her loss, her death. It is this loss 
and this desiring lack that wounds him. It is his mother, but also the Mother – the primal 
scene of loss and separation from the real. It is not surprising, then, that Barthes 
perceives, “[a] sort of umbilical cord” that “links the body of the photographed thing to 
my gaze” (81).  
Even though every photograph represents this loss for Barthes, there is one 
photograph he takes particular personal interest in: what he calls the Winter Garden 
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photograph. It is a picture of his mother, Henriette, as a young girl, and it is this image, 
out of all the photographs of her, where he recognizes her – her reality and her absence. 
Barthes withholds this picture from us. He does not show it to us because its meaning is 
private to him, it would mean nothing to us. In its place he puts a photograph by Nadar, 
which is cryptically labeled “The Artist’s Mother (or Wife).”28 In doing so, Barthes 
eludes us and creates uncertainty. The mother that eludes him must also elude us. And so 
he deliberately toys with the connotative message by misquoting and miscaptioning the 
picture that stands in for the picture of his mother. In many ways this deliberate game on 
Barthes’ plays on us hearkens to the well-known puzzle-picture, “My Wife and My 
Mother-in-Law.” 
                                                
28 W.J.T. Mitchell notes that “the photograph was taken by Paul Nadar, the artist’s son, and is of 
his mother, Nadar’s wife” (305). 
Figure 6. My Wife and My Mother-in-Law 
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W.J.T. Mitchell calls these kinds of picture-puzzles “multistable images” (48). He 
argues that they “function as reflections on the basic nature of pictures, places where 
pictorial representation displays itself for inspection rather than effacing itself in the 
service of transparent representation of something else” (48). Images like this are not 
about what we see, but how we see. In “My Wife and My Mother-in-Law” we can see a 
young woman turned in profile looking away from us or we can see an elderly woman’s 
downtrodden visage. On a more abstract level we also see a third figure: the wife-mother-
in-law. Barthes’ reflections on photography aim at this multistability. This is not the 
aiming discussed in the previous section – not the assimilation of alterity implied in 
targeting – but a kind of surrender. He abides the intractable parts of the photograph and, 
of course, he fails because there is no language for it. He can only perceive it as loss – his 
mother’s death and his own I-am-going-to-die. This is the photograph’s defiant tuché. 
 
Picturing Picturing: Metapictures and Doubletakes 
On the other side of the tuché of the photograph is the cliché of the photograph. In 
French, cliché signifies both the photographic negative and an overused, meaningless 
phrase. In other words, it is both the site of exposure and overexposure. If the tuché is a 
wounding poignancy, the cliché is a callous disinterest. Seeing photographs is already 
seeing at a distance (in both space and time) so the move from being voyeuristically 
interested – even compassionately interested – to being disinterested, unmoved, detached, 
and anesthetized is a small step. And the fact that the “ante keeps getting raised” 
(Photography 19) on images of violence lessens their ability to mean anything.  
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This is just one reason for Barthes to declare, “Yes, indeed: the Photograph is 
dangerous” (Camera 28). And photographs are dangerous for so many other reasons: 
they prick and wound, they exploit scenes of suffering, they target and assimilate alterity, 
they are a kind of death, they can render acts violence a kind of aesthetic fantasy. They 
are dangerous, too, because by capturing the visible world in a neat slice of space and 
time, they expand what can be found aesthetically pleasing – they can make cruelty a 
kind of beauty and death a kind of sublime spectacle.  
This danger – this lurking violence – bleeds through the photograph and on to us. 
Michael Herr observed that Dana Stone – the famous war photographer – “never got 
anything on film that he didn’t get on himself” (253). On another level, whatever he got 
on film also gets on those who view his images. Stone knew the photographic propensity 
to aestheticize violence so he called his pictures ‘snaps’ as part of an ethic not to let it be 
beautiful or art (196). They are beautiful anyway.  
The perverse voyeurism endemic to photography turns both the photographer and 
the spectator into peeping toms. It leaves war photographer Larry Burrows feeling “like 
such bastard” (Herr 227). Diane Arbus says, “when I first did it I felt perverse” 
(Photography 13). This quasi-sexual guilt arises in the spectator, too, whose privileged 
gaze allows him/her to look upon the scene of cruelty and feel, as E.L. Doctorow said, 
“undifferentiated emotions of longing and dissatisfaction” (71).29 
                                                
29 From E.L. Doctorow’s novel The Book of Daniel (New York: Random House, 2007): “Images 
[…] are essentially instruments of torture exploding through the individual’s calloused capacity to feel 
powerful undifferentiated emotions full of longing and dissatisfaction and monumentality. They serve no 
social purpose.” 
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This apparition of violence – somewhere between symbolic and real violence – is 
not just the purview of war photography. Even Atget’s Paris street scenes seem to 
Benjamin like a crime scene (“Short History” 215). For Benjamin the violence concealed 
within the technologically reproducible image has the potential to allow us to “experience 
[our] own annihilation as a supreme aesthetic pleasure.” Like Doctorow’s views in the 
epigraph above, Benjamin has a distaste for the potential monumentality photographs 
produce. Do photographs serve a social purpose? Of course. They are important to the 
work of remembering and reminding, but they never do this work alone because 
photographs do not mean, they show. Benjamin certainly wanted photographs to serve a 
social purpose, moreover a political purpose. He admits that, in the wrong hands, 
photographs will only aestheticize the world. He sees promise in captions – in how we 
render the photograph, not how the photograph renders the world: 
The camera will become smaller and smaller and more prepared to grasp fleeting, 
secret images whose shock will bring the mechanism of association in the viewer 
to a complete halt. At this point captions must begin to function, captions which 
understand the photography which turns all the relations of life into literature, and 
without which all photographic construction must remain bound in coincidences. 
(“Short History” 214) 
 
Captions, though, cannot stop a photograph like Adams’ from loving cruelty and 
engendering a loving cruelty in the viewer. It cannot kill the denoted message. Even if it 
is captioned and packaged for antiwar purposes, even if it awakens moral outrage, it still 
seduces. At the end of Regarding the Pain of Others, Sontag wonders if there is “an 
antidote to the perennial seductiveness of war” and the picturing of war (122). “Could 
one be mobilized actively to oppose war by an image (or group of images)?” She is, in 
essence, asking this of photography: Is there an antidote to the seductiveness of violence 
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in the photograph? And, can an image be mobilized to oppose the violence of 
photography?  
Of course we will continue to look at pictures of violence and picture taking will 
always carry some tinge of violence. But perhaps the potential images that Sontag seeks 
arise out of the realm of what W.J.T. Mitchell calls “metapictures” – pictures about 
pictures (Picture Theory 35). More specifically, here, we might think about the potential 
of metaphotos. The photograph that Sontag suggests might mobilize an active opposition 
is Jeff Wall’s 1992 photograph titled “Dead Troops Talk (A Vision After an Ambush of a 
Red Army Patrol near Moqor, Afghanistan, Winter 1986).” It is giant Cibachrome 
transparency backlit and mounted in a lightbox depicts gruesome bodies that have been 
reanimated – the dead of war talking and playing – and even teasing each other with their 
own guts. The scene is completely staged, but it carries the semblance of credibility of a 
war photograph – it is photorealistic. Additionally the caption is loaded with details and 
specificities of place and time. It has the aura of a newspaper caption. It alerts us to 
photography-ness of photography and subverts our photographic expectations.  
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Subversive metapictures do not always have to come from the world of art. In the 
pre-internet-meme photo remix “Oswald Rocks the Mike” we see a different kind of 
metapicture. Instead of staging a photographic scene, this image revises an iconic 
photograph and forces us to confront photography’s slipperiness in spite of its seductive 
aura. Both “Dead Troops” and “Oswald” depict a kind of irreverence that is both 
humorous and dead serious. In doing so, they point a finger at the irreverence that attends 
our looking. 
Metapictures might have an ability to disrupt the flow of violence that 
accompanies the targeting and triggering of photography. If metapictures elicit self-
Figure 7. Oswald Rocks the Mic 
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reference, Mitchell argues, “it has as much to do with the self of the observer as with the 
metapicture itself” (48).  
These two examples hardly begin to draw out the potential of an antidote to 
photographic violence. But the potential lies in the fact that they do not ask us to see; they 
ask us to see ourselves, seeing.  
 
The Wall, The Tomb of the Unknowns, and Sad Hill Cemetery 
 
The unconscious is the chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or 
occupied lie: it is the censored chapter. But the truth can be refound; most 
often it has already been written elsewhere. Namely in monuments… 
 – Jacque Lacan (Ecrits 50) 
 
This chapter began with Trinh T Minh-ha’s critique of the ongoing “superfilm” of 
the Vietnam War, which she (and we) might define as an apparatus of mythologization 
comprised of literal films, but also photographs, monuments, stories, and other 
technologies that transform nationalist projects into surface spectacles. Here, in the final 
sections of this chapter, I want to locate the work of that superfilm onto another set of 
screens of war: tombs and names. In this epilogue to this chapter I visit three graves – 
The Wall, The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and Sergio Leone’s Sad Hill Cemetery – 
in order to once more examine the screenic superfilm of the Vietnam War, this time 
through the work of another kind screen: names and naming.  
When the dust and debris from the cannonball settles in Sergio Leone’s 
quintessential spaghetti western, The Good, The Bad, & The Ugly, Tuco (Eli Wallach) 
conveniently finds himself in Sad Hill Cemetery. It’s as if the cemetery did not exist 
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before it entered the frame, as if the camera itself engendered Sad Hill. This field of death 
is the destination the whole film has moved toward. Somewhere in its Arlington-like 
expanse of graves and markers, amidst the remains of Confederate soldiers, amidst all the 
expended life that has fueled the Confederate war machine, there lies buried $200,000 
worth of war profits in the form of gold coins. It is this treasure that Tuco, ‘The Ugly,’ 
has come to claim. Implausibly, out of the innumerable graves, Tuco must find the name 
Arch Stanton because (as far as Tuco knows) Stanton’s grave marks the buried treasure. 
To the crescendoing cadence of Ennio Morricone’s “The Ecstasy of Gold,” Tuco and the 
camera dizzyingly pan the cemetery for the proper name that marks the profitable claim. 
The wheeling view accelerates until the graves become an indecipherable blur and then it 
suddenly stops on the grave of Arch Stanton. This is the prelude to the iconic three-way 
showdown that will reveal the treasure. It is the beginning of the end: a moment we will 
return to later, after we have visited other graves. 30 
In 1972, six years after the release of The Good, The Bad & The Ugly, a pilot was 
shot down over South Vietnam. In 1984, his still-unidentified remains, labeled X-26, 
were interred at the Tomb of the Unknowns in Arlington National Cemetery amidst all 
the laurels and adornments of a state ceremony, including a speech from President 
Reagan. This was the only ‘unknown’ soldier of the Vietnam War and the official 
ceremony of interment presumably sought to bring some measure of cathartic resolve to a 
controversial war. Fourteen years later, in 1998, because mitochondrial DNA tests had 
positively identified this only ‘unknown’ American soldier of the War in Vietnam, the 
                                                
30 Leone allegedly consulted Matthew Brady’s Civil War photographs (many of which, of course, 
were themselves staged) in order to accurately stage the Civil War in this film. See Lang Thompson and 
Jeff Stafford’s Turner Classic Movies film article “The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly.”   
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now-known remains of Michael J. Blassie were disinterred from the Tomb of the 
Unknowns. Across the Potomac River on the Capitol Mall, the symbol next to Blassie’s 
name (already etched alongside 58,000 other names on the Wall of the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial) was changed from ‘Missing in Action’ to ‘Killed in Action.’ Blassie became 
the only soldier to straddle the Potomac in this way: an anonymous corpse entombed 
under white marble and a proper name engraved into a black granite chevron – the only 
to be amongst both the nameless remains and the remaining names.  
Following the name and the remains of Blassie, then, becomes a way to unfold the 
symbolic economy of nameless bodies and bodiless names at work in the 
commemoration of the dead, particularly the dead of war. In the broadest sense, every 
burial, every interment, every en-cryption is the re-articulation – the recoding – of the 
first burial, the primordial violence that preceded it, and the order – the life – that follows 
from it. In a classically anthropological sense, the tomb or grave is constitutive of culture 
and language; it engenders the social. To name death and to bury its remains is to 
ritualize and sublimate death to the continuation of life. The gravesite, as the concealed 
presence of death – a presence made of absence – reproduces the process of production; it 
puts death to work for life. “Culture always develops as a tomb” (83), argues René 
Girard. “The tomb is nothing but the first human monument to be raised over the 
surrogate victim, the first most elemental and fundamental matrix of meaning. There is 
no culture without a tomb and no tomb without a culture; in the end the tomb is the first 
and only cultural symbol.” In this paradoxical foundational moment that Girard 
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describes, the tomb guarantees life at the very moment it marks and conceals the end of 
life; it commemorates its own cover-up.  
With Blassie, we begin to see how names and bodies are placed in a system of 
substitution that points, not only to the foundation of life in general, but to the life of the 
nation particularly. Blassie-the-corpse and Blassie-the-name are substances and 
abstractions that are made to monumentalize, memorialize, ritualize, commemorate, 
consecrate, and dedicate death-as-sacrifice in order to both cover up and commemorate 
the generative violence at the heart of life, and thus preserve and maintain the grand 
narrative – the mythos – of the state. The life spent by the war machine is recouped into a 
symbolic economy in which the material past is taken up into the epic past where it 
stands as the guarantee of an unfolding national destiny.  
The story of Blassie points to a contradiction within the national project of 
memorializing the dead. One the one hand, a national commitment to identifying, 
reclaiming, and honoring those who die in service of the country insists that X-26 be 
known – that he be properly identified with a proper name, Michael J. Blassie. On the 
other hand, the desire to make X-26 stand for national sacrifice outside of any particular 
war in the historical past, but rather within in the timelessness of the nation’s heroic past, 
insists that X-26 remain unknown – that his ‘proper’ name be Unknown Soldier.  
Across the Potomac River lies another memorial, The Wall, with Michael J 
Blassie’s name engraved in black granite alongside 58,000 other names of the American 
dead and missing from Vietnam. Assumedly, the cross once next to his name signifying 
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the uncertainty of his whereabouts has since been superimposed by a diamond indicating 
that with certainty he is dead, his remains have been found.  
Blassie is the only fallen soldier to have straddled the Potomac in this way, etched 
in black granite as an individual with his proper name, and etched in white marble as 
every- or any- man under the banner of ‘Unknown.’ Perhaps the debacle around Blassie’s 
remains indicates the technological and scientific impossibility of an Unknown Soldier. 
That mode of memorializing war dead may have come to an end.  
This section performs a comparative reading of the semiotic and symbolic 
functions of three memorials, The Wall, The Tomb of the Unknowns, and Sad Hill 
Cemetery. All of these ‘tombs’ invest in the Name, within this economy of death, as the 
guarantor of the nation’s future through its past. Furthermore, the Name serves as the 
avatar of an inter- and intrasubjective encounter with death outside of any particular war 
or national project. In other words, these tombs, through the semiotic and symbolic 
functions of naming and sacrifice, rejuvenate certain modes of knowing and modes of 
sacrifice that are simultaneously particular to a nationalist subjectivity and generic to 
human subjectivity as it is ordered around a being-toward-death. The former partakes in a 
nationalist project of mythmaking and memory-making; the latter calls forth the 
foundational violence out of which culture emerges.  
 
The Monument and the Wound 
The Tomb of the Unknowns and The Wall represent two varied ways of 
memorializing the dead of war. The most obvious differences reside in their physical 
appearance. The Tomb of the Unknowns is white marble, box-shaped, above ground, 
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situated within the National Cemetery, and has no names (save ‘Unknown’) on it. The 
Wall is a black granite chevron, below ground, situated outside the National Cemetery, 
and has 58,000 names on it. Furthermore, the Tomb is an actual tomb and The Wall is 
merely tomb-like. Both are sacred sites situated in relation to other powerful symbols of 
nation and sacrifice along the Potomac. The Tomb’s place within the National Cemetery 
grants it state sanction. Its white marble blends with the surrounding architecture. It 
functions as part of the state apparatus. Operating in the name of the state, its rituals are 
solemn and official (the changing of the guards, the laying of the wreath). The Wall, 
while situated on the National Mall, was created out of private funds. An informal group 
of volunteers serve as its disciples, and, like the Marines at The Tomb, they maintain a 
24-hour watch over the memorial. It bears little resemblance to the surrounding phallic 
memorials and has been referred to in more vaginal language as a gash and a wound. 
Where ritual at The Tomb is controlled around a unified message, ritual at The Wall is 
multi-faceted and heteroglottic in its messages (the placing of personal objects at the 
Wall, the space for emotional expression, physical interaction with the memorial). Where 
The Tomb communicates a heroic ideology of patriotism, The Wall’s significance 
remains more mutable and directed toward sorrow and pity over heroic patriotism.  
These memorials motivate and are motivated by different modes of 
commemoration. Although both clearly center around the commemoration of sacrifice, 
the manner in which each links that sacrifice to a national cause differs. The Tomb asks 
us to honor the sacrifice by accepting it; the Wall asks us to honor it by questioning it. 
John Bodnar, in Remaking America, argues, perhaps too neatly, that two cultural 
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discourses fight for control over a memorial’s meaning in what he calls “the intersection 
of official and vernacular cultural expressions.” For Bodnar, the “official” discourse 
belongs to national and cultural leaders, and the “vernacular” discourse belongs to what 
might be best summarized as ‘the people.’ Bodnar’s formulation helps explain how the 
experience of these memorials, in relation to both personal and nationalist projects, vary.  
The “official” discourse, or what others have called “the administrative version,” 
of commemorating the dead of war tends to emphasize sacrifice in terms of bringing the 
past into the present as myth in order to guarantee the future of the nation (Haines 6). In 
other words, the dead return from where they never came (the heroic past) as insurance 
for the righteousness of the national project. I do not want to suggest that these warring 
discourses attach themselves neatly to the two memorials in question (i.e. The Tomb is to 
“official” as The Wall is to “vernacular”). Both can be ensnared in the official message: 
‘these memorials symbolize past and present sacrifices to remind us of the continuing 
necessity of sacrifice and vigilance for the preservation of freedom and future of this 
nation, etc.’ And both can be read into the vernacular as well. However, The Tomb more 
readily accepts the structuring force of official discourse while The Wall has much of its 
genesis in the vernacular.  
 The Tomb opens itself to the official discourse partially because of its official 
look and placement, but also because the name Unknown is a kind of ‘blank’ name on 
which to write the unifying national message. In “The Most Important Monument,” 
Ingersoll and Nickell, note that not only do Tombs of the Unknown exist in almost every 
Western nation, but that this particular Tomb of the Unknowns is located in a natural 
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landscape that, imbued with historical significance and intentional lay-out, “emerges as a 
heroic cultural diorama perceived to exist in the heroic simultaneity of patriotic time and 
space” (201). The Unknowns are situated in relation to other dead, both known and 
unknown, thus acknowledging sacrifice in terms of a “known and unfolding destiny of 
freedom liberty, and democracy” (201). Under that Name that is Not a Name, the 
Unknown lose their place in history, and enter into the national mythos as the sacrificial 
guarantors of that “unfolding destiny” (203).  
The Wall, on the other hand, resists the official discourse. Where The Tomb 
stands as a monument to nationalist ideology, The Wall appears as a wound – a black 
gash in the earth. Where The Tomb’s empty name, Unknown, can be filled with a 
nationalist message through the official discourse, The Wall’s 58,000 names already lend 
it fullness. Its national message comes through other routes. Rather than as a monument, 
the Wall reads more like an itemized receipt of national debt; not the debt paid in heroic 
timelessness that guarantees the future, but the debt paid in historic time that calls into 
question that future. The only attempt to link the Vietnam Memorial to the “heroic 
diorama” along the Potomac comes from Frederick Hart’s Three Soldiers – the realist 
sculpture added as a compromise for groups who argued that The Wall was unpatriotic 
and shameful – but Hart’s Soldiers never have attained any real status as part of the 
memorial’s commemorating power. 
Of course, much what gives The Wall its power stems from the war it 
commemorates. Maya Lin wanted the memorial to be an ‘apolitical’ commemoration of a 
war so mired in political friction and moral ambiguity. The national divisiveness 
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stemming from the war already reduced the possibility of the memory of the war being 
part of the heroic national story. Even so, resistors to Lin’s design called for a more 
patriotic and heroic memorial. These detractors called it too feminine, too shameful, too 
black, and too buried, among other things. While the memorial perhaps cannot shed 
politics completely, it is often viewed as therapeutic place, as a site of healing. The 
detractors were right insofar as the memorial is different from the surrounding white, 
phallic marble in Washington. As Catherine Howett notes, the therapeutic potential born 
out of Lin’s elements of design emphasizes “individual deaths, not deaths in a cause” (7). 
The official discourse of the national “cause” does not have a ready inroad for gaining 
discursive control of the memorial. The 58,000 names at The Wall, despite their 
exhaustive specificity, create more ambiguity than the Unknowns. Again, because of the 
history to which it is tied, The Wall “implies some terrible questions” without offering an 
answer (Griswold 711). Through this ambiguity, The Wall is literally more accessible and 
interactive. You can walk along it, touch it, see yourself in its polished granite sheen. The 
reflective capacity of the memorial, both as a literal mirror and a place of questioning, 
brings viewers into a relationship with death. The viewer’s reflection appears among the 
names of the dead forcing the viewer to read him- or herself into the text and, as Howett 
argues, “actively participate in the cultural memory of Vietnam even as the memory is 
produced” (9). “Each visitor,” Haines writes, “must bring his or her own meaning to bear 
upon the names in granite, and each must see his or her own reflection – the self – among 
the dead” (6). 
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Furthermore, the names themselves, while etched in stone, are transportable. The 
rubbings done at The Wall give visitors a piece of The Wall, a name as an indexical token 
that carries with it The Wall’s aura. This relationship to death, both public and private, 
arises out of a signifying process generated out of the name and the sacrifice that I will 
explore more fully in the following sections. 
The Wall’s funding, design, and visitor-ship give preference to a vernacular 
discursive power emphasizing the personal and private – the therapeutic – intentions of 
The Wall, but does not exclude it from being incorporated by a national mythos. As 
Haines argues, the memorial signifies, in general, a sense of loss for the dead, but also a 
“sense of reincorporation of the survivors” (4). The woundedness that The Wall 
represents creates a sense of gratitude to the dead and thus restores some sense of 
national unity. The ambiguity of the Vietnam War itself and The Wall’s ability to cater to 
polyvalent interpretations of its meaning effectively naturalizes the Vietnam experience. 
As Griswold argues, “The [Wall] makes the loss of these individuals a matter of national 
concern.” (709). 
 
In The Name of the Name 
 This mechanism of sacrifice, which displaces violence onto the symbolic the very 
moment the symbolic is founded in that act of sacrifice, creates what Kristeva might call 
a thetic moment in which the signifying process guarantees itself – signs for itself – in 
order to institute itself. In keeping with one of the threads of this essay – the nationalistic 
power of the tomb – I want to link the founding institution of sacrifice discussed in the 
last section with the founding institution of nationhood. In particular, I want to explore 
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the name game operating within that sacred and founding document, the Declaration of 
Independence. This foundational naming process is continually replayed at the tombs. 
 Derrida, in “Declarations of Independence,” posits that the Declaration of 
Independence is a performative utterance posing as a constitutive utterance. In this 
founding moment, as Derrida famously put it, “the signature invents the signer” (10). 
Like the founding sacrificial moment, the founding national moment theologizes its 
process, invoking the Name as guarantor of the Law. That instituting force is the name of 
the Father (here, both God and phallus); the best proper name to guarantee the institution 
being enacted. In a chain of metaphoric substitution posing as metonymic continuity, 
“Jefferson ‘represents the ‘representatives’ of the people in whose name they speak, the 
people themselves authorizing themselves and authorizing their representation (in 
addition to the rectitude of their intentions) in the name of the laws of nature which 
inscribe themselves in the name of God, judge and creator” (12). In other words, the 
draftsman, Jefferson, represents the intentions of representatives who represent the 
intentions of the ‘good People’ that comprise the ‘nation,’ and those ‘good People’, 
whose goodness of intention is in turn guaranteed in the name of God, ‘sign’ the 
document that institutes (declares) the nation, without which there are no ‘good People’ 
to sign. Like the sacrificial mechanism at work in the foundation of culture, this founding 
moment displaces its ‘lie’ into the sacred and symbolic order at the very moment that 
order is instituted. The Name, in an “act of concealment,” elides the rupture and 
commemorates its own cover-up.  
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 These founding moments of sacrifice and naming that institute knowledge and 
subjectivity are restaged and repeated at the tombs. At the Tomb of the Unknowns, within 
its Name that is Not a Name (and therefore any name) we find the signature of the best 
proper name: 
HERE RESTS IN 
HONORED GLORY 
AN AMERICAN 
SOLDIER 
KNOWN BUT TO GOD 
Here God, that “other subjectivity” (11) that came to sign the document, continues to 
sign. The Unknown stands for sacrifice in our name, for our name. The Unknown, with 
God there to sign for our good intentions, re-declares and reinstitutes the ‘good People’ in 
whose name this nation’s existence is guaranteed. The Wall, too, with its many names, 
brings us into a relationship with the dead, as representatives, that re-sign the founding 
document. Despite the differences in the two memorials’ modes of commemoration the 
simultaneous encounter with sacrifice and death brings us back into relation with the 
founding violence (death-self) and the founding document (nation-self) 
 
Sad Hill, Again for the First Time 
We do not arrive at Sad Hill to theorize film, but rather to allow film to theorize. 
Specifically, to see how film, and particularly this film, commemorates and en-crypts the 
generative, foundational, mythmaking power of the gravesite and, simultaneously, how it 
goes about de-crypting that commemorating power. In a sense, this paper is an attempt to 
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consider not only how this film pictures the tomb, but also to see the film itself as a tomb. 
The Good, The Bad, & The Ugly as a myth of a myth is a kind of empty tomb – the return 
of the Western from whence it never came. In 1966, before the American public fully 
realized what was happening in Vietnam, all the way from Italy, through the deserts of 
Spain and against the backdrop of the Civil War, the iconic Western comes bounding into 
America to give the Law of the West back to Hollywood.  
Before the film brings Tuco to Sad Hill, earlier in the story, a driverless wagon 
filled with dead and dying Confederate soldiers recklessly traverses the desert right into 
the path of Blondie and Tuco. One of the soldiers, Bill Carson, in his final moments of 
life, imparts the secret location of a hidden treasure. He breaks the knowledge in half, 
telling Tuco which cemetery to go to and telling The Man With No Name (Blondie) 
which grave to seek. This broken knowledge – this tessera – binds Blondie and Tuco, the 
Good and the Ugly, in mutual dependence, insuring that any violence that might erupt 
over their shared desire for the gold is deferred until they arrive at Sad Hill.  
By the time Tuco comes to Sad Hill, he thinks he has re-bonded the tessera. He 
thinks that Blondie has relinquished his half of the secret by revealing to Tuco the name 
Arch Stanton. As Tuco digs at Arch’s grave, Blondie materializes, inexplicably, preceded 
by his shadow. The ‘Bad’ Angel Eyes arrives shortly after from that same mythic 
nowhere beyond the frame. 
Throughout the film, all three men stumble into both sides of the Civil War. All 
around them the foundational and constitutive myth of the nation is being threatened. The 
‘good People’ that ‘signed’ the founding document four score and seven ago, are at war 
   82 
 
with each other. But The Good, The Bad, & The Ugly have not come ‘to dedicate – to 
consecrate – to hallow’ the dead at Sad Hill or any other dead and dying of this war. They 
are dedicated to the gold, not the reconstitution of the nation through the dedication of the 
dead. When Blondie uncovers Arch Stanton’s grave we do not find treasure; we find the 
corpse of Arch Stanton, to which Blondie responds, “There’s nothing there.” This 
moment of de-cryption evacuates the gravesite of its symbolic power and lays bare the 
remains of death. ‘Blondie,’ who is now the sole keeper of the treasure-knowledge, now 
moves to restage the moment of mimetic desire. He says he will write the name of the 
treasure-grave on a stone. Whoever survives gets the stone and thus gets the gold. 
Sad Hill transforms into a Greek amphitheater filled with an audience of the dead. 
The drama is staged as a triangular stand-off. The desire for the Other’s desire takes the 
symbolic from of a stone and the promise of its inscription, but it is a stone that signifies 
nothing, a stone that (unbeknownst to Tuco and Angel Eyes) Blondie has left blank. 
Either all three men will shoot each other, effectively resulting in suicide. Or, two of 
them will gang up on the other one, effectively sacrificing one to ensure the survival of 
the others. ‘Blondie,’ though, has rigged the whole production. He has secretly unloaded 
Tuco’s gun, making the showdown only between himself, The Good, and his monstrous 
double, The Bad. The protracted scene breaks down the men into their constitutive parts 
through an over-the-top, escalating sequence of close-up inserts timed to Morricone’s 
score: faces, guns, fingers, eyes, guns, fingers, crotches, gazes, glances, twitches, squints.  
The sum of all these looks and gestures does not add up to suspense so much as it 
adds up to pure style. The tempo increases, the frame closes in and then, 
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anticlimactically, Blondie dispatches with Angel Eyes, casually shooting him into a 
waiting grave. Blondie and Tuco – the Good and the Ugly – become the possessors (the 
stewards?) of the signifying treasure instituted only through the violent elimination of the 
third man – the Bad.  
The tomb where the gold lies, it turns out, has no name, only “Unknown” marks 
it. Arch Stanton, that proper name, was the arche stand-in. The ‘real’ treasure is 
guaranteed only by The Man with No Name under The Name that is Not a Name. Tuco, 
the one who digs, tries illiterately to speak the name on the grave marker – “unk, unk” – 
but cannot, and so he decides that is no kind of name. Like the “nothing” that was Arch 
Stanton’s un-incorporable corpse, “Unknown” remains inscrutable and ineffable. Of 
course, “Unknown” is a name of sorts. “Unknown” encompasses any name, every name. 
Hidden under the Unknown, the gold becomes Lacan’s “signifying treasure.” The gold is 
special; it embodies both abstraction and substance. Like the empty name under which it 
is buried, it can stand for any and every other thing, but it also maintains its own intrinsic 
value, its value as gold. For Blondie and Tuco, it is valuable unto itself most clearly, but 
concealed within it is the value of all the spent life buried around it. 
In this way, the filmic American West, already an empty allegory of national 
myth, employs empty names to restage the substitutive and constitutive foundational 
moment of mimetic desire and sacrifice. This restaged foundational moment evacuates 
the tombs of their commemorating power and goes, instead, for the gold.  
•   •   • 
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If Michael J. Blassie signals the technological impossibility of being an Unknown 
Soldier and if Arch Stanton exposes the lie at the heart of mythologizing the dead of war, 
together they speak to the correlation between the modes of knowing and the modes of 
sacrifice incorporated under the banner of nationalism and residing in the unconscious. In 
the current era of indefinite detainment of and infinite war against “known unknowns” 
and “unknown unknowns” (to quote Donald Rumsfeld’s epistemological thesis for the 
post-911 world), in which “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence,” do 
Blassie and Stanton, whose bodies became “nothing” and whose names became myth, 
help to de-crypt these emerging ever more abstracted modes of concealment?  
I titled this chapter “Photographs and Other Tombs of the Unknown” because of 
all that is buried in the surface of things – in photographs, in monuments, and in names – 
or, to be more precise, because of all that we desire to bury in them. In a sense, all these 
surfaces, from Burrows to Blassie, are tombs of the unknown. Photochemical stock and 
polished granite don’t tell us anything except what we would have them say. The treasure 
isn’t there. They are screens of war, not so much because of what they display, but what 
they hide; not because of what is seen in them, but what is projected onto them. In the 
next chapter, I turn to the overwhelming spectacle of the Gulf War, whose screenic 
ecology generates some of the same myths, this time by covering over the physical 
surfaces of war with a fast and fleeting televisual deluge.   
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CHAPTER 2 
Desert Screens & Desert(ed) Bodies: Traversing the Gulf, 1991 
 
In the electric age we wear all mankind as our skin.  – Marshall 
McLuhan31 
 
Technology is our uniform. – Ernst Jünger32 
 
War stripped of its passions, its phantasms, its finery, its veils, its 
violence, its images; war stripped bare by its technicians even, and then 
reclothed by them with all the artifices of electronics, as though with a 
second skin.    – Jean Baudrillard33 
 
Media Ecologies of the “Luckiest Man”: Borders and Gulfs 
On January 30th, 1991, the late General Norman Schwarzkopf gave a long, now 
infamous press conference on the progress of American military operations in Iraq.34 
After talking his way through a number of charts, graphs, and maps detailing sorties 
flown, targets struck, and other operational statistics, he turned his attention to a 
television-set in the briefing room and began playing video montages culled from 
targeting-screen footage of bombing missions. After showing various targets demolished 
by precision bomb strikes in the first two video clips, Schwarzkopf perks up for the third 
clip, in which we are shown, through the crosshairs of a cockpit targeting screen, a car 
                                                
31 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, 1964 (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1994) 47. 
32 Ernst Jünger, “Photography and the ‘Second Consciousness’: An Excerpt from On Pain,” 1934. 
Trans. Joel Agee. Photography in the Modern Era: European Documents and Critical Writings, 1913-
1940, ed. Christopher Phillips (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1989) 207. 
33 Jean Baudrillard, The Gulf War Did Not Take Place, 1991, trans. Paul Patton (Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1995) 64. 
34 My account of this press conference comes from CNN’s coverage of the press conference (30 
January 1991), which I viewed at the Vanderbilt Television Archive. ABC’s coverage can be viewed in a 
YouTube series titled “1990-91 Gulf War briefing General Norman Schwarzkopf.” For a report on the 
press conference see for example Edward Cody, "Allies Claim to Bomb Iraqi Targets at Will; U.S. 
Commander Says Opponents Not Giving Up," The Washington Post 31 Jan. 1991: A1. 
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crossing a bridge. The car reaches the other side just as the missile strikes and the bridge 
explodes. The transcript reads:  
SCHWARZKOPF: “I am now going to show you a picture of the luckiest man in 
Iraq on this particular day…”  
 
[Members of the press chuckle as the video footage begins]. 
  
SCHWARZKOPF: “Keep your eye on the crosshairs. Right there! Look it here! 
Right through the crosshairs!”  
 
[More laughter] 
 
SCHWARZKOPF: “And now, in his rear view mirror…” 
 
[On screen the bridge explodes just missing the car as it continues driving to the 
other side; the briefing room erupts in laughter]  
 
SCHWARZKOPF: “Stop the tape.” 
  
Figure 8. Schwarzkopf Press Briefing. 
Youtube / ABC News. 
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The “luckiest man” press conference encapsulates what the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War looked like on the television screen. So many aspects of it are emblematic of the 
televisual illusion of the Gulf War: Schwarzkopf’s swagger, his boyish eagerness to 
show-and-tell, what media theorist Susan Buck-Morss accurately describes as his 
“chauvinistic good humor,” the chuckling press corps, the casual disregard for human 
loss, the pretensions of U.S. military supremacy, the rhetoric of righteous cause, and the 
self-congratulatory fantasies of heroic success (247). The briefing captures many of the 
key objections critics had of the mediation of the Gulf War: that the television coverage 
of the war created the illusion of a surgical, sanitized, bodiless war fought by machines; 
that it emphasized the destruction of the built environment and de-emphasized the loss of 
life; that the pictures of the war were so disjointed from the realities on the ground that 
the screen functioned as more of a wall than a window between the spectating public and 
the happenings on the ground. Indeed, the Schwarzkopf briefing shows all the ways in 
which television coverage of the war engaged in covering up and covering over the 
bodies of war, sanitizing it for mass consumption.  
The briefing is among the many typical moments during the one thousand hours 
of Gulf War television coverage that, as John Taylor outlines in Body Horror, fetishized 
the machines and hid the bodies (163). The pleasures taken in the footage – 
Schwarzkopf’s giddiness and the press corps’ giggles – seem to celebrate a grossly 
inverse relationship between the glut of images and the scarcity of meaningful 
information and the correlating inversion between the thousands of people killed and the 
absence of those deaths from the visual record of the war. The briefing shows the ways in 
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which the Gulf came to represent more than a contested geopolitical region. It 
represented a negative space – a gulf – between optical reality and electromagnetic 
hyperreality; a gulf between the American war machine and the Arab other it 
manufactured for itself; a gulf between machines and bodies; between the screen and the 
senses; between the dead and the living; between the violent realities of war and their 
phantasmatic appearance on the screen; between images and flesh. In Schwarzkopf’s 
press briefing we glimpse these many gulfs of the war, especially the distance established 
in the layering of screens upon screens and cameras upon cameras – what Jean 
Baudrillard called “the reality gulf” of the Gulf War.35 The “luckiest man” traverses the 
surface of the bridge to the lens surface of the infrared targeting camera through the 
crosshairs of the cockpit targeting screen to Schwarzkopf’s television screen into the 
ABC’s live-feed cameras and disperses into living room television sets, and, throughout, 
it permeates the surface of human sensoria. We glimpse the overwhelming artificiality 
and pervasive sense of unreality that most cultural theorists of the Gulf War found so 
absurd and horrifying as they watched the war unfold.  
In part, this prevailing sense of absurdity emerged out of the strange juxtaposition 
of materiality and immateriality in the Gulf. On one hand, the Gulf War represented one 
of the most massive military deployments of people and materials in history and, on the 
other hand, it represented the most fleetingly imagistic war ever. It was billed as the 
“Mother of All Battles” and yet it ended after one thousand hours of overwhelming and 
                                                
35 See Jean Baudrillard’s essay “The Reality Gulf” (1997). 
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lopsided use of military force.36 It was a conflict, Paul Virilio argues, “that paradoxically 
eluded everyone due to the lack of territorial scale matched by the immediacy of its 
presentation in the media” (Desert 1). It seemed that everything, even for many soldiers 
and journalists on the ground, was immediately distant or distantly immediate, which is 
to say visually immediate and physically distant. Everything happened elsewhere, right 
now. 
Many rich analyses of the nature of the spectacle emerged out of these 
juxtapositions and paradoxes of the Gulf War.37 One predominant tendency among many 
                                                
36 Translated from a speech delivered by Saddam Hussein Broadcast on Baghdad state radio, 17 
January 1991. 
37 Media criticism of the Gulf War, though encompassing a wide range of positions, tactics, and 
aims can, perhaps crudely, be characterized as exploring various combinations of three strains of inquiry: 
questions about the realities and virtualities of the image, questions about the technologies of the image, 
and questions about the politics of the image. Foremost among the ‘realities and virtualities’ theorists is 
Jean Baudrillard (The Gulf War Did Not Take Place. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), who 
argued, predictably, that the Gulf War was simulation par excellence and that we are beholden to the 
simulation as the only available object of criticism because it veils us from any concept or experience of a 
“reality” beyond it. Paul Virilio (Desert Screen: War at the Speed of Light. New York: Continuum, 2002) 
most directly engages the “technologies of the image” line of criticism with his phenomenological 
approach to changing technological influences on human perception and experience of war. The third strain 
of critics, who engage the politics of the image, often do so in opposition to the first two kinds of inquiry. 
Most polemically and forcefully, Christopher Norris (Uncritical Theory: Postmodernism, Intellectuals & 
The Gulf War. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1992), takes on Baudrillard’s theorization of 
the Gulf War as an opportunity to indict postmodern theory in general. Norris accuses Baudrillard of 
intellectual charlatanism for his refusal to see the political and material realities operating beyond the 
propagandistic spectacle of the Gulf War. Susan Buck-Morss’s (Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The 
Passing of Mass Utopia in East and West (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002)) critique of James Der Derian 
(Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992)) highlights disagreements 
between Der Derian’s Virilio-styled technological analysis and her own materialist/political approach to the 
mediation of the war. She argues that Der Derian overdetermines the effects of technology on the 
perception of war.  
Later in this chapter I elaborate further on the work of Baudrillard, Virilio, and Judith Butler 
(“Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of ‘Postmodernism,’” Critical Encounters: 
Reference and Responsibility in Deconstructive Writing, ed. Cathy Caruth and Deborah Esch (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1995)). My characterization here of critical approaches to the Gulf War stems 
from these theorists as well as the others listed below. By no means exhaustive, the following list represents 
often-cited works that provide an overview of the array of positions toward and arguments about the 
mediation of the Gulf War: Seeing Through the Media: The Persian Gulf War, ed. Susan Jeffords and 
Lauren Rabinovitz (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1994); Douglas Kellner, The Persian Gulf TV War 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Kevin Robins and Les Levidow “The Eye of the Storm,” Screen 32.2 
(Autumn 1991): 324-328; Postmodern After-Images: A Reader in Film, Television, and Video, ed. Peter 
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critical theorists was to make the Gulf War exceptional – to see its mediascapes as 
indicative of new and changing modes of warfare, spectacle, and perception. To these 
theorists, the spectacle on television seemed to confirm the portents of the cybernetic 
theories of the 1980s. Modern war it seemed had become, as Donna Haraway once 
described, a “cyborg orgy” (8). Other critics, in contrast, downplayed the media-
technological exceptionalism of the Gulf War. Instead, they viewed it as yet another 
iteration of age-old propaganda techniques that manufacture public consent through the 
creation of digestible narratives and plotlines with conveniently simple moral ends. For 
these theorists, the propaganda of the Gulf War was nothing new; it was merely newly 
adorned in high-tech modes of propagation.  
Despite varying positions and tactics, the critical approaches to the war, whether 
ceding to the triumph of the illusion, cautioning against the uses and abuses of 
technology, or embarking on a Chomskyan effort to cut through the false consciousness 
and misinformation of the Gulf War, all, at some point, confront the intractable paradox 
at the heart of the Gulf War and its spectacle: the historical and material realities of the 
Gulf War can be neither entirely reduced to its spectacle nor entirely extricated from it. 
Faced with the philosophical dilemmas couched within the spectacle of a massive 
American military deployment that yet effortlessly floats and flickers, dreamlike, within 
the modest confines of the television screen, critics seemed dumbstruck by the prosthetic 
                                                                                                                                            
Brooker and Will Brooker, (London; New York: Arnold, 1997); Elaine Scarry. “Watching and Authorizing 
the Gulf War.” Media Spectacles. ed. Marjorie Garber, Jann Matlock, and Rebecca L. Walkowitz (New 
York: Routledge) 57-73; John Taylor, Body Horror: Photojournalism, Catastrophe, and War (New York: 
New York UP, 1998); Philip M. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War 
(Manchester University Press, 1998); Triumph Of The Image: The Media's War In The Persian Gulf, A 
Global Perspective, ed. Hamid Mowlana, George Gerbner, and Herbert Schiller (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1992). 
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sensation of watching war unfold as a manufactured television event. Given this 
unbearable lightness of watching, most critics struggled with a perspective of war that 
confounds the nature of what is ‘real’ in war by maintaining an impossibly mediated 
distance. In the televisual montage of map-like aerial and orbital views, sub-optical and 
non-optical seeing machines provided estranging thermal, infrared, and other 
electromagnetic images. The images appeared green, grainy, and rasterized. Those 
‘unnatural’ images, combined with slick graphics and military B-roll assembled under a 
regime of military censorship and self-censoring journalists, produced a seemingly 
premeditated, manufactured television event – an event running parallel to, yet 
incongruous with, “actual” events. Yet, despite the seeming incongruities, the images 
were also, paradoxically, inseparable from the events. The screens through which we 
watched the war were the same screens through which it was waged. Schwarzkopf’s 
briefing typifies the inseparability of the television from the mechanisms of destruction. 
In a dramatic reorganization of perception, mass destruction and mass communication 
became indelibly linked at the speed of light, creating an audience that watches the war 
on the same screens through which it is waged. Our view of the “luckiest man” originates 
from the same screen that the weapons system used to create the circumstances of his 
“luck.” 
In his introduction to the “War” issue of PMLA, Srinivas Aravamudan refers to 
this entanglement of weapons and images as “cameralistics” (1510).38 Though he is 
                                                
38 Aravamdan’s neologism – which suggests a merging of the camera with the militarized 
vocabulary of logistics and ballistics – seems to play off the “logistics of perception” that Virilio explores 
in his prescient book War and Cinema (1984), in which he charts how camera technologies transformed the 
modern battlefield from a theatre of warring objects into a cinema of warring pictures. 
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referring to more recent drone missions over Afghanistan and Pakistan, the term is just as 
apt in describing the events in Schwarzkopf’s briefing room. The proliferation of 
“cameralistics” is part of the dramatically changing meaning of war in which, 
Aravamudan argues, “killing machines and human lifeworlds increasingly imbricate each 
other” (1512). This increasing entanglement of machine and human lifeworlds make up 
one of the central concerns permeating the theorization of the Gulf War. In Desert 
Screen, Paul Virilio, responding to what he saw as the unchecked dangers of 
Schwarzkopfian cameralistics, reiterates Susan Sontag’s prescient call in 1977 for the 
creation of an “ecology of images” by concluding his analysis of the Gulf War with his 
own appeal for the creation of a “media ecology” (Sontag, On Photography 180; Virilio, 
Desert 43). To some extent, most critical theorists of the Gulf War, whether implicitly or 
explicitly, wish for or anticipate an ecology of media – a way to address the assemblages 
and interrelations of images, machines, and people within the military-industrial-media 
complex. While the aim of this chapter is not to put forth a systematic ecology of media, 
it does seek ways to address the Gulf War ecologically or more precisely to explore how 
different photographic, filmic, and literary images address ecologically the 
interpenetrations of imageworlds and lifeworlds of the Gulf War.  
The medial gulfs we might perceive within the multilayered screens and 
cameralistics of Schwarzkopf’s “luckiest man” are so many borders in what was 
ostensibly a border war. Among the many borders of the Gulf War, the colonially-drawn 
border between Iraq and Kuwait, upon which the Americans justified their use of force, 
was only one. Other technological and electronic borders both striated and enmeshed the 
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geopolitical, screenic, and corporeal territories of war, serving as liminal spaces of 
connection and disconnection between events-as-they-occurred and events-as-they-
appeared. “The relation between organism and machine has been a border war,” Haraway 
observed in 1985 (8). Now it had become a gulf war.  This chapter addresses these 
contestable borders between the technologies and bodies of war by illuminating two 
particular borders: the skin and the screen. I am interested in how photographic, 
cinematic, and literary images and imaginings of the Gulf War attempt to negotiate the 
sometimes incommensurable, sometimes interpenetrable borders between bodies and 
machines, between place and displacement, and between the subjects and objects of war. 
The borders and gulfs of the Gulf War function as zones of both incommensurability and 
propinquity within the media-ecosystems of the war machine. They serve as sites of 
demarcation and division, on the one hand, and sites of imbrication and interrelation on 
the other. Given that these borders – the screen and the skin in particular – are at once the 
boundaries that map the terrains of war and the (inter)faces of complex assemblages and 
relations, the approach to the mediation of the Gulf War in this chapter is, in addition to 
being ecological, also cartographic. That is, this chapter maps, or rather seeks out the 
ways that images themselves map the multifaceted borders of the Gulf War from its 
landscapes to its bodyscapes to its mediascapes, and, furthermore, considers how these 
images theorize the autopoeitic interrelations – the ecologies – of matter-flows and data-
flows that comprise the war machine. In brief, this chapter looks to images of the screen 
and the skin to explore how screens render the flesh of war and how skin renders the 
screens of war in their co-capacity as sites of obstruction and sites of transgression.  
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If Schwarzkopf shows us the sterile, bodiless screen-image that dominated the 
public spectacle of the war, this chapter in contrast, looks to images contaminated by 
flesh. In the next section, I turn to Judith Butler and Paul Virilio’s reflections on the 
experience of image-events of the war in order to more fully sketch the modes through 
which lifeworlds and imageworlds imbricate each other, particularly through images that 
enact themselves upon the world. Then, through the lens of Steven O’Connor’s The Book 
of Skin, I argue that these modes of interpenetration can be mapped onto and read through 
various interrelated figurations of the skin and the screen within the images of the Gulf 
War. Finally I trace these figurations of the skin and the screen through a collection of 
photographic, cinematic, and literary images of the Gulf War including Michal Rovner’s 
reprocessed Polaroid pictures of live television events and Ken Jarecke’s visceral war 
photographs of the carbonized flesh that littered the Basra Road; the bleached 
Ektochromatic vision of the Gulf War in the film Three Kings, where cameras follow 
bullets into bodies and organs; and, lastly, Anthony Swofford’s memoir Jarhead, which 
constructs a vulgar and vulnerable masculine body of war. The aim of this chapter is to 
reconsider the fleshly surfaces of war that were elided on the targeting and television 
screens that dominated the war spectacle in order to elucidate the ecological relationships 
that shape the interactions between the bodies and machines of war. The skin and the 
screen are the relational surfaces upon which we can read the intersections of the actual 
and virtual, the visible and invisible, historical time and technologically compressed time, 
place and displacement, location and dislocation, materiality and immateriality. They 
open up ways to localize and imagine the relation between the human and the 
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technological that is pertinent not only to the pre-digital, video moment of the “luckiest 
man,” but to the broader questions arising in the realms of media convergence, digital 
embodiment, and digital visual culture. In light of Schwarzkopf’s “luckiest man,” I turn 
in this chapter to more peripheral images and imaginings of the Gulf War in order to 
illuminate the medial borders of the Gulf War and to theorize the modes through which 
the technologies of war enmesh bodies and machines in reflexive relations.  
As I have suggested, the methods at work here are controlled by two entangled 
metaphors: the cartographic and the ecological. Both help to envision the surfaces of a 
war that was dominated by distant, controlling screens. The cartographic view identifies 
the borders between media, technologies, and humans; the ecological view explores the 
interrelations between those borders. To attempt to address the complex autopoeitic 
assemblages of human, technological, and mediatic systems that comprise the war 
machine, is, in itself, to occupy a borderland – and a gulf. That is, we are engulfed by 
those systems. Despite the map-like views that dominated the Gulf War spectacle, our 
critical position cannot achieve such an objective, total view of medial relations lest we 
overlook a basic fact of technologically mediated perception: we are always already 
inscribed within media and that no theory of media ever rises above media. In the Gulf 
War, as is always the case, W.J.T. Mitchell reminds us, “we not only think about media, 
we think in them” (Images Want 215).39 In other words, the map, in this case, 
                                                
39 Throughout this section I rely on Mitchell to help frame my approach to the mediation of the 
Gulf War because amid the proliferating theoretical approaches to media in the digital age he presents a 
cogent perspective on the interrelations of technological media and human sensoria that works well in the 
context of the Gulf War. In both Picture Theory and What Do Pictures Want? Mitchell frames his approach 
to pictures and the technologies of picture-making as things that we not only address as objects of study, 
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encompasses the cartographer; the ecosystem includes the ecologist. Our critical position, 
therefore, as Virilio and Butler will reveal, is situated within the ecology we seek to 
elucidate. Thus, in contrast to Marshall McLuhan’s famously ambitious intention to 
“understand media,” I would like to think instead, as Mitchell has suggested, about the 
ways we “address” media and, in turn, about the ways that media “address” or “call out” 
to us (207). The approach I take to the Gulf War images addressed in this chapter 
borrows from the foundation of Laura Marks’ haptic approach to visuality, which seeks 
to “derive theory from the objects themselves rather than impose theory on objects” (xiv). 
Or as Mitchell would frame it, to illuminate not only theories of pictures, but also 
pictures of theory.40 If we were to revisit the film theorist Stanley Cavell’s famous 
question about the nature of the relationship between technological and human-sensory 
surfaces – “What does the silver screen screen?” – and revise it for the multitude of 
screens in the Gulf War, what would we ask?41 What do all these screens screen? Like 
Cavell’s silver screen, which “screens the world” from him, the screens of the Gulf War 
perhaps screen the world from me. But they also screen the world to me and, moreover, 
they are the world to me. This interpenetration of lifeworlds and imageworlds is the 
foundation for the overlapping epistemological, ontological and visual crises of the Gulf 
War. 
                                                                                                                                            
but that also address us. This shifting agency between subject and object – between addresser and addressee 
– suggests the kind of ecological relationships I am trying to explore in the mediation of the Gulf War. 
40 Throughout Picture Theory Mitchell plays off of the verb and noun forms of the word “picture” 
so that the picturing of theory and the theorizing of pictures become an entangled enterprise. 
41 “What does the silver screen screen? It screens me from the world it holds – that is, makes me 
invisible. And it screens that world from me – that is, screens its existence from me” (Cavell 24). 
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Given our immersed position, how do we begin to address autopoeitic systems 
that we can only observe from within? One particularly fruitful method Mitchell proposes 
for addressing the totality of media is to revisit the potential of systems theory – a theory 
rooted in ecology – which, he argues, provides useful ways to think through and about 
complex adaptive systems.42 Media are both transmitters and habitats – both systems and 
environments – or as Mitchell describes, the things “through which messages are 
transmitted” and the things “in which forms and images appear” (208). Systems theory, 
with its dialectical approach to the relationships between marked space (system) and 
unmarked space (environment), accommodates the ability of media to operate as both 
systems and environments. In the context of the Gulf War, in which the spectacle itself 
was comprised of images and narratives that extolled the technologically advanced 
systems of the American war machine, systems theory becomes a fruitful way to 
ecologically conceive of the entanglements of image, machine, and flesh. As the ‘luckiest 
man’ reveals, the screens of the Gulf War functioned as both transmitters and habitats, 
simultaneously serving as the modes through which war was waged and the sites in which 
the war appeared. Systems theory, then, provides a basic framework for addressing the 
mediation of the Gulf War ecologically because it accounts for the dual capacities of the 
skin and the screen to serve as both the transmitters and the habitats of war. 
One way to begin to explore a systems-theory view of media in the context of the 
Gulf War is to look to where natural habitats and medial habitats converged in the Gulf – 
                                                
42 Though systems theory has been applied across a number of disciplines from natural ecology to 
business management to sociology, in What Do Pictures Want? Mitchell seems particularly interested 
systems theory’s roots in the cybernetic theories of the 1960s and 1970s, namely the work of Ervin Laszlo. 
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to begin an ecology of images, in other words, with images of ecology.43 The image of 
the oil-soaked seabird, in particular, (which became a recurring visual trope in the 
human-interest stories on the evening news during the war) came to embody the overlap 
between physical lifeworlds and more mediatic ones. The oil-soaked bird has become a 
symbol not only of the ecological crises that occurred in the natural habitats along the 
Gulf coast, but also a symbol of a looming crisis within a media ecology. This bird – the 
appearance of a creature helplessly drenched in a kind of inscrutable, viscous coating – 
has become a Gulf War meme that finds expression not only in Jean Baudrillard’s 
comparison of those “sticky and unintelligible” birds to our own sticky and unintelligible 
encounter with the war spectacle (32), but also, as we will see, in the interference created 
by Michal Rovner’s photographic manipulations, in the carbonized flesh depicted in Ken 
Jarecke’s photograph, in Three Kings when Troy Barlow is force fed oil during an 
interrogation as a symbolic act of America’s global consumption, and when Anthony 
Swofford tries to make sense of the war through what he calls the “rather gooey” flow of 
information (152). The oil-soaked birds on the nightly news represented not only a far-
away ecological disaster; they also embodied a kind of media coating that renders the 
viewer just as helplessly immobilized. The debilitating gooey-ness that affects the birds 
and the spectators alike is a surface problem. It is a second surface – a stubborn coating, 
an interfering second skin. In essence, this chapter is about a surface problem – a 
stubborn stickiness that interferes with sensorial and spectatorial capacities of the skin 
and the screen, respectively. Like the seabird, the epigraphs that began this chapter – 
                                                
43 For an exploration of the ecology of images and the images of ecology that focuses specifically 
on the images of oil-soaked birds during the Gulf War, see Andrew Ross, “The Ecology of Images,” The 
South Atlantic Quarterly 91.1 (Winter 1992): 215-238. 
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from Marshall McLuhan, the global villager; from Ernst Jünger, the fascist aesthete; and 
from Jean Baudrillard the pomo philosopher – suggest varied entanglements of 
technology and flesh. They offer up three configurations of machine-as-flesh or, perhaps, 
flesh-as-machine – mankind as skin, the uniform as skin, screen as skin – that touch on 
longstanding anxieties and dreams about the threats and promises of the technologization 
of the body and the corporealization of technology – the body extended, the body 
protected, the body penetrated, the body compromised, the body colonized, the body 
abandoned. The body, in other words, screened. Schwarzkopf’s “luckiest man,” too, 
serves as a kind of epigraph – one that, on its surface, elides these entanglements and 
hoists technology triumphantly over the “luckiest man” through a casual and 
unacknowledged distance. If Schwarzkopf showed us how to destroy a bridge, the images 
studied in this chapter, in contrast, attempt to build bridges, however tenuous, between 
the watchers and the watched, between the those who target and those targeted, and 
between the interconnected surfaces of humans and machines. 
 
Screen & Skin: Relational Surfaces of War 
As I argued in the previous section, an uneasiness permeates most theorists’ 
encounters with the spectacle of the Gulf War. This uneasiness is tied an encounter with 
images that, more than representing war, help to enact it. The novelist David Foster 
Wallace once observed that the television viewing experience in general presents to the 
critical viewer all kinds of “existeniovoyeuristic conundra” (27). In her essay, 
“Contingent Foundations,” Judith Butler delves into the conundra particular to Gulf War 
television coverage, which is made even more “existeniovoyeuristic” by its cameralistics. 
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In particular, she unravels a peculiar image-event in which she witnesses a “smart bomb” 
hitting its target via the bomb’s onboard camera:  
Throughout the war, we witnessed and participated in the conflation of the 
television screen and the lens of the bomber pilot. In this sense, the visual record 
of this war is not a reflection on the war, but the enactment of its phantasmatic 
structure, indeed, part of the very means by which it is socially constituted and 
maintained as war.  
 
The “smart” bomb camera, she argues,  
effectively constitut[es] the television screen and its viewer as the extended 
apparatus of the bomb itself … The smart bomb screen is, of course, destroyed in 
the moment that it enacts its destruction, which is to say that this is a recording of 
a thoroughly destructive act which can never record that destructiveness, indeed, 
which affects the phantasmatic distinction between the hit and its consequences. 
(221-222) 
 
By distinguishing image-as-reflection from image-as-enactment, Butler highlights 
the “existeniovoyeuristic” – or what Paul Virilio more plainly called the “philosophically 
vertiginous” – conditions of perception during the Gulf War (Desert 45). For her, the 
conflation of the smart bomb camera and the television screen correlates with a 
conflation of the act of bombing and the act of viewing – a kind of potentially destructive 
spectatorship. The screen creates a sense of connection and conflation with the events of 
war as it simultaneously ensures Butler’s disconnection and alienation from those same 
destructive events. The image becomes an event in itself, removed from yet part of events 
happening far away, right now. She suggests that, despite watching passively, she is 
drawn into participation in some way, at least in the sense that she passively watches a 
destructive act that, through its destructive power, erases its own destructiveness. 
Through her passivity she becomes tacitly conflated with the war machine because, while 
she cannot act, the image is enacting the destruction before her eyes – a state of what 
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Elaine Scarry called “fascinated immobility” (61). Butler occupies a temporal and visual 
immediacy (she shares a duration and a perspective with the bomb itself) and a spatial 
distance (she is safe at home in front of the television). For her, like many other theorists, 
the spectacle of war had never appeared so immediate and ubiquitous and, paradoxically, 
so distant and disconnected. There was little reciprocity between what happened on the 
ground and what happened on the screen, yet the two worlds interpenetrated each other. 
Timothy Druckery, in his introduction to Electronic Culture, argues, via Martin 
Heidegger’s “The Age of the World Picture,” that we might consider “the image not only 
as a signifier, but rather as an event” (25). The destructive spectatorship Butler 
experiences while sharing the perspective the smart bomb (the same camera that shows 
the event also enables the event) lends concreteness to Druckery’s abstract consideration. 
The image, more than signifying an event, is itself an event, or at least inextricable from 
the event – enacting the event – thus blurring any boundaries between image and event. 
Yet, in another sense, the two events are quite distinguishable by distance, one happening 
peacefully in the living room, the other happening violently in the desert.  
Paul Virilio finds this blurring of screenic worlds and the physical worlds 
extraordinary. Like Butler, he is disturbed by images that do not merely reflect 
destruction but rather enact it. In Desert Screen, he turns to the emblematic machines of 
the Gulf War – the F-117 stealth fighters –, which, by design, literally do not reflect (light 
and electromagnetic signals). For Virilio, the F-117 physicalizes the enmeshing of the 
real and hyperreal, where “the image dominates the thing” (111). It is the signature 
machine of the Gulf War precisely because it has no signature on radar and thermal 
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screens; it is a representationally invisible object. It was designed just as much for the 
screenic world as for the physical world – it is bound to both the laws of electromagnetic 
representation and the laws of physics. As he observes, the aircraft’s “form is linked not 
only to the requirements of movement in space but also to the requirements of its remote 
representation” (45). He concludes that this condition, in which “the remote image of an 
object has an effect on the object itself,” is “a very important event in the history of the 
image” (45). Virilio and Butler both address images, or are addressed by images, that blur 
the borders between the realities and virtualities of war – between the watching of war 
and the enacting of war. 
The stealth fighter’s taking-place in the world is linked to its not-taking-place on 
the screen; the taking-place of the smart bomb in the world is linked to its taking-up a 
different, screenic place in the living room. Given these varieties of taking and not taking 
place, it is worth revisiting the contentious title of Baudrillard’s Gulf War commentary 
The Gulf War Did Not Take Place (Guerre du Golfe n'a pas eu lieu). Despite the obvious 
arguments against a literal reading of the title (“Of course it took place!”), the title and 
the subsequent claims of the book raise interesting questions about what it means, in 
screenic terms, to “take place.” More than signifying “to happen” or “not to happen,” to 
ask whether the Gulf War “took place” is to question the modes of occupying space and 
time in the material world against the modes of occupying space and time in the 
simultaneously occurring screenic world. For Baudrillard, the only course of inquiry is to 
question the reality (or unreality) of the spectacle itself because any notion of a reality 
beyond the simulacra of the television is rendered inaccessible by those very same 
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processes of simulation. But what “takes place” on television in Butler’s living room or 
aboard Virilio’s F-117 are both instances of a taking-place that paradoxically does not 
take place – the smart bomb explodes, but not in her living room, and the stealth jet 
appears in the sky, but not on the screen. What Baudrillard only suggests, Virilio and 
Butler confront more directly: the paradoxical inter-actions of materiality and 
immateriality that “take place” in the gulf between being present there now, in the Gulf, 
and being represented here now, on the screen. For Virilio, this mutually assured 
enactment of the world on the screen and the screen on the world is “true tele-action” – 
“the establishing of the interactivity of the partners in war: those actually making war, 
and those watching it at the same time as their counterparts” (Desert 56). “The remote 
interaction of a being at once absent and acting (teleactive),” he writes elsewhere, 
“redefines the very notion of being there,” and, I would add, redefines the notion of 
taking place (Sky 131). Where Baudrillard might argue that we were cut off from any 
reality of the war beyond the simulations on the screen, Virilio would insist that events on 
the screen “loom up” into events in reality (Sky 131). Despite Baudrillard’s provocative 
title, it is not simply a question of whether the Gulf War did or did not “take place,” but a 
question of the possibility of “taking place” at the intersection of the world and the 
screen. The concept of “taking place” is loaded. It carries with it the sense of happening 
(as an event), substituting for (taking the place of, in lieu of), and, in a colonial sense, 
conquering territory and people (literally taking the place). What kind of place, then – 
what kind of milieu – is the screen? What “takes place” there? What does it “take the 
place of”? What place does it (over)take? Both Butler and Virilio convincingly argue, 
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perhaps with more nuance than Baudrillard, that the screen does not merely “take the 
place of” (substitute itself for) the world. Rather, the screen is part of the world, 
interacting with and enacting what “takes place” in the world. Its relationship with the 
world (of the Gulf War) is one of continuity (metonym) not substitution (metaphor). 
Furthermore, the screen also “takes place” in the colonial sense – it overtakes the events 
of optical reality. It usurps the present, actual taking-place of the world in favor of a 
distant technologically mediated taking-place. 
•   •   • 
However bodiless the screens of the Gulf War appeared, the screens of war are 
inextricable from the bodies of war. They assemble, arrange, filter and expose the bodies 
occupying both sides of the screen, putting the lucky and the unlucky, the spectator and 
the spectacle, the one targeting and the targeted into relations that are neither entirely 
based in the material world nor entirely based in the virtualities of the screenic world. In 
the ensemble of image-flows, data-flows, and matter-flows that comprised the Gulf War, 
the screen and the skin serve as two mediating membranes – two interfaces – within that 
assemblage of war. They are two surfaces of war capable of being both porous and 
impermeable, both intelligible and inscrutable. They are surfaces of war upon which we 
read the interpenetration of the material world and virtual world – what N. Katherine 
Hayles describes as the “the entanglement of signal and materiality” (Druckery 15), or 
what Virilio calls the sites of “passage from something material to something that is not’” 
(Friedberg 184). The screen and the skin are two boundaries that adjoin the many terrains 
of war and organize the perception of war by mapping the relations between materiality 
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and immaterality, mobility and stasis, reality and virtuality, subject and object, human 
and machine, self and other, life and death, desire and destruction. They are the surfaces 
of complex assemblages of human, geographic, and technologic interrelations couched 
within the war machine. The screen and the skin are sites of protection from and exposure 
to the war machine. They are engaged in the dual-function of damming up and flowing 
forth, of sealing-off and seeping-out.  
In The Book of Skin, a cultural history of skin, Bruce Connor unfolds the links 
between the medial functions of the screen and the skin, arguing that they both serve as 
membranes of passage and obstruction: “if the skin is a screen and a filter, it is also the 
medium of passage and exchange, with the attendant possibility of violent reversal or 
rupture” (65). He characterizes the human senses as “milieux, or midplaces where inside 
and outside meet and meld” and concludes that “the skin is the global integral of these 
local area networks, the milieu of these milieux” (Connor 27). If, for Connor, the skin is 
the midplace of midplaces – an integral borderland – the screen, he argues, serves a 
similar function “as a separating membrane, screening out unwanted stimulus and 
marking the point of defining interface between the user and his or her object” – a 
function which “yield[s] to a much more complex interimplication of the user and the 
used” (68). For Connor, the skin is a screen and the screen is a skin. Both skin and screen 
function as boundaries that mediate media and mediate each other. The interpenetration 
of these two surfaces, of course, has a history of inducing anxiety about human and 
technological limits. One need only turn to popular cinema for expressions of this 
anxiety. As countless critics have pointed out, films like Alien and Videodrome explicitly 
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explore these liminal anxieties, where the flesh is both comprised of and penetrated by 
inorganic and extra-organic life. These films explore a condition in which, as Connor 
argues, “the skin is no longer primarily a membrane of separation, but a medium of 
connection or greatly intensified semiotic permeability, of codes, signs, images, forms, 
desires” (Connor 66). These anxieties of the flesh are present in the imagination of the 
Gulf War as well. Instead of Videodrome’s technologically integrated flesh – a hybrid 
substrate, both video and flesh – the anxiety represented by the Gulf War spectacle is the 
disappearance of any substrate altogether (whether fleshy, geographical, or 
photochemical) leaving in its absence a seemingly immaterial, impermanent, and frenetic 
image-event dispersed across and held episodically in the light of screens. Instead of Max 
Renn’s cry in Videodrome – “Long live the new flesh!” – an equally sinister image 
condition emerges from the Gulf, not of a horrifyingly integrated “new flesh,” but a 
terrifyingly disconnected fleshlessness – not a medium of connection but a ubiquitous 
disconnection that is yet visually immediate and present.  
So why seek the flesh within the fleshless Gulf War spectacle? In part to re-
articulate and re-member the disarticulated and dismembered bodies of war, but also 
because the cybernetic fantasies of warfare that were played out in the Gulf, 
paradoxically, spawn new fleshly, analogue experiences and forms. Michal Rovner’s 
photographs of televisual images, reprocessed to the point of inscrutability, Jarecke’s 
detailed photodocumentation of the carbonized flesh of Basra Road bombing victims, 
David O. Russell’s bile-spilling scenes of bullet-punctured organs, or Swofford’s bodily 
exposure to the natural and unnatural elements in the Iraqi desert: they all imagine and 
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reenvision embodied experiences and forms in the light of (in all senses), and sometimes 
in despite of, the hegemonic screens of war. If the war machine builds itself out of 
hardware, software, and bioware – innovations in the hardware and software also entail 
innovations in the bioware (the human components). The machines of war not only give 
rise to new forms of embodiment and embodied experiences – those of the screenic, 
consisting of the photographic, cinematic, and literary reimaginings of the body – but 
they also create new kinds weaponized and victimized bodies – screened as such and also 
masked via the screen. The photographic, cinematic, and literary images discussed in the 
following sections work to reclaim the bodies that were elided on the screens of the Gulf 
War spectacle. They look to bodies as surfaces upon which the Gulf War does, in fact, 
“take place.” 
 
Decoy & Decay: The Photographs of Michal Rovner and Ken Jarecke 
Here are two photographs depicting Gulf War bodies. 
The first, Decoy #1 (Man One), an abstract figure of a man with raised arms, is a 
photograph from artist Michal Rovner’s (Israeli, b. 1957) Decoy series, which is 
comprised of Polaroid photographs of television images that are then re-photographed, 
enlarged, and re-colored.44  
 
 
 
                                                
44 During the Gulf War, Rovner used a Polaroid camera to take photographs of television news 
reports as she watched the coverage from her apartment in Manhattan. She then enlarged and colorized the 
photographs, which rendered the subjects as abstract figures often appearing blurred and shadowy in 
strange landscapes. 
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The second photograph, taken by photojournalist Ken Jarecke in the wake of the 
“Highway of Death” massacre along the road to Basra, which the Observer later 
captioned as “The Real Face of War” when it published the image on 3 March, 1991, 
captures the carbonized remains of an Iraqi man seen through the blown out windshield 
of the jeep in which he was retreating from Kuwait when American A-10s 
indiscriminately firebombed the 1000 vehicle caravan on 27 February, 1991.  
Figure 9. Decoy #1 (Man One). © 2013 Michal Rovner. 
Courtesy Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York. 
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Few iconic photographs emerged from the Gulf War. One method of sanitizing 
war is to avoid the intractable existence of photographs in favor of more quick and 
ephemeral images. The spectacle of the Gulf War was a brief and assimilable collective 
fantasy comprised of fleeting televisual images that displaced the possibility of a lasting 
collective memory and pacified the threat of contingency. Photography, in contrast, 
retains in its surface both a potential foundation for collective memory and a haven for 
contingency. The Gulf War, like the campaigns in the Falklands, Grenada, and Panama, 
as John Taylor demonstrates in Body Horror, centered around “making heroic bodies 
appear while emphasizing the clash of machines” (177). In the effort to avoid “Vietnam 
Figure 10. Highway of Death. ©Kenneth Jarecke. Courtesy of the photographer. 
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Syndrome,” the Gulf War became an exercise in image regulation and control.45 As the 
previous chapter attests, the cultural memory of the Vietnam War is stained in part by the 
disarticulated and dead bodies that persist in photographs: the naked, napalmed girl, the 
street-side execution of a Viet Cong man, the My Lai massacre, the wounded soldiers and 
civilians, and the body bags. The cultural memory of the Gulf War, in contrast, is a 
predominantly stainless collection of aerial images, maps, and machines inserted into a 
narrative of unambiguous military triumph.  
In a war that systematically overlooked and obscured the bodies of war, save for 
the “heroic” bodies of soldiers, Rovner’s decoy man and Jarecke’s carbonized man, 
alternatively, introduce two distinct ways of witnessing the bodily surfaces of the Gulf 
War: one that foregrounds the interference of media and one that attempts to circumvent 
it.46 Rovner’s artistic creation upends our expectations of traditional war photography 
while Jarecke’s documentary record relies on those expectations.47 Both photographs 
raise similar questions about the taking-place of the Gulf War that permeates the theories 
of Butler, Virilio, and Baudrillard discussed in the last section. In particular, they explore 
the interactions between the skin and the screen as two of the primary surfaces upon 
which war ‘takes place’ and introduce themselves as a third surface: the photograph. 
They reimagine, photographically, the body as surface.  
                                                
45 See Michelle Kendrick’s “Kicking the Vietnam Syndrome: CNN’s and CBS’s Video Narratives 
of the Persian Gulf War” in Seeing Through the Media: The Persian Gulf War, edited by Susan Jeffords 
and Lauren Rabinovitz (New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1994). 
46 See John Taylor, Body Horror: Photojournalism, Catastrophe and War (New York: New York 
UP, 1998) for an excellent analysis of the kinds of bodies that are hidden and revealed in war photography. 
47 In general, war photographs are expected to provide a sense of authentic presence, documentary 
evidence, aesthetic humility, and a brutal, un-tampered-with visual record. Though many war photographs 
technically fail to meet these criteria, the successful ones at least appear to meet them. Rovner’s 
photograph undoes these expectations and Jarecke appears to meet them. 
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Rovner, sitting in her New York apartment, taking Polaroid snapshots of Gulf 
War news coverage on her television, creates an indeterminate image that echoes and 
even amplifies the indeterminacies of the screen images she captures. The distant, 
fleeting television image, already rendering the body through layers of screens, becomes, 
through her photographic manipulations, even more reprocessed, retouched, and 
reframed. Her photograph depicts a bodily figure even more inscrutable and abstract than 
the one that first appeared on television. Jarecke’s iconic and controversial photograph, in 
contrast, belongs to a more traditional kind of war photography. It documents in graphic 
detail the destruction, death, and chaos of war as written on immolated flesh and metal. 
Operating outside the official press pool, Jarecke provides a picture of the body that 
stands in stark contrast to the disembodied spectacle exemplified by the Schwarzkopf 
press briefing that began this chapter. Operating out of her apartment in New York, 
Rovner creates a parodic vision, in which bodies don’t stand in contrast to, but rather in 
exaggerated imitation of the disembodied spectacle of the Gulf War.  
What are the differences between Rovner’s photographic stills of ‘virtual’ events 
on television and Jarecke’s photograph of the aftermath of the ‘actual’ events of the Basra 
Road Massacre? How does each photograph place (or displace) the body? Or, in more 
Barthesian terms, how do they pose decoy man and carbonized man?48 And how do they 
pose us in relation to them? How do they pose the body in war? How does Gulf War pose 
                                                
48 Roland Barthes argues, “what founds the nature of Photography is the pose” (Camera Lucida 
78). He meditates on how one poses for photographs and, at the same time, how one is posed by the 
photograph. This arresting quality of the photograph is, for Barthes, one of its key separations from cinema. 
Photography poses and cinema passes. Here it is worth quoting an excerpt from a long, yet elegant sentence 
in Camera Lucida: “in the Photograph something has posed in front of the tiny hole and has remain there 
forever (that is my feeling); but in cinema, something has passed in front of this same tine hole: the pose is 
swept away and denied by the continuous series of images: it is a different phenomenology, and therefore a 
different art which begins here, though derived from the first one” (78). 
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the body to Rovner and Jarecke? How, in other words, do these photographs enter the 
economy of posing, composing, and decomposing bodies of war? This section explores 
the ways in which Rovner’s decoy man and Jarecke’s carbonized man pose the bodies of 
war to us (as photographs) and pose us toward the bodies of war (as spectators). Rovner’s 
and Jarecke’s photographs place the body and place us in relation to the body through 
different photographic negotiations of location and dislocation, composition and 
decomposition, and manipulation and documentation. In doing so, decoy man and 
carbonized man introduce a different picture of the Gulf War that troubles the cavalier 
spectatorship surrounding Schwarzkopf’s luckiest man.  
If, as Virilio has argued, we were all “a hostage of the televisual interface” during 
the Gulf War, Rovner’s decoy man, arms raised in surrender, encapsulates that condition 
in a single photograph (Desert 21). Her photograph appears on the cover of Barrett 
Watten’s prose poem Bad History, a text that intermingles the events of the Gulf War and 
the L.A. riots within the consciousness of the narrator. The poem opens with an 
unacknowledged reference to Rovner’s image:  
A bad event happened to me, and now I understand it occurred only there and 
then. But it was the continuous, circling treadmill of its displacement for a very 
long time, brought to a single image – obscured, interfered with, reprocessed at a 
third remove over remote-control channels of communicative links – that got me 
to say this. (9-10) 
 
Watten has argued elsewhere, in a review of the Decoy Series, that Rovner’s work 
begins with the premise that “where unthinkable events are concerned, interference is as 
much a form of knowledge as clarity would be” (Artweek 14). The knowledge embodied 
by Rovner’s decoy man is not the knowledge of facts – not the statistics and numbers of a 
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Schwarzkopf press briefing. Rather, decoy man presents the obstructed view itself as a 
kind of knowledge of war, as a way of seeing how we see war. In Bad History, Watten 
seems to borrow that premise for his approach to the over-mediated events of the early 
1990s. If, as Watten suggests, Rovner’s photograph captures the “treadmill of … 
displacement” that permeated the television cycle of the Gulf War, that displacement – 
that dislocation – starts with the artist’s own predicament on that treadmill. Even more 
acutely than Judith Butler beholding the smart bomb in her living room, Rovner felt 
dislocated by the television (Rovner 34). The war threatened the security of Rovner’s 
family in Israel. She found herself relaying real-time reports from CNN to her parents in 
Israel from her apartment in New York. Her spectatorship – one of temporal immediacy 
and spatial distance – was both fascinated and anxious, both amazed and devastated by 
the alienating prosthesis of the technologically mediated spectacle.  
Rovner engages the fascination and anxiety that attended the spectacle of the Gulf 
War by parodying its images. Rovner’s Decoy photographs comment on the televisual 
decoys that occupied the 24-hour news cycle during the Gulf War. By reprocessing and 
reframing the televisual image, she adds layers of interference to an already interfered 
image. The result is an image that exaggerates and thus foregrounds the pervasive sense 
of disconnection between images and their purported referents already at work in the 
televisual images of the Gulf War. Decoy man does not convey anything in particular; 
rather he surrenders to a vague vision of war. Like the televisual image that is at its core, 
it does not furnish a picture of war, only a picture of a picture of war. Rovner 
caricaturizes the dominant image of the Gulf War and thus calls attention to it not merely 
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as a false impression, but as a decoy luring us toward a spectatorial trap. Unlike 
traditional war photography, which, as in the case of Jarecke’s photograph, seems so 
present at the scene, whose power comes from the being-there of the photographer, 
Rovner’s images are photographs of photographs of television screens. This removed, 
layered, and distorted view echoes the immediacy-at-remove that was the Gulf War on 
television. Decoy man calls to mind Laura Marks’ comments on the haptic quality of 
undefined images:  
An image that is grainy, indistinct, or dispersed over the surface of the screen 
invites a haptic look, or a look that uses the eye like and organ of touch […] 
Because it does not rely on the recognition of figures, haptic looking permits 
identification with (among other things) loss, in the decay and partialness of the 
image. (105)  
 
In this sense, Rovner’s decoy is also about decay – not the bodily decay of Jarecke’s 
carbonized man so much as the decay that haunts all technologically reproducible 
images. 
If Rovner’s decoy man conveys a sense of dislocation, Jarecke’s carbonized man 
is grounded in a sense of location. Jarecke was among a number of photojournalists 
operating outside the bounds of the official press pool who captured the aftermath.49The 
many photographs taken of the “Highway of Death” received very little media attention 
save for Jarecke’s, which was published in both England and France in the days 
following the massacre. It has become perhaps the most iconic photograph of the Gulf 
War. The antiwar group Refuse and Resist, as part of a protest funded in part by Kurt 
Vonnegut, projected it on the side of U.N. headquarters and onto the walls of CBS, ABC, 
                                                
49 See also photojournalist Peter Turnley’s superb and devastating photographs of the same 
massacre in The Unseen Gulf War, which can be found at digitaljournalist.org. 
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and NBC in New York (Briemberg 350). Tony McGrath, picture editor at The Observer, 
defended his editorial choice to be the first to publish what he describes as “not an easy 
picture”:  
It’s the first picture of any serious description of death in the war. The function of 
the picture is to say, war is disgusting, humiliating, and degrading, and diminishes 
everybody … There were 1400 vehicles in that convoy, and every picture 
transmitted until that one came, two days after the event, was of debris, bits of 
equipment. No human involvement at all…it could have been a scrapyard … So 
many of the pictures we’ve seen from this war have been frivolous, some rather 
macho – preening and strutting. But this was altogether different. It was a terribly 
difficult picture to take, because you’re so close to voyeurism, but I think it 
worked. (“Publishing” 4) 
 
Jarecke’s photograph does, as McGrath worries, present to us the risk of mere 
voyeurism, but it also provides a record of a kind of bodily disarticulation that was absent 
from the Gulf War spectacle and, as McGrath points out, absent even from other pictures 
of the “Highway of Death” that came across the transom. The bombs dropped along the 
highway became an unnecessary and terrifying kind of camera whose flash captured 
bodies, stilled them, and cooked them. That Jarecke in turn captured the aftermath may 
be a kind of voyeurism, but certainly not any worse than the sanitized spectacle that 
sought to elide the aftermath. Where the Gulf War on television called for casual glances, 
Jarecke’s carbonized man demands a sustained look. It pictures the body, not the 
machine. Its view is not from some impenetrable altitude; it is on the ground. It has 
propinquity to the flesh and to death. The surface of the photograph is the emulsified 
index of this carbonized flesh; the flesh, in turn, is the index of the bombs.  
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•    •   • 
Rovner’s and Jarecke’s photographs envision the modes (and are among the 
modes) through which the bodies of war are composed and decomposed. Both 
photographs hold in common inscrutable flesh. From different perspectives and toward 
differing effects, they both picture unrecognizable bodily surfaces. Like the image of the 
oil-soaked seabirds, Rovner creates and Jarecke documents “sticky and unintelligible” 
bodily surfaces. Jarecke’s photograph tries to remove the coating and reveal the “reality” 
of war beyond the screen – to show the body. Rovner, on the other hand, illuminates the 
coating itself. The inscrutability of Rovner’s photograph results from the screen, while 
Jarecke’s results from the skin. Rovner’s decoy man is blurred first by the distancing 
perspective of the screen, then by her own manipulations. The unreadability of Jarecke’s 
carbonized man, in contrast, results not from the distancing view of the screen but from 
an intimate photographic view of immolated flesh. Rovner’s photographs render the body 
inscrutable while Jarecke photographs inscrutable bodies.  
In Rovner’s image we experience the lure of the decoy and in Jarecke’s, the allure 
of the decay. Rovner’s decoy draws us toward danger – it represents a vague and 
permanent threat – while Jarecke’s documentation of decay details the destruction. The 
former’s image of potential violence conveys a kind of terror while the latter’s image of 
the effects of violence conveys a kind of horror. The blurry fabric-like texture of 
Rovner’s decoy calls us to decipher the various threads of interference while the harsh 
wax-like disfigurations of Jarecke’s decay draw us into a study of its intractable detail.  
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As Rovner intentionally obscures and Jarecke faithfully preserves the world 
before the lens, they not only elucidate the compositions and decompositions of the 
bodily surfaces of war, they also relay two distinct senses place in relation to the screens 
of the Gulf War. 
The photographic apparatus takes an instant of past time, frames it, preserves it, 
and carries it into the present. The photograph is the record of what “takes place” in front 
of its lens. To “take” a picture, then, is to capture what “takes place” in an instant in front 
of the camera and grant it a more durable existence that “takes the place of” the moment 
in the world that created it. Photographs, both analog and digital, owe their existence to 
the having-been-there of the camera and to the taking-place of the world before the 
lens.50  
Both Rovner’s photo-manipulation and Jarecke’s photo-realism rely on this 
photographic capacity to automatically and faithfully document the reality in front of its 
lens – to map one piece of the visible world onto another whether or not that piece of the 
world is a moment on television or a corpse in the desert.51 Rovner exploits and Jarecke 
preserves this photographic capacity.  
                                                
50 A note on indexicality: Analog photographs, because they are concrete and continuous with the 
world seem, perhaps, (given their indexical ties to the world) more reliable, more direct, and more auratic. 
Digital photographs, on the other hand, seem, perhaps, less tangible, less reliable, and more prone to 
manipulation because they lack such indexical links to the world. They are discrete from and discontinuous 
with the world. But, as I hope to demonstrate through the Abu Ghraib photographs in the next chapter, the 
power of photographs, whether digital or analog, are derived not from the extent of their indexicality, but, I 
argue, from the having-been-there of the camera – what Barthes deemed the photograph’s “certificate of 
presence” (87). Whether emanations of light from the world are imprinted on a photosensitive substrate or 
translated into data by a charge-coupled device, the basic fact of the having-been-there of the camera is 
arguably the most important factor in shaping the unique representational power of the photograph. 
51 I am borrowing language from Timothy Binkley’s illuminating essay, “Refiguring Culture,” on 
the material and operational differences between analog and digital media forms. “Consider photography as 
a function which maps one piece of the visible universe onto another” (Binkley 111).
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Like all photographs, they present an intractable reality; “the referent” as Roland 
Barthes would say, “adheres” (5-6). This basic photographic fact permeates both 
photographs: their having-been-there (whether elsewhere, in front of the television 
screen, or there, along the road to Basra). However, where Jarecke’s photograph 
documents what has “taken place,” Rovner documents what has not, at least literally, 
“taken place,” but instead, captures that which flickers and floats episodically on the 
television screen – that which “takes place” elsewhere. If Jarecke’s photograph is the 
record of having-been-there, Rovner’s is the record of having-been-elsewhere. For 
Rovner, a sense of dislocation stemming from screen image pervades her photograph. 
Jarecke’s photograph, however, conveys a sense of location – a sense of being there – in 
spite of and in opposition to the dislocating power of the screen. It is through their 
respective relationships to elsewhereness and thereness and that Rovner dislocates and 
Jarecke locates the bodies of the Gulf War.  
Whether “there” or “elsewhere” – whether located or dislocated – both 
photographs oppose the here-now of the televisual perspective by imposing what Barthes 
described as a “funereal immobility” on the frenetic images of the Gulf War (Barthes 5-
6). Rovner’s photographs bring a funereal immobility to the glut and flow of the 
television screen – they literally immobilize the images on television. Jarecke captures 
the already funereal, already immobile scene of carbonized flesh along the Basra road. 
But what they capture and how they capture it differs. Rovner captures a passing 
televisual image – already a mediated image. Her photograph is an image of an image. 
The adhering referent is a referent of a referent. Its link to the world has already been 
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framed, edited, and manipulated before Rovner ever snapped a Polaroid. Decoy man is 
born of the world of images; carbonized man births an image of world.  
Rovner’s referent – decoy man – perseveres in the photograph (despite Rovner’s 
and the television’s interference) as a vague body whose form nonetheless dominates the 
photograph like a terrifying blotch. The referent in Jarecke’s photograph – carbonized 
man – adheres seemingly unobstructed and unmeddled with (save for the intervention of 
framing, filters, f-stops, and film speeds). Where decoy man struggles to emerge from the 
fog of copy-loss, carbonized man appears as a direct transaction between the camera and 
the world negotiated by light. In an act of creative destruction, Rovner, through her 
photographic interventions, decomposes the decoy man. Jarecke, by contrast, provides 
the record of an act of destructive creation. He composes a photograph of a decomposed 
world. 
Rover’s Decoy Series reminds us that all photographic images, in a sense, are 
decoys and that they all, in a sense, also represent the decay of the pastness they carry 
with them in their ephemeral surface. They hold what Mary Ann Doane in The 
Emergence of Cinematic Time argues is the “threat and lure” – the decoyness – of 
contingency that generates in the viewer the “fascination and anxiety” that attends 
looking at them. Rovner’s manipulated photographs announce themselves as decoys and 
so, paradoxically, they don’t work as decoys. Rather, her images are about decay – the 
decay inherent in technologically mediated perception. In the case of the Jarecke 
photograph, however, where we are faced with a blunt picture of brutality and death (the 
ultimate contingency), the fascination and anxiety of contingency is foregrounded. The 
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conditions of its production are concealed in the unconscious of the image and it presents 
itself as the world it captured, making it a perfect decoy. The viewer confronts the dual 
pleasure (both of fascination and anxiety) of beholding such a gruesome and final 
spectacle intractably present in the photograph. “There is the satisfaction of being able to 
look at the image without flinching,” Sontag once reminded us. And “there is the pleasure 
of flinching” (41). Carbonized man – a photographic decoy – encourages both the 
satisfaction of not flinching and the pleasures of flinching. Ironically, Rovner’s decoy is 
an image of decay and Jarecke’s decay is a decoy image.  
 
‘Infected Pockets of Bile’: Piercing the Body in Three Kings 
If Rovner and Jarecke show how war is imprinted on the surface of the body, the film 
Three Kings shows how war penetrates the body. From the very first line of Three Kings – “Are 
we shooting people or what?” – the film foregrounds the act of shooting – both film and bullets – 
and in doing so brings a self-conscious and critical view to the distant and sanitized perspectives 
that dominated the mediation of the Gulf War. The film opens not with the aerial and orbital 
view that characterized Gulf War coverage; rather, it begins on the ground. Before the first 
image illuminates the screen we hear the sound of boots in the sand. The war has just ended, the 
movie has just begun and Troy Barlow (Mark Wahlberg) stops running as he spots an Iraqi man 
atop a distant sand berm. He looks over his shoulder back at the other soldiers, back toward the 
film crew, and back at us, asking,  
“Are we shooting people or what?”  
Off screen, another soldier bounces the question right back to Barlow: “Are we 
shooting?”  
   121 
 
“I don’t know,” Troy impatiently snaps back, “that’s what I’m asking!”  
The camera pans quickly across a bleached out desert landscape and zooms in on 
two more soldiers nonchalantly milling about – one trying to help the other get a piece of 
sand out of his eye. Everyone on the patrol is preoccupied – either negotiating stray 
specks of sand or reluctantly sharing chewing gum. An air of indifference meets Barlow’s 
question. The camera pans back to him and then peers down the sights of his gun. 
Through the sights we see an Iraqi man waving a white flag in one hand and gripping an 
AK-47 in the other. Barlow fires a single shot that whizzes across distance landing with a 
thud into the neck of the Iraqi. The previous indifference of the other soldiers turns to 
excitement. They all rush over to the berm where the Iraqi bleeds to death.  
“I didn’t think I’d get to see anyone shot over here,” one of them exclaims. 
Someone snaps a photograph, Barlow averts his eyes. The opening credits roll. 
Barlow/Wahlberg seems to simultaneously ask if the war is over (“are we 
shooting people or what?”) and if the film has begun (“are we shooting, people, or 
what?”). They are ground soldiers who didn’t get to do any shooting in an air-dominated 
war; they are actors who have begun shooting a movie. The initial shot is the initial shot. 
From the first scene onward, in almost every moment of shooting, the film concentrates 
on singular bullets and singular durations, as if to remind the viewer that we are indeed 
shooting. 
Three Kings is a farce that is part moral coming-of-age story and part caper. Just days 
after the official ceasefire, four American soldiers – Archie Gates (George Clooney), Troy 
Barlow (Mark Wahlberg), Chief Elgin (Ice Cube), and Conrad Vig (Spike Jonze) – plot to steal 
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millions of dollars worth of stolen Kuwaiti gold hidden in Saddam’s bunkers using a map they 
found hidden on an Iraqi POW. In the midst of their thievery they bear witness to Saddam’s 
brutal suppression of the Kurdish rebellion. This awakens their moral outrage – both at Saddam’s 
brutality and the U.S. government’s broken promises to the Kurds. The four soldiers decide that 
in addition to stealing the gold they will help the Kurdish rebels reach safety across the Iranian 
border. 
Three Kings is among only a handful of big-budget films (including Jarhead and 
Courage Under Fire) to be set in the context of the Gulf War. Like Courage Under Fire 
(the Rashomon remake in which certain events that took place in the Gulf War must be 
reassembled from the unreliable narrative fragments of various eye witnesses), Three 
Kings also takes place after the war has ended. A similar untimeliness also permeates the 
film Jarhead (which is based on the eponymous memoir discussed in the next section). It 
takes place during, but away from the action of the Gulf War. The Gulf War is over 
before the Marines in Jarhead know what has happened. It’s as if Gulf War films cannot 
find grounding in the evanescence of the Gulf War’s televisual spectacle and must 
instead seek a setting away from or after the action.52 What Virilio called “the tyranny of 
real time” prevailed in the Gulf. Film seems to find purchase only outside the purview of 
such a tyrant. Thus Three Kings conveys a sense of being out of time: the war is over, it’s 
too late. 
Before the film begins the following message to the audience appears: “The 
makers of Three Kings used visual distortion and unusual colors in some scenes of this 
                                                
52 The made-for-TV HBO film Live from Bagdad is an exception as it takes place in the milieu of 
the 24-hour news cycle of the Gulf War. 
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film. They intentionally used these unconventional techniques to enhance the emotional 
intensity of the story line.” Shot on hypersensitive Ektachrome stock and developed 
through a bleach-bypass process, the Gulf of Three Kings appears in high-contrast clarity 
with bright colors and washed-out whites. Where Schwarzkopf’s Gulf was comprised of 
the green-toned, grainy, and rasterized images that inspired Michal Rovner’s 
photographs, Three Kings pictures the Gulf in gritty hypercolored crispness. It stylizes 
the Gulf in a way that isn’t “derealized” like the targeting screen, but rather over-realized.  
As the four soldiers drive toward Karballah to steal the gold, they pass the time by 
shooting Nerf footballs out of the air. Shooting the footballs seems to satisfy their desire 
to shoot since they never got the opportunity to shoot during the war. Gates, the war-
weary special-forces veteran, realizing that the rest of the men don’t harbor the self-
control and maturity that the heist requires, pulls the humvee over to the side of the road 
for a little pep talk. Trying to temper their unbridled and ignorant lust for violence, Gates 
walks them over to a carbonized corpse buried in the sand. He reminds the men that “we 
dropped a lot of bombs out here.” As he points to the corpse, he seems to suggest an 
answer to the film’s opening question: it appears that we are in fact shooting people. The 
camera shows the corpse’s face frozen in agony and then cuts to the charred severed hand 
beside it. Both of these shots quote directly from two photographs by Peter Turnley, a 
photographer who, like Jarecke, captured the devastation of the “Highway of Death.”  
The jocular mood among the men turns more somber. Their encounter with the 
roadside corpses signals the beginning of a moral awakening for the soldiers, who wished 
they’d seen action, but ended up watching the war on CNN like everyone else. Gates 
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hopes that the corpse will make the other men see the war differently from the slick 
spectacle that currently structures their knowledge of the war. The immolated corpse 
signals the beginning of their emergence from the Plato’s cave of the Gulf War – but at 
the expense of the carbonized other in the sand, who can no longer speak.  
Vig’s initial disgust at the sight of the corpse disperses quickly and he once more 
bemoans the fact that he has not seen any action. He enthusiastically exaggerates the memory of 
Barlow’s shot at the opening of the film. The film flashes back to the first scene only this time, in 
Vig’s version, the Iraqi man’s head pops off and flies into the air in a fountain of blood. Vig 
cherishes this memory cinematically as the only proof that he has in fact been to war. “It was 
badass!,” he recalls. Gates continues his attempts to temper Vig’s raw desire to shoot by 
lecturing the men on the physiological effects of gunshots on the human body. Here the film 
doesn’t just imagine the bodies that were absent from the television. As if trying to undo the 
impossible distance of the television images of the war, the camera follows the bullet into the 
body. It answers the aerial view with an organ-level view. Gates points an imaginary finger gun 
at Barlow and fires. The camera follows the imaginary bullet into Barlow’s gut and then cuts to 
an interior view of the body that shows a bullet slicing through organs as bile fills the cavity. The 
imaginary sequence ends with a reversal. The imaginary bullet retreats out of the body and back 
to Gates’ imaginary gun. Gates reminds the soldiers and the filmmakers: “No unnecessary 
shots.” 
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The bullet and camera that enter the body in this scene is not computer generated. Rather 
the filmmakers borrowed technology developed at UCLA Medical School that records the 
insides of cadavers to study how the body reacts to different traumas like gunshots. The cadaver 
is shot by an actual bullet penetrating actual organs. Shot at a high frame rate, the camera 
captures the bullet’s path. 
Three Kings in general, and the cadaver scene in particular, remind the viewer that it was 
not the technological conditions of “virtualization” that made the spectacle of the Gulf War 
appear so false and empty. Three Kings, like the television coverage and targeting screens, is also 
in the business of virtualizing the war. Instead of grainy aerial views it uses gut-level views. 
Instead of colorless images, it utilizes an Ektachromatic palette that could only be an effect of 
film, not of any “natural” mode of vision. Both the war spectacle and the film spectacle reach 
beyond any kind of ocular reality – in the former the body disappears in the distance of the 
image; in the latter the image enters the body. The difference between the televisually mediated 
vision of the Gulf War and Three Kings’ cinematic reenvisioning of it is not the virtualizing 
Figure 11. Three Kings. © 1999 Warner Brothers Entertainment, Inc. 
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forces of technology, but rather the extent to which they project and reflect the body as a surface 
of war. 
 
The Body as Screen: Anthony Swofford’s Jarhead  
 Christopher Norris, in Uncritical Theory, his polemic against Baudrillard, identifies 
a common theme among the first-hand accounts of the Gulf War:  
the curious sense of not really having experienced these events at all, but having 
witnessed them only at a distant remove where ‘reality’ could scarcely get into 
conflict with the steady stream of images, war-game scenarios, media liaison 
exercises, and so forth. (122) 
  
 Norris, in this case, seems to be in support of Baudrillard, not against him, for he 
suggests that, even for soldiers and reporters on the ground, the Gulf War did not seem to 
“take place.” The soldiers in Three Kings depict this sense of disconnection. At one point 
Vig says, “The only action we saw was on CNN.” This sense of disconnection also 
pervades Anthony Swofford’s Gulf War memoir Jarhead. For him, the surface of the war 
isn’t the television screens of Schwarzkopf’s briefing room or of Judith Butler’s and 
Michal Rovner’s living rooms. The surface of the war is Swofford’s body, there, in the 
Gulf. Yet despite his physical presence in the desert, his thereness, he remains, 
paradoxically, dislocated. He doesn’t seem to be in a war so much as on the margins of it. 
The war does not “take place” for Swofford, at least not in the mother-of-all-battles way 
that he and his fellow Marine’s both desire and dread. He is close to the war, yet it 
remains distant.  
 As the subtitle announces, Jarhead is “a Marine’s chronicle of the Gulf War and 
other battles” and Swofford builds this chronicle out of an inventory of bodily fluids 
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(sweat, shit, piss, semen, blood, both withheld and spilled), of sand (blown around, dug 
into, and trudged through), of profanity, and of intermingled moments of boredom, 
anguish, joviality, rage, loneliness, and self-mutiny (2). Like Tim O’Brien’s Vietnam in 
The Things They Carried, where soldiers’ experiences were defined by the stuff they 
humped and the terrain they traversed, Swofford’s Gulf War is mediated not by 
illuminated screens, but screened through the material minutiae and residua of everyday 
life in the desert. From the beginning of the book, we come to know Swofford as a 
hypermasculine “I” that is constructed out of the activities of his eyes and his body. This 
“I” aims to penetrate others and attempts (but ultimately fails) to stave off the 
penetrations of others. Swofford’s chronicle of the Gulf War is constructed out of a 
particular way of seeing and embodying the war, a particular way of being an embodied 
eye/I of war. He becomes a kind of screen that shields and projects itself in the desert 
Gulf. He screens the Gulf War, not in the far-off modes of Schwarzkopf’s briefing-room 
TVs, but in an ocular, physical reality on the ground where war is mediated by even the 
sand itself. As the narrative moves through the screenings of Vietnam War films to the 
homoerotic rituals of the Marine Corps to the harsh environments of the desert to an 
encounter with the carbonized corpse of his enemy, Swofford’s experience in the Gulf is 
tied to his body, the sensorium that mediates it. If Jarhead is meant to recount the poverty 
of Swofford’s spirit, that poverty begins in a vulgar and vulnerable body of war, what 
Elaine Scarry called the “incontestable reality of the body” (Swofford 3, Scarry 130). His 
body – and, more precisely, his body-ego – constitute a desiring-machine that both serves 
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and resists the larger war machine that consumes it.53 A hyper-masculine yet vulnerable 
body that desires to penetrate surfaces – to fuck and kill – and obsessively shields itself 
from those same penetrations. Like Klaus Theweleit’s Freikorps men in Male Fantasies, 
the desire of Swofford’s Marines is structured by the threat of penetration: to avoid 
spilling over (bleeding, dying, getting fucked, exposing their vulnerability) they dam 
themselves up with both physical and psychic levies as they aim to spill others.54  
Through a vulgar and profane performance of masculinity they code themselves as 
impenetrable. They display themselves as shielded surfaces – as screens. “Through 
profanity and disgrace,” Swofford argues, the Marine communicates “the truth of his 
being” (52). 
 From the start, Swofford’s world is structured by a sexually aggressive, violent way 
of seeing. His eyes and those of his fellow Marine scout/snipers aim to penetrate and to 
conceal behind their aggressive gaze any hint of vulnerability and fear. To gear up for the 
coming war (which they imagine will be epic), the men watch Vietnam War movies 
including Platoon and Apocalypse Now. They bask in the “magic brutality” of the films 
(5). War cinema serves as a kind of pornography that prepares the men for their first war 
experience – their “real First Fuck” (7). The war movies, as Swofford observes, are a way 
for them to “get off on the various visions of carnage and violence and deceit, the raping 
                                                
53 The body-ego perhaps more accurately denotes the interpenetration of the psychical and 
corporeal experiences of war that Swofford represents in Jarhead – an embodied inner experience of war. 
Moreover, I find the screenic qualities of Freud’s concept of the body-ego apt in the context of Swofford. 
Freud says that the body-ego is the projection of a surface. “The ego is ultimately derived from bodily 
sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as a mental 
projection of the surface of the body" (Freud 20). 
54 The militarized masculinity that Swofford depicts in Jarhead echoes the fascist construction of 
masculinity that Theweleit so brilliantly and devastatingly captures in his psychoanalytic account of the 
formation of the fascist psyche in Male Fantasies. See in particular the chapter “Male Bodies and the 
‘White Terror’” (143-270). 
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and killing and pillaging” in preparation for their own entrance into war (6). Here, even 
before their deployment, Swofford constructs a voyeuristic, cinematic way of seeing that 
finds pleasure in war. As Stacey Peebles observes in “Lines of Sight,” her exploration of 
the illicit visual pleasure that marks Swofford’s memoir, the Vietnam war films (in spite 
of their often anti-war message) allow Swofford to “visually penetrate the spectacle on-
screen and take pleasure in its offerings without being vulnerable himself” (1665). 
Swofford is an eye/I that desires to inflict a violent line of sight on the world in order to 
avoid being inflicted upon.  
 As a scout/sniper Swofford considers himself the “eyes” of the battalion 
commander (190). His job is to hide and watch and perhaps kill – he is an unseen seer, a 
lethal voyeur. Like the voyeuristic pleasure he takes from watching “war porn,” the ideal 
wartime situation for a sniper such as Swofford is one in which he can penetrate the 
world and avoid discovery. The scope of his purview is the scope of his weapon. 
 He is an obsessed eye. He fantasizes about the “pink mist” of blood and brains that 
signals a successful kill shot or “medulla shot” (70). He mythologizes an enemy he’s had 
no contact with into a worthy adversary. He regales himself with sniper legends of bullets 
that go through the scope and into the eyeballs of enemy snipers. He is haunted by 
nightmares of getting shot in his own eye and seeing through that missing eye the 
bullethole in the eyeglasses he wore as a boy. He mythologizes himself as “Death from 
Afar.” Swofford’s entangled pleasure and fear stem from the fantasies of dreams and 
films and are intensified by the machinery of war (namely guns). Like the Freikorps men, 
Swofford desires to unify his body with the war machine – “to move beyond himself, 
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bulletlike, toward an object that he penetrates” (Theweleit 179). The unknown, unseen 
enemy becomes that object. He is fascinated by his rifle’s potential to do what he cannot: 
“discharge and still remain whole” (179). 
 But all his heroic fears and all his masculine performances are rendered impotent 
by a war machine that doesn’t need him. When the moment comes for him to finally 
exercise the precise artistry of “one shot/one kill” an unnecessarily blunt airstrike is 
called in to take out the two men that were his target. Instead of the neat lethality of his 
eye and rifle, the messy work of bombs from the sky does the job. Thus, even though 
Swofford was in the war and part of it, he is left to conclude that he has “remained a 
spectator” (231). He is just an eye. 
 He is also just a grunt. His body is a grunt body that must bear the brunt of the 
harsh world it occupies. In contrast to the sanitized aerial views that dominated the 
spectacle of the Gulf War, Swofford occupies a dirtier world that is on the ground and in 
the ground. He must undertake the Sisyphean task of digging into the sand. His digging is 
perpetual as the sand he removes falls back into the hole. Furthermore, his digging is 
without purpose as it has no strategic value in a war being waged from on high. There is 
“no getting out of the land…the desert is in us, ” he realizes (15). For Swofford, the 
material reality of the sand becomes the medium of the Gulf War that is more tangible 
but no less obfuscating than the images flickering by on television back home: “the 
shipped sand means you must move that sand again, as though through this thankless 
action you might know each particle personally, as though because you now actually live 
inside it, you must care about this most unstable material or medium that will make futile 
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all effort or endeavor” (177). The media ecology in which he operates is comprised of his 
literal surroundings. 
 The vulgarity and vulnerability of this hypermasculine grunt body is most clearly 
defined in the book’s “Field Fuck” scene. Swofford and the other Marines in his unit are 
ordered to play a game of football in their MOPP (Mission Oriented Protective Posture) 
suits and gas masks as a spectacle for reporters (21). The MOPP suit, which is designed 
to protect soldiers in the event of a biological attack, is a second skin – one that, for the 
news cameras, shows off their impenetrability, their immunity to deadly attack (if they 
can play football in 110-degree heat in these suits, imagine all the killing they can do in 
them). But the reality is that the suits are defective, torn, broken, and compromised. This 
game of football, for the soldiers playing it, only reminds them of how vulnerable they 
are. “I’m fucking dead already,” one of them yells trying to use his faulty hydration 
system (20). The MOPP suits – like the oil-soaked birds – are a coating of interference. 
They create a sense of dissonance among the soldiers. While showcasing their 
impenetrability to the news media, they are only further reminded of their vulnerability. 
Feeling that their situation is fucked, Swofford and the other men begin trying to fuck 
their way out of it. The football game disintegrates into chaos until all of them take turns 
at simulating the rape of scapegoat victim they’ve chosen from among themselves. This 
is what he terms the “Field Fuck:” a performance of penetration – a simulated gang bang 
– that functions as a way to compensate for all the ways they could be penetrated. “The 
exhilaration isn’t sexual,” Swofford insists, “it’s communal” (21). He then embarks on a 
two-page litany of all the things they are fucking through the Field Fuck, which includes 
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but is not limited to George Bush, CNN, all the world’s televisions, unfaithful wives, 
peaceniks, Communists, their own fear and boredom, and all the hometown girls they 
wanted but never had.  
 This performance of both aggression and vulnerability embodies Swofford’s 
experience of war a never “takes place.” The Marines have trained him to see the world 
through a sexualized and militarized gaze – a damaging concoction of sexuality and 
violence in which Swofford must objectify his enemy from a voyeuristic distance. The 
kind of gaze laid bare at Abu Ghraib during the Iraq War, where cameras became 
implements of torture in a sanctioned program of total humiliation. This intoxicating 
blend of sexuality and violence begins to unravel for Swofford, and from this unraveling, 
Swofford draws his authority to speak. As Peebles rightly observes, “Swofford claims his 
right to speak on the basis of … erosion of agency rather than its development” (1667). 
The “enemy,” for Swofford, is an object of his imagination built constructed from films, 
dreams, training, and propaganda – an object to be eliminated. This object, too, begins to 
unravel when he encounters the corpses of firebombed Iraqi soldiers. Ironically, his first 
“real” encounter with the objectified “enemy” as objects – as corpses. One corpse sits in a 
jeep immolated and carbonized exactly like the massacred body along the Basra Road in 
Jarecke’s photograph. Swofford describes his communion with the carnage:  
We stop for a water break. A few feet behind me a bombed jeep sits on the road. 
A corpse is at the wheel, sitting erect, looking serious, seeming almost to squint at 
the devastation, the corpse’s face not unlike our faces – what has happened? ... 
Men are gathered dead around what must have been their morning or evening fire. 
This is disturbing, not knowing what meal they were eating. I am looking at an 
exhibit in a war museum. But there are no curators, no docents, no benefactors 
with their names chiseled into marble…The man to my right has no head. To my 
left, the man’s head is between his legs, and his arms hang at his sides like the 
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burnt flags of defeated countries… It would be silly to speak, but I’d like to. I 
want to ask the dead men their names and identification numbers and tell them 
this will soon end. They must have questions for me. But the distance between the 
living and the dead is too immense to breach. I could bend at the waist, close my 
eyes, and try to join these men in their tight dead circle, but I am not yet one of 
them. I must not close my eyes…I feel as though I’ve entered the mirage. The 
dead Iraqis are poor company, but the presence of so much death reminds me that 
I’m alive, whatever awaits me to the north. (222-224) 
 
Of course, it is too late to speak. Swofford has stumbled into one of Jarecke’s 
photographs – a museum of death, as he suggests, impossible to curate or comment on, 
permanently what-has-been. The carbonized bodies are the only material remainder of 
what was previously, to him, only an intangible enemy. Unlike Butler’s experience of the 
smart bomb view from on high, which troubled her because it was an omnivoyant, 
alienating erasure of the other, Swofford encounters the ineffable and unspeakable 
inscribed on the flesh of the other.  
For Swofford, the screens of the Gulf War were corporeal and immediate; the 
screens of war were the skin he was in and the skin on which the effects of war were 
written. His was an embodied war that was nowhere to be found in Schwarzkopf’s 
briefing room, where the highly visible General in fatigues, on television, standing in 
front of a television, hosted the first heavily televised war. In that briefing room, all of the 
black and blank screens of the Gulf War – the black oil, black smoke, and blackened 
flesh – were superimposed by a shining spectacle that was emceed by a commander 
whose name literally translates as “Black Head.” For the charred corpses in Jarecke’s 
photograph and in Swofford’s war, the irony is too much. They became invisible screens 
in a six-week blitzkrieg in which the most powerful military in the world, according the 
Schwarzkopf’s obituary in the New York Times, “overwhelmed a country with a gross 
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national product equivalent to North Dakota’s,” and in which, “Iraq’s bridges, dams and 
power plants had been all but obliterated and tens of thousands of its troops killed 
(compared with a few hundred allied casualties).”  
It’s absurdly good television, though.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Picture Torture: Abu Ghraib and the Frames of Digital Photography 
 
No one can commit photography alone.  – Marshal McLuhan 
 
I know it looks bad. – Sabrina Harman 
 
INTERVIEWER: The Interrotron? Did you make up the name?  
ERROL MORRIS: No, it was named by my wife…She liked the name 
because it combined two important concepts – terror and interview. 
 
Framing the Photograph 
If anything was exceptional about the atrocities committed at Abu Ghraib, it was 
not the abuses themselves, it was that they were photographed. In fact, as more and more 
evidence has surfaced about how the administrations of George W Bush and Barack 
Obama have respectively engineered and suppressed the knowledge of a global regime of 
torture and detainment, we are reminded how easily torture can become standard 
operating procedure. The practice of torture is rarely a state of exception; rather, it is a 
calculated expression of state power. And contrary to ideals and values professed in its 
name, the neo-liberal democratic state is not immune to such expressions of power. 
Although the apparatus of detainment, rendition, and torture was justified through a 
rhetoric of ‘crisis’ and ‘exception,’ and implemented in the name of ‘security,’ its 
practice was calculated, programmatic, and indefinite – it unfolded logically, not 
barbarously. The Abu Ghraib photographs show us a glimpse of the modes of torture and 
violence that operate beneath the civil veneer of liberal virtues and in the name of those 
virtues. “And here we have to see – as Adorno cautioned us,” says Judith Butler in 
Frames of War, “that violence in the name of civilization reveals its own barbarism, even 
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as it ‘justifies’ its own violence by presuming the barbaric subhumanity of the other 
against who the violence is waged” (93). The very fact that so many images surfaced and 
that even more remain classified speaks to the mundane nature of the events of torture 
and the ubiquity of photography. 
If the state’s calculated torment of the body – its inscription of power upon the 
surfaces of the indefinitely detained bodies at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere – is not itself 
exceptional, the photographs depicting it are. They are exceptional because they both 
furnish proof of torture and serve as one mode of its application. That we know anything 
of the atrocities at Abu Ghraib is owed to the fact that they were photographed, but at the 
same time, that the atrocities depicted happened in the first place was in part because a 
camera was present, because the abuses were done “for the pictures.” The photographs 
are entwined with the acts they depict. “The horror of what is shown in the photographs,” 
Susan Sontag observed in “Regarding the Torture of Others,” “cannot be separated from 
the horror that the photographs were taken.” Therefore, understanding Abu Ghraib entails 
understanding its photographs. The photographs serve as both the evidence and the crime 
– they document the torture and they were central to its staging. The camera was among a 
collection of what Jasbir Puar, in her biopolitical survey of the Abu Ghraib incidents, 
calls “shaming technologies” that “function as a vital part of the humiliating, 
dehumanizing torture itself” (31). The camera joined other shaming technologies 
including stress positions, waterboards, sexual acts, forced nudity, fists, leashes, hoods, 
collars, dogs, boots, boxes, wires, shackles and handcuffs that helped to stage the 
grotesque tableaus of Abu Ghraib. In this context the camera became an “adjunct 
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weapon” in what Joseph Pugliese termed the “geocorpography” of Abu Ghraib, where, he 
argues, the abused and detained bodies of prisoners “became metonymic adjuncts of the 
external terrain of Iraq’s territory to be raped, mutilated … conquered” and, it should be 
added, humiliated (4, 14). Though the abuses were committed in the name of intelligence 
gathering, they also occurred within a larger framework of sexual humiliation, which, 
despite any claims to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), security, or liberation, 
seemed to be the dominant theme not only of Abu Ghraib, but of the spectacle of the Iraq 
War in general – from the Shock & Awe prelude to the “Mission Accomplished” photo-
op to the broadcasted medical examination of the captured Saddam Hussein.55 
The complicated entanglement of photography and torture at Abu Ghraib is 
evident in the public outrage it generated. Much of the public outcry seemed, at times, to 
displace the reality of Abu Ghraib onto the photographs themselves, as if, again in the 
words of Susan Sontag, “the fault or horror lay in the images, not in what they depict” 
(Sontag). Moreover, the photographs have also come to overshadow all the crimes that 
are not depicted at all – all the abuse and torture not occurring within the purview of the 
camera and all the pictures that have not seen the light of day. The public was invited to 
                                                
55 See John Limon, “The Shame of Abu Ghraib,” Critical Inquiry 33: 543-572. Limon argues that 
the United States’ attempt to afflict shame upon Iraq also exposes America’s own culture of shame: “My 
argument will be that America is engaged in the dispensation of shame, which requires at least an intuition 
of what it means for the United States, not only Iraq, to be a shame culture” (546). He examines the 
influence of Raphael Patai’s The Arab Mind on the policies and practices that were meant to exploit Iraqi 
shame culture (544). Slavoj Žižek, taking a more Freudian approach, also considers the disguised American 
shame at work in Abu Ghraib. In “What Rumsfeld Doesn’t Know That He Knows About Abu Ghraib” 
(published in In These Times, 21 May 2004), Žižek writes, “If Rumsfeld thinks that the main dangers in the 
confrontation with Iraq were the “unknown unknowns,” that is, the threats from Saddam whose nature we 
cannot even suspect, then the Abu Ghraib scandal shows that the main dangers lie in the “unknown 
knowns” – the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about, even 
though they form the background of our public values” (Žižek). 
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see the atrocities of Abu Ghraib as an aberration, not standard operating procedure.56 
Rather than garnering outrage toward the calculated use of torture throughout the theater 
of the “war on terror,” the photographs came to limit the outrage to what was framed 
within them and to their very existence as photographs. Indeed, at the end of the day, the 
crime for which the “seven bad apples” of Abu Ghraib were punished was photography – 
both taking and being in photographs – not for acts of torture.57 The MPs involved in the 
scandal were punished for humiliating the United States with photographs, not for the 
humiliation perpetrated on the prisoners. The events of Abu Ghraib created a reciprocal 
tided of shaming in which the humiliators were humiliated. Meanwhile the countless 
other crimes including the murder of a detainee by OGA (Other Government Agencies) 
personnel during interrogation have gone un-prosecuted.58  
The special relationship that the Abu Ghraib photographs have to the events that 
they depict – that they were taken by the perpetrators, that they added to the humiliation 
being perpetrated upon the prisoners, that they serve as evidence of the atrocities 
committed – raises important questions about how we address and are addressed by 
practices of torture and by the photographs that point to acts of torture. The Abu Ghraib 
photographs alter the way we frame our understanding of torture and other forms of state 
violence both within and beyond the walls of Abu Ghraib as well as the way we frame 
                                                
56 See Butler, Frames of War, 40-41 and Žižek, “What Rumsfeld Doesn’t Know,” for good 
summaries of government officials’ public reactions to the Abu Ghraib photographs in which the disgust is 
directed at the homosexual nature of the pictures rather than the systematic torture and abuse. 
57 See Morris’s New York Times blog entry “The Most Curious Thing,” 19 May 2008. 
58 A key fact explored in Errol Morris’s documentary, Standard Operating Procedure, which will 
be discussed more later in the chapter, is that Sabrina Harman was prosecuted for taking photographs of 
Manadel al-Jamadi’s corpse, but the CIA agents (Mark Swanner in particular) who were responsible for his 
death during interrogation have remained unprosecuted. 
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photography itself. The question of torture and the question of photography become 
interrelated at Abu Ghraib where the torture frames the photograph and the photograph 
frames the torture.  
In her recent endeavor to trace the connections between the visual and political 
regimes of war in Frames of War, Judith Butler argues that the framing of torture and the 
framing of photography at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere affects and is an effect of the larger 
frames of the Iraq War. Butler contends that “war is framed in certain ways to control and 
heighten affect in relations to the differential grievability of life” (26). In other words, the 
framing of some lives as grievable (and thus recognizable) and the framing other lives as 
ungrievable (and thus unrecognizable) is central to the practice of war. “Such frames,” 
she says, “do not merely reflect on the material conditions of war, but are essential …to 
that material reality” (26). For Butler, then, cameras are among the technologies that 
shape the literal, discursive, and symbolic frames through which war acts on the senses 
(51-52). Thus, like the dialectic of borders and gulfs at work in the media ecology of the 
Gulf War discussed in the previous chapter, Butler’s concept of the “frames of war” is an 
attempt to draw out both the links and gaps between bodies, machines, and images that 
shape both the practice of war and the possibilities of resistance to it. Hearkening back to 
her Gulf War critique of smart bomb cameras, she links the operation of cameras at Abu 
Ghraib to the operation of cameras as part of the bombing apparatus, concluding that 
“there is no way to separate, under present historical conditions, the material reality of 
war from those representational regimes through which it operates and which rationalize 
its own operation” (29). The Abu Ghraib photographs, which both enabled and 
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documented abuse, seem particularly emblematic of the kind of co-constitutive framing 
that Butler identifies as the inseparability of material realities and representational 
regimes of war. This inseparability is the work of the screenic. Not only does 
photography frame torture and torture frame photography, but the photographs, which 
were not meant to be seen, also impose on and augment the frames of war. On one hand, 
the Abu Ghraib photographs play a dominant roll in framing not only torture, but the Iraq 
War in general. On the other hand, they disrupt the frames of war – the photographs, in 
their capacity to show what has been, reveal a grievability and thus recognizability to 
lives that were previously ungrievable. In framing the war, they alter the frames of war.59 
From this context, wherein torture and photography are co-framed, this chapter 
begins an investigation into the permutations of “picture torture.” This is not to equate the 
very real torture of bodies with the symbolic “torture” of pictures, but rather to suggest, 
first, that our picture of torture is already framed by various cultural, legal, and political 
modes of “disciplining the photographic image” (as Tom Gunning puts it) (43) – modes 
of contorting them to various purposes as evidence, icons, propaganda, and truth claims – 
and, secondly, that our picture of torture, in this instance, is bound to photographs that are 
themselves tortured, or rather tormented, even haunted, both by their collusion with the 
acts they depict and by all the crimes of Abu Ghraib and elsewhere that remain unseen by 
the camera. This chapter seeks to elucidate how the lens-based practices at Abu Ghraib 
and throughout the theatre of the Iraq War functioned as “shaming technologies” that 
                                                
59 The argument I am making about the Abu Ghraib photographs via Butler’s Frames of War, it 
should be noted, is not a causal, technological-deterministic one. The cameras and image-making practices 
at Abu Ghraib, the pornographic and colonial gazes they engender, and their digitality are not the cause of 
the actions at Abu Ghraib, but rather deeply embedded instruments of both the epistemological and 
ontological conditions of Abu Ghraib. 
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frame war through practices of (sexual) humiliation and how those images are resituated 
through cinematic and artistic practices that seek to redraw and disrupt the frames of war. 
In particular, I am interested in two works – filmmaker Errol Morris’s Abu Ghraib 
documentary Standard Operating Procedure (2008) and Iraqi-born artist Wafaa Bilal’s 
web-based interactive art installation Domestic Tension (aka “Shoot an Iraqi”) – that 
endeavor to disrupt the official frames of war by, first, restaging and reenacting the Iraq 
War’s spectacle of humiliation and, secondly, foregrounding digital visual cultures of 
humiliation. Both artists use practices of reenactment to illuminate not only the 
humiliation at the heart of the Iraq War spectacle but the visual apparatus and practices 
that enable it. Morris’s Standard Operating Procedure engages the torture that was 
staged by the cameras at Abu Ghraib by restaging those photographs as cinematic objects 
and contextualizing them through highly stylized (and controversial) documentary 
reenactments. I argue that Morris’s treatment of the photographs as a cinematic object 
highlights the screenic digitality of the photographs yet remains invested in their 
particularly photographic qualities. In other words, the digital modes of capture, storage, 
and circulation that enabled the existence of the photographs in the first place is shown in 
the film to be inextricable from the work they do as photographs, which is to point 
(sometimes literally and often ambiguously) to torture. Amid the theoretical speculation 
surrounding the status of the digital photograph (which ranges from lauding the 
expansion of photographic practices to lamenting the loss of the indexical depth of the 
photograph), Standard Operating Procedure approaches the Abu Ghraib images 
dialectically, presenting them both as digital quanta and photographic phenomena. The 
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film compellingly demonstrates that our understanding of acts of torture at Abu Ghraib is 
inseparable from our understanding of photography itself, particularly because the 
photographs serve as both the evidence and the crime. Similarly, Wafaa Bilal’s 
installation, Domestic Tension, also reenacts a spectacle of humiliation. Drawing on 
cyber and gaming cultures, Bilal attempts to provoke a crisis in the viewer and to disrupt 
what he calls the “curious detachment that attends American spectatorship of war” (Bilal 
xiii). For Domestic Tension, Bilal confined himself for thirty days in a gallery space at 
the Flat File Galleries in Chicago, during which time people from across the globe could 
interact with him via chat, webcam, and remote-controlled paintball gun. People had 24-
hour web access to the space and they could choose to shoot at Bilal with the paintball 
gun, transforming the virtual interaction into a very physical one. Over the thirty-day 
period Bilal took 60,000 shots from 128 countries (xvi). Both Morris’s documentary and 
Bilal’s installation reenact and restage the corporeal, visual, and technological conditions 
of the war spectacle in order to highlight the interpenetration of screens and bodies in the 
context of war. Despite different modes, both works grapple with and disrupt the frames 
through which bodies mediate and are mediated by the screens of war via a 
technocorporeal network of surface effects that encompasses the detained, disarticulated, 
and dead bodies of war, the screens of war, and the human sensoria of the globalized 
electronic masses.  
As the following sections will elucidate, the Abu Ghraib photographs emerge 
from a broader visual and political culture of humiliation that frames the Iraq War 
through both official and vernacular channels. The work of Morris and Bilal draw our 
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attention to and disrupt the visual operations of humiliation by restaging them as critical 
encounters on the screens of film and cyber-art. Before engaging directly with Morris’s 
and Bilal’s texts, however, I want to first elaborate on two key concepts of the Iraq War 
and its electronic mediation: embeddedness and indexicality. 
 
Embeddedness 
When the bombs began falling over Bagdad at the start of the Iraq War on 19 
March 2002, it looked a lot like the 1991 Gulf War. Fixed cameras provided wide shots 
of the explosions from across the Tigris River. Flashy graphics and brassy music 
introduced the war coverage on the news, retired generals, who were retained by all the 
major television networks, offered talking-head analysis, and elaborate studio sets 
comprised of floor maps and touch screens created an NFL-style news spectacle. Large 
scale spectacles and photo-ops unfolded for mass consumption – sometimes as 
manufactured moments meant to be iconic and triumphant, other times as aleatory 
happenings in front of news cameras. There are so many visual monuments of the Iraq 
War that could be and have been deconstructed by various media critics: Colin Powell’s 
illusive PowerPoint slide presentation at the U.N. in the drum-up to war (a misleading 
compilation of dated satellite photos, bulleted lists, and computer-generated illustrations); 
the live televisual coverage of the toppling of the statue of Saddam (where individual 
soldiers, Iraqi civilians, and journalists created multiple narratives of who was toppling 
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what);60 the video of Jessica Lynch’s rescue by Special Forces (eventually made into a 
television movie); President Bush’s virile flight-suited arrival for the “Mission 
Accomplished” speech aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln; the Rockwellian photograph of 
President Bush holding a glistening (plastic) turkey on a Thanksgiving platter; the 
medical examination of Saddam Hussein (grainy video of the sterile latex-glove of the 
military probing the deposed dictator’s mouth). These images and many others are among 
the visual icons and iconic boondoggles that were used in various attempts to shape the 
frames through which the war was seen. Such images are the result and continuation of 
both the contingent events of war as well as manufactured spectacles that promoted and 
maintained an ideology of humiliation. The images and their framing bolstered a heroic 
and overwhelming vision of American force and, at the same time, demonized and 
humiliated the Arab world. In this section I will investigate the various strata of 
embeddedness through which these images framed and were framed by technological, 
ideological, and aesthetic practices. 
The work of Morris and Bilal, as well as the Abu Ghraib photographs themselves, 
emerge out of a media context shaped by exchanges between official (mainstream) and 
vernacular (DIY) forms of media. Throughout the Iraq War, the lens-based practices that 
created and regulated the visual field of war were not only the purview of official media 
outlets and military targeting/surveillance technologies, but part of the everyday practice 
                                                
60 See Peter Maass’s article, “The Toppling,” in the Jan. 1, 2011 New Yorker. In the documentary 
film Control Room, Al Jazeera journalists argue that the toppling of Saddam was manufactured event. Peter 
Maass argues that the toppling was not planned by the military and that the significance and iconicity it 
took on through live broadcast was unintended. He ties this event to the concept of the “strategic corporal”: 
in 1999, Marine General Charles Krulak wrote an article in which he coined the term "strategic corporal" to 
refer to idea that in an interconnected world even the actions of a lowly corporal can have global 
consequences. 
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of soldiers, insurgents, and civilians through the use of personal hand-held camera 
devices. Whereas Anthony Swofford and his fellow Gulf War Marines of the previous 
chapter transformed the iconic anti-war Vietnam films of Coppola, Stone, and Kubrick 
into the “war porn” upon which they structured their heroic fantasies of war, the soldiers 
of the Iraq War created their own “war porn.” They strapped cameras to their helmets, 
gun turrets, and Humvee dashboards, documented patrols, raids, and everyday soldier life 
in Iraq, and edited their footage – aping the techniques and aesthetics of music videos, 
Hollywood action flicks, and first-person shooter video games – into highlight reels, 
documentary films, and comedic parodies. The mediation of the Iraq War became more 
liquid. Screen technologies enabled a more splattered media environment that not only 
poured from the main spigots of major news outlets, but also trickled onto video sharing 
sites and blogs. In other words, the embeddedness of reporters that became the dominant 
mode of the official news narrative was matched by other forms of embedded 
representation, namely the digital media practices of soldiers and participants themselves.  
The 24-hour news machine – a more thoroughly entrenched and technologically 
enhanced media entity than its Gulf War predecessor – followed, at least initially, many 
of same formulas of the Gulf War: a frenetic spectacle with little information. With the 
reintroduction of the Vietnam War practice of embedded reporting, the coverage had the 
appearance of Vietnam-War-style free-range access and transparency in contrast to the 
confined aesthetic of the hyper-regulated press pools of the Gulf War. But like the press-
pool model, the Iraq War practice of embedding was controlled by the military and it 
created a self-regulating, self-censoring symbiosis between the press and the military: the 
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security and access of embedded reporters was dependent on the very units they were 
reporting on. Within the same milieu of these official channels, an emergent hand-held 
media culture – the amateur visual record of war – worked both to reify the official 
frames of war (for example, the many heroic, quasi-propagandistic battle highlight reels 
that soldiers posted on video sharing sites) and to ‘leak’ outside the established frame (for 
example, the Abu Ghraib photographs and videos as well as other soldier-produced 
videos, images, and blogs that punctured the official message).61 What Butler describes 
as an “omnipresence of stray cameras” put the production of the visual culture of the war 
in the hands of soldier, insurgent, and civilian eyewitness-participants. Hand-held and 
web-based technologies enabled insurgent and rebel groups to produce propaganda and 
assassination videos. Soldier blogs and video-sharing channels dedicated to soldier-made 
videos introduced new media outlets for first-hand, personal narratives and visuals of the 
Iraq War, some of which were appropriated by major news outlets and others of which 
remained outside the official frames of the war.62 The 1991 Gulf War, with its aerial 
                                                
61 See the “Video Verité” chapter in Paula Rabinowitz’s They Must Represented, which provides 
an excellent theorization of the George Holliday’s video footage of the Rodney King beating as an early 
example of an emergent form of DIY reverse surveillance within what she calls “the apparatus of real 
events.” Since the Rodney King video (and the Zapruder film before that), such DIY video documentation 
has, of course, become ubiquitous in the age of the cell phone camera. Events like the 7/7 London Tube 
bombing, the execution of Saddam Hussein, and the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, in addition to the 
Occupy protests and the Arab Spring have become free-floating artifacts of handheld verité open to all 
modes of contextualization and narrativization as evidence, propaganda, or otherwise. 
62 For an overview of soldier-created videos see the little-known MTV News documentary Iraq 
Uploaded (2006) <http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1536780/iraq-uploaded-soldiers-post-war-footage-
online.html>. A sampling of war blogs turned into books includes U.S. soldiers Colby Buzzell, My War: 
Killing Time and Kayly Williams, Love My Rifle More Than You as well as Matthew Currier Burden’s 
compilation, The Blog of War. Books from Iraqi citizen bloggers includes the anonymous blogger 
Riverbend’s Baghdad Burning and Faiza Al-Araji’s The Iraq War Blog: An Iraqi Family's Inside View of 
the First Year of the Occupation. First-hand journalist accounts include Evan Wright, Generation Kill 
(originally for Rolling Stone and later turned into an underrated HBO mini-series by The Wire creator 
David Simon); and Bing West, No True Glory: A Frontline Account of the Battle for Fallujah. 
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bombing views, was called a ‘Nintendo War’, but it was during the Iraq War that the 
battlefield began imitating the visual world of the first-person shooter video game.  
Two working-class women from West Virginia – Jessica Lynch and Lynndie 
England – illustrate this changing visual culture of the war. They embody the sometimes 
competing, sometimes converging representational regimes of war (the mainstream and 
the DIY). Lynch, who was captured in March 2003 by Iraqi forces during the Battle of 
Nasiriyah and was the first recorded American woman prisoner of war to be rescued, 
became the heroine of a propagandistic media fable meant to arouse public support for 
the war. England, on the other hand, the subject of many of the most infamous Abu 
Ghraib photographs, became the unintended poster-girl for egregious acts that irreparably 
damaged public support for the war. Beyond the sensationalist narratives of the brave 
heroine and the wicked sadist, Lynch and England expose how lens-based practices not 
only construct and deconstruct the frames of war, but how images are used as 
technologies of humiliation. The Jessica Lynch story, which went through many 
conflicting permutations in the press and led to a book deal and a television movie, 
represents the attempt – through manufactured visuals and narratives – to officially 
manage the frame of the war. Lynndie England, became a chief figure of the handheld 
DIY version of the war. The diminutive woman who famously pointed mockingly at the 
exposed genitals of Abu Ghraib prisoners and became, herself, an object of mockery and 
blame as the ‘white trash’ girl upon whom public outrage about Abu Ghraib could be 
directed.63 
                                                
63 After the Abu Ghraib scandal broke there were websites devoted to user-submitted photographs 
of people “doing the Lynndie,” which entailed reenacting the pose Lynndie England strikes in one of the 
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In their framing as women, as female bodies, and as soldiers, Lynch and England 
became props in a systematic and condescending process of co-constitutive humiliation 
that was founded on the basest assumptions about not only Arab masculinity, but also a 
vague notion of liberal democratic feminism. Embedded within the images of Lynch and 
England is a particular visual use of gender and class as part of the sexual shaming 
machine and its blowback. Rather than just exploit the presumed ‘backwardness’ of Arab 
sexism, ironically, the military-media complex highlighted its own implicit sexism, 
racism, and classicism. In the name of progressive liberalism, military women were made 
to serve as cultural weapons to inflict shame and sexual humiliation on an imagined Arab 
other. Stemming from the most rudimentary understanding of Iraqi culture, both women 
were used to visually shame Iraq.64 Lynch was first portrayed as the heroic warrior of a 
progressive nation, and when reports surfaced that she did not engage in combat during 
the ambush, the rescue operation became an opportunity to demonstrate how Western 
                                                                                                                                            
most famous Abu Ghraib images. This phenomenon was a precursor of the widespread popularity of recent 
photo-memes like planking, owling, and Tebowing. In the original infamous photograph, England has 
cigarette dangling from her mouth as she points, fingergun-style, at a naked prisoner’s genitals. “Doing the 
Lynndie,” then, quoted and recontextualized this act of sexual humiliation in any number of mundane 
scenarios: parties, happy hours, classrooms, meetings, etc. The “Doing the Lynndie” internet phenomenon, 
as the title suggests, had very little to say about Abu Ghraib and had everything to do with a kind of classist 
and sexist mockery of England herself, the West Virginia hillbilly. In many ways it reinforced the official 
message: Abu Ghraib was the result of low-ranked, individual soldiers, many of whom weren’t very smart 
and didn’t know any better.  
Not to be perverse, but perhaps this meme is as good a place as any in the Abu Ghraib context to 
take Butler’s advice to go back to Adorno. In Minima Moralia he writes of art, not internet memes, but he 
might as well have been writing about the whole visual genealogy, from the original Abu Ghraib 
photographs to Errol Morris’s film, that is under examination in this chapter: “by turning suffering into 
images, harsh and uncompromising though they are, it wounds the shame we feel in the presence of the 
victims. For these victims are used to create something, works of art, that are thrown to the consumption of 
a world which destroyed them… The moral of this art, not to forget for a single instant, slithers into the 
abyss of its opposite. The aesthetic principle of stylization, and even the solemn prayer of the chorus, make 
an unthinkable fate appear to have had some meaning; it is transfigured, something of its horror removed. 
This alone does an injustice to the victims; yet no art which tried to evade them could confront the claims 
of justice." 
64 See the footnote in the first section about Patai’s Arab Mind and its appropriation by the 
military. 
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women are saved from the barbaric Arab male by the American masculinity of its Special 
Forces. England, because of her sex and stature, was used as part of a larger strategy of 
shame – as one of several tools of torture and interrogation.65 
For Judith Butler, Errol Morris, Wafaa Bilal, and the many others who have 
pondered what is depicted and enacted in the Abu Ghraib photographs (and in the visual 
culture of the Iraq War in general) the key question is: what is in these photographs? 
What do we see? What do we not see? What are the frames that structure our seeing? 
These are questions of embeddedness and the Abu Ghraib photographs contain various 
strata of embeddedness. They emerged in proximity to a news media culture of embedded 
reporting – the “in bed” arrangement that allowed the military to shape the story and 
allowed news outlets to give stories the added authenticity (and presumed objectivity) of 
proximity.66 The photographs themselves contain metadata – extravisual information – 
embedded within their files. This information contains basic information about the time, 
settings, and device used to take the photographs, which later became forensically useful 
in the creation of an accurate timeline of events. Relatedly, the photographs also emerge 
out of what Timothy Druckery called a general condition of “distributed embeddedness” 
                                                
65 This rescue narrative resonates, of course, with the long tradition and varieties of the ever-
popular White Savior trope, whether in the context of the United States’ own colonization of American 
Indians and the consequent extreme popularity of captivity narratives, which we can trace through to John 
Wayne’s Ethan Edwards in The Searchers (1956) setting out to rescue or kill his niece Debbie before she is 
‘corrupted’ and de-Westernized by the Comanche who have kidnapped her. Or, even more recently, we 
might identify White Savior variants at work in Avatar (2009) or even The Help (2011). In more strictly 
postcolonial terms, Gayatri Spivak’s often-quoted summary in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” of the British 
abolition of the Hindu rite of sati in India might best sum up what is at work in the Lynch narrative: it is a 
case of “White men saving brown women from brown men,” or more specifically in this instance, a case of 
white men saving white women from brown men in the name of saving brown women from brown men. 
66 Reporters became not only physically embedded with military units, but also ideologically 
embedded by dint of their proximity to and dependency on the units they were embedded with. Butler 
describes embedded journalism as “a way of interpreting in advance what will and will not be included in 
the field of perception” (Frames 66). 
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in which the notion of discrete identity has been supplanted by the immersion of the self 
into the “mediascapes of teleculture … whose boundaries are mapped in virtual transitory 
networks, whose hold on matter is ephemeral, whose position in space is tenuous, and 
whose agency is measured in acts of implication” (20). Druckery wrote this before the 
Abu Ghraib moment and he was addressing the digital shift more broadly, but his 
characterization seems apt for embedded media conditions of the Iraq War and, in 
particular, the modes under which the Abu Ghraib photographs were taken, stored, and 
distributed. We also see it in the transmedial flows between the mainstream and DIY 
media cultures just described, where both media forms and media content become cross-
embedded: the news looks more like DIY handheld media and DIY handheld media 
looks more like the news. Perhaps the most important form of embeddedness in these 
photographs, however, are the ideological currents embedded in these images – the top-
down culture of humiliation that enabled this picture torture and the particularly sexual 
nature of that humiliation. The photographs do not point only to the particular visual 
regime of Abu Ghraib prison, but, as Butler has argued, to “forms of social and state 
power” that are “embedded in the frame, including state and military regulatory regimes” 
(72). The enduring image of the Iraq War, the ideology that fueled it, and the shame that 
resulted from it is particularly and persistently sexual: the way that a flight suit 
foregrounded the President’s “package” aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln or the 
packaging of the Jessica Lynch story as a sexualized rescue mission or Lynndie England 
pointing finger-guns and mocking the exposed genitals of male prisoners or the fact that 
she struck this pose under the direction of her male superior (and photo-taker and father 
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of her child), Charles Graner, or that people would later circulate pictures of themselves 
mockingly “Doing the Lynndie” or that the only footage of the captured Saddam Hussein 
was of an oral examination. The thread of sexual humiliation runs throughout the visual 
field of the Iraq War, not as subtle subtext, but right there, embedded within the frame.  
War and its representation is always sexual and always structured around modes 
of humiliation, whether they be dirty wars, hot wars, cold wars, or sterilized wars. Klaus 
Theweleit showed us this as well as anyone in Male Fantasies, his exploration of the men 
of the proto-Nazi Freikorps for whom war was profoundly sexual and, simultaneously, a 
primary mode of sexual repression and control. Perhaps that is what is so surprising about 
the sexual desire and humiliation embedded in the images of the Iraq War: how 
prominently it is displayed and how unacknowledged and repressed it nonetheless 
remains. It is the lack of shame that is shocking. In an article on Abu Ghraib that he wrote 
for In These Times, Slavoj Žižek pulls a Žižekian reversal on Donald Rumsfeld to 
describe these phenomena:  
If Rumsfeld thinks that the main dangers in the confrontation with Iraq were the 
“unknown unknowns,” that is, the threats from Saddam whose nature we cannot 
even suspect, then the Abu Ghraib scandal shows that the main dangers lie in the 
“unknown knowns” – the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices 
we pretend not to know about, even though they form the background of our 
public values.  
 
Furthermore, this visual culture of shameless shaming is also deeply embedded in 
the even less acknowledged sexual politics of colonialism and orientalism. The Abu 
Ghraib photographs are haunted by, yet completely unaware of, the sordid photographic 
history of the ethnographic gaze, here come about by other more embedded means 
(soldier-photographers as participant-observers). Before Butler’s metric of grievability 
   152 
 
and its relationship to photography in the war-on-terror era, the artist and theorist Martha 
Rosler, as discussed in the first chapter, similarly observed during the Vietnam War era 
that war photographs reveal an “ideological stance toward other lives.” For her, war 
photographs are part of a broader ideological frame masquerading as an informational 
one, which, in the context of the Iraq War, we might understand as the ideological 
embedded within the informational. Caroline Brothers, too, in War and Photography, 
argues that an iconic war photograph, rather than providing evidence of any particular 
event, instead “bears witness… to the ideological currents which produced it and the 
collective imagination it inflected and to which it contributed” (185). The Abu Ghraib 
photos, in many ways, are no different. This is not the first time that photographs have 
served as trophies and mementos for U.S. soldiers or the first time that photographs have 
illuminated human rights violations perpetrated by agents of the U.S. Military. But then 
again, that is why they are also quite different. They are both constitutive and derivative 
of a kind of ideological framing of other lives. The uses of the camera at Abu Ghraib 
contributed to the establishment of ungrievable lives, yet the pictures from those cameras, 
once they became public documents, engendered a kind of grievability of the referent 
lives within the pictures.  
Embeddedness is a concept for thinking about not only what is in the pictures, but 
what is in us and our viewing of them. Embedded in these images are all the usual liberal 
anxieties of looking and power that Susan Sontag made a career out of investigating: we 
must look; we should not look; our looking is itself a reiteration of violence; our looking 
indulges the patronizing pity through which the West feels good about itself and validates 
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its own privilege; our looking is that of bourgeois, Western, orientalist subject that wishes 
to take hold of its object of desire, consumption, and otherness, as Walter Benjamin 
observed, “at close range.”67 
 
Indexicality 
Where embeddedness is a general characteristic of representations of the Iraq War, 
indexicality is that characteristic expressed photographically. Indexicality is a concept 
that has often been called upon in an effort to unravel the ontological mysteries of what is 
in photographs, and a concept that, in the digital era, is thought to fail us.  
Making sense of Abu Ghraib entails an interrogation of both the nature of torture 
and the nature of (digital) pictures. In other words, in addition to interrogating what is 
depicted in the pictures, we are faced with questions about the nature and existence of 
those depictions as digital entities. The events at Abu Ghraib not only fueled debates over 
the slippery definitions of torture, but also lead to questions about the fluid definitions of 
photography. The Detainee Photographic Records Protection Act of 2009 (H.R. 3015), 
which banned the release of more photos from Abu Ghraib, Afghanistan, and other 
detention centers around the globe, demonstrates this fluidity in its definition of the 
photograph. “The term ‘photograph,’” it states in its Definitions section, “encompasses 
all photographic images, whether originals or copies, including still photographs, 
negatives, digital images, films, video tapes, and motion pictures.”  
                                                
67 In the “Work of Art” essay, during a discussion of the concept of the aura in historical and 
natural objects, he writes, “Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object at very close range 
by way of its likeness, its reproduction” (225). 
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Under the term “PHOTOGRAPH” the Act seeks to ban not just the photograph, 
but all iterations, analogue and digital, of the photographic base including not only visual 
images (both still and moving), but presumably any accompanying sound and extra-
visual data as well. The definition indicates the convergence at work across media and 
the general difficulty of delimiting photography from other media. Thus there is little 
surprise that the Abu Ghraib photographs, though predominantly serving as a touchstone 
in the political and humanitarian discourses around the practice of torture, are also 
peripherally, but persistently, attached to a debate within media theory about what art 
historian Rosalind Krauss has called the “post-medium condition.” They have become 
iconic not only of the indefinite “war on terror” but of digital modes of photographic 
capture and circulation. The Abu Ghraib photographs pose the question of digitality, or 
rather, they lead us to ask what kind of questions digitality poses. Unlike photographic 
icons from past wars, the Abu Ghraib photographs were not the work of professional 
photojournalists and the images were no longer bound to a photosensitive surface. Rather, 
the perpetrators themselves were amateur photographers and their digital snapshots had 
the capacity for newer viral modes of circulation. Yet, despite the drastic changes in the 
modes of production, circulation, and storage – despite their digitality – the Abu Ghraib 
photographs seem to reintroduce many of the old critical questions asked of photographs. 
Given their digitality, do they convey a reliable record of the reality that existed before 
the lens? As numerically-based rather than chemically-based entities, do they 
meaningfully retain the emanations of the world? That is, despite their apparent 
immateriality do the Abu Ghraib photographs still remain “pieces of the world,” as 
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Sontag once said of analog photographs (On Photography 93)? Do they still retain what 
she called a “material vestige” of the world (144)? Like their analog predecessors, do 
they furnish evidence and lay photographic claim to ‘truth’? And, paradoxically, do they 
remain, like all photographs, ambiguous, mutable, and mysterious? And does it matter?  
Certainly digitality represents a fundamental change to the material reality of the 
photograph. What was once a chemical imprint of emanations of the world is now a 
matrix of numbers. As David Rodowick describes, what was once an analogical 
transcription of the world, has become a digital conversion or calculation of the world 
(116). This transformation from a transcription to a translation of the world has 
challenged how theorists of visual culture define the medium of photography, explain the 
work of photographs, and, importantly, describe our fascination with photographs. 
Reading across the disciplines engaged in media theorizing, one finds a rhetoric of crisis 
haunted by anxieties about the status and fate of the photograph in a digital, convergent 
media environment. Much of the philosophical handwringing stems from the loss of the 
apparent materiality of traditional photography and the emergence of an apparently 
immaterial (and therefore dubious) digital photography. The photograph once had a 
privileged physical relationship with the world, so the argument goes, and now that 
grounding in reality has been eliminated, leaving its status up in the air, out in the ether. 
Digitality, then, fundamentally challenges the concept of photography and of medium 
specificity in general. This leaves theorists of the photograph doubly haunted, first by the 
seeming ghostly immateriality of digitality and, secondly, by the loss of the very physical 
relationship to the world that was thought to give photography the power to haunt us in 
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the first place. This special status is threatened by the emergence of digitality. More 
precisely, perhaps, the desire for this special referentiality – for a physical relation to the 
object – is under threat.68 
At the center of this haunted anxiety about photography is the role of indexicality 
as a concept for describing the representational workings of photography. The index, the 
famous concept taken from Charles Peirce’s taxonomy of signs, has been used to 
describe, semiotically, the nature and work of the photograph in the world of signs. Like 
other indexical signs – a footprint, a weathervane, or the word “this” – the photograph 
“points to” its referent by virtue of a material, causal connection to it. For Rodowick, 
digitality weakens and even eliminates “the indexical powers of photography.” He 
concludes that “it is probably incorrect or misleading to attribute photographic 
indexicality or causality to digital synthesis” (106). For him, the digital photograph, as a 
translation of the world rather than a transcription of it, is, at a certain level, more akin to 
a painting than a photograph. He writes almost nostalgically of the “phenomenological 
density” of the 35mm image (109). The density or depth – the physical connection to the 
world – that Rodowick finds lacking in the digital image is the same quality of the 
photograph so elegiacally captured in the work of Roland Barthes who, as discussed in 
the first chapter, was drawn to the “absolutely, irrefutably present” of the photograph 
(Camera Lucida 77). This density was also important to the great film critic Andre Bazin, 
who argued that the photograph “contributes something to the natural order of creation 
                                                
68 This digital anxiety permeates Paul Haggis’s 2007 Iraq War film In The Valley of Elah. Central 
to the plot is a corrupted digital video file of a hit-and-run accident that killed an Iraqi girl. The homemade 
footage, taken by a soldier, points to the central traumatic event of the film and serves as the only visual 
evidence of it. The file must be restored in order to solve the case. The digital, in other words, is corruptible 
and unreliable, calling into question its status as evidence. 
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instead of providing a substitute for it” (15). The irony that permeates many recent 
‘obituaries’ for the indexical image is that, even though they do a wonderful job of 
interrogating contemporary media concepts such as “virtuality” (they remind “new 
media” that it is entangled with “old media”), they remain unwaveringly attached to a 
concept of the index. They are attached, in other words, to a concept of attachment. 
Rodowick’s argument that the digital photograph is not sufficiently indexical resonates 
with other laments including Mary Ann Doane’s cautious concern that digitality threatens 
the “constraints and possibilities” of the indexical specificity of photochemical media 
and, moreover, aesthetic expression in general (131), or with Vivian Sobchack’s more 
apocalyptic claim that digitality, which is “at one remove from previous representational 
connections,” dangerously lacks “a grounded investment in the body” and is instead 
saturated by “the present instant” that could “cost us all a future” (159). In short, for 
many theorists, digitality – the separation of inputs and outputs (light goes in, numerical 
data come out) – makes it impossible for the photograph to corroborate with the world as 
it once did. It removes the stain of the real from photography. Thus digitality is often 
diagnosed as a ‘condition’ – a post-indexical, post-cinematic, post-photographic, or post-
medium condition. As Anne Friedberg noted, it is the condition of being “born digital” 
(4). 
Ironically, the Abu Ghraib photographs, which seemingly do the indexical work 
of ‘pointing’ to torture and the camera’s involvement in it – which seem to be emanations 
of certain realities of Abu Ghraib – have become one of the sites of debate about the loss 
of the indexicality. Is it possible that the index was always an insufficient concept for 
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unraveling the mysteries of the photographic base? Despite the loss of indexicality and all 
the other revolutionary changes to the lives of photographs brought about by digitality, is 
the digital photograph not experienced on some level as a photograph all the same? It 
seems that digital photographs are no more or less likely to become iconic, to furnish 
evidence, to haunt us, to awaken memories, to be manipulated and doctored, and to 
garner the phenomenological and ontological fascinations of its beholders.  
The Abu Ghraib photographs have appeared amid much philosophical 
handwringing about the emergence and significance of “the digital” within media theory. 
The photographs, which mediate one kind of crisis (the ramifications of U.S.-sanctioned 
torture), have fallen into the middle of another ‘crisis’: the crisis of the medium itself. 
The fate of the index has led occasionally to hyperbolic proclamations of the ‘death of 
photography.’ But the relevance of the Abu Ghraib photographs tells a different story. If 
anything, they reconstitute photography with the traits it has always carried. Wouldn’t 
Barthes and Bazin both find in the Abu Ghraib photographs a unique mode of 
representation that is not a substitute for the world, but an irrefutably present contribution 
to it? The paradox of the analogue photograph, as Mary Ann Doane has noted, is that it 
harbors a fullness, “an excessiveness of detail” and, at the same time, an emptiness, “a 
hollowness that can only be filled” in contingent and always mutating situations (2). This 
fullness and emptiness is evident in the Abu Ghraib photographs of Lynndie England’s 
thumbs up, or of the hooded “Gilligan” standing, wired, on a box. Simultaneously the 
viewer is struck by an excess and lack of detail – by all the ways the photographs are 
framed and could be framed.  
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Tom Gunning questions this attachment to the concept of the index in his 
punningly titled essay “What’s the Point of an Index? Or, Faking Photographs,” in which 
he questions not only the worth of the index as a photographic concept but also, more 
literally, what exactly photographs, indexically, point to. Gunning acknowledges how 
digital photographs present dramatic implications for how images are stored, transferred, 
and manipulated, but, he argues, “storage in terms of numerical data does not eliminate 
indexicality (which is why digital images can serves as passport photographs and the 
other sorts of legal evidence or documents, which ordinary photographs supply)” (40). 
After all, he observes, one can think of many indexical devices – thermometers, 
speedometers, and barometers – that convert information into numbers without calling 
into question their indexicality (40). His ‘point’ is that an index does not need to resemble 
the thing it represents to be indexical: “the fact that rows of numbers do not resemble a 
photograph…does not undermine any indexical claim” (40). Even the indexicality of a 
traditional photograph, he reminds us, “inheres in the effect of light on chemicals, not in 
the picture it produces” (40).  
Gunning is essentially demonstrating that the index has been overvalued as a 
property of the photograph, that it has undue influence on how we think about 
photographs. This overemphasis on the index has created currents of nostalgia and 
longing for a photographic presence that was never there to being with. Worse, it has, 
through what Freud might call “the narcissism of small differences,” led to the 
devaluation of the digital photograph as photograph. It is not that the index is not a useful 
concept for thinking about photographs, but that perhaps its use for thinking about 
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photographs is not exactly semiotic. Within the phenomenological and poetic traditions 
of theorizing the photograph, the index has served as a useful concept for discussing the 
‘touch of the real’ within a photograph, that particularly mysterious capacity of a 
photograph to exceed the bounds of language and to ‘prick’ us (as Barthes said). The 
index, in this context, is less a semiotic category than an ontological and 
phenomenological concept – it has more to do with being, presence, and experience (both 
the what-has-been and the looking-now) than it has to do with signification. As discussed 
in the earlier chapter in the context of Vietnam War photographs, while photographs may 
(and do) function as signs, it is precisely where they exceed semiotics that they capture 
our fascination. "The semiotic category of the index,” writes Gunning, “assimilates 
photography to the realm of the sign, and although a photograph like most anything 
(everything?) can be used as a sign, I think this approach prematurely cuts off the claims 
… that the photograph exceeds the functions of a sign and that this indeed is part of the 
fascination it offers” (48).  
This fascination is what Barthes, Bazin, Sontag, Deleuze, and others have set out 
to explore. It has sometimes, perhaps wrongly, been called an indexical quality. This 
quality, though, is not the thing that resides in the chemical processes of analog 
photography, it is the thing resides in the fragmentary persistence of an unknowable (yet 
visible) past reproduced ceaselessly into the present. If the index is that which points 
directly (literally and causally), like an index finger, and says “that there,” the ubiquitous 
thumbs-up in the Abu Ghraib photographs shows us a different kind of ‘point.’ This 
‘point’ – a symbol of inexplicable, obscene optimism amidst torture and death – is 
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something done for the photographs. This is not a candid moment captured; it is posed 
for the camera. What does this thumbs-up mean? Where does it point us? It means 
nothing, it points nowhere, but it adheres us to the image and to the event.  
 
Errol Morris & The Epistemology of the Photograph 
In one of the epigraphs of this chapter – “nobody can commit photography alone” 
– Marshall McLuhan’s suggestive use of the verb ‘commit’ seems appropriate in the 
context of Abu Ghraib. It lends to the photographs a tinge of criminality – the sense that, 
in the act of photographing, one commits, if not a crime, some vague act of violence, and 
moreover that ‘committing’ photography extends beyond the taker of the photograph to 
implicate the photographs as well as its beholders – the collective and individual 
meanings, outrages, obsessions, and fascinations that photographs seemingly generate in 
their viewers and the commitments (epistemological, aesthetic, and otherwise) that 
viewers, in turn, impose upon photographs.69 In the other epigraph to this chapter, 
Sabrina Harman, one of the seven “bad apples” of Abu Ghraib, directly addresses the 
viewer via Errol Morris’s Interrotron camera in his Abu Ghraib documentary Standard 
Operating Procedure and admits that the infamous photograph of her smiling with 
                                                
69 The criminality inherent to photography has been observed well before McLuhan and well 
after. In his “short history” of photography in 1931, Walter Benjamin astutely observed:  
The camera will become smaller and smaller, more and more prepared to grasp fleeting, secret 
images whose shock will bring the mechanism of association in the viewer to a complete halt […] 
Not for nothing were pictures of Atget compared with those of the scene of a crime. But is not 
every spot of our cities the scene of a crime? every passerby a perpetrator? Does not the 
photographer – descendants […] uncover guilt in his pictures? (215). 
And, in equal measure, in addition to revealing guilt, there are many confessions of how guilty one 
feels for taking photographs. For one famous example we turn to Diane Arbus: “I always thought of 
photography as a naughty thing to do - that was one of my favorite things about it, and when I first did it, I 
felt very perverse” (Sontag, On Photography 12-13) 
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thumbs up over the disfigured corpse of Al-Jamadi “looks bad.” In saying so, she too 
suggests that something is ‘committed’ in the photographic transaction, wherein what 
“looks bad” and what “is bad” become conflated and confused within the frame of the 
photograph.  
This epistemological slipperiness – the peculiar future anterior relationship that 
the Abu Ghraib photographs establish between what-is-seen and what-has-been – is the 
main subject of Errol Morris’s 2008 documentary Standard Operating Procedure. The 
film attempts to disrupt our photographic commitments by revealing that the crimes we 
think we see in the photographs are often not the crimes that were committed.70 Because 
the cameras at Abu Ghraib both recorded crimes and committed crimes, for Morris it 
becomes the ideal place to investigate not only the events of Abu Ghraib, but also, 
necessarily, some fundamental existential questions of photography. Many of the 
cinematic and journalistic investigations of Abu Ghraib treated the photographs as only 
one kind of document in a sea of policies and paper trails through which the practices of 
torture were justified. Uniquely, Standard Operating Procedure is premised on the idea 
that to grapple with Abu Ghraib is to grapple with photography itself. Through its 
transformation of the Abu Ghraib photographs into cinematic objects, Standard 
Operating Procedure considers them as both photographic images and digital files – the 
extent to which they behave like all photographs and the extent to which they produce 
new modes of extra-visual, digital-photographic meaning. The film situates the 
                                                
70 “It is a mistake,” Morris says, “to confuse the pictures at Abu Ghraib with the crimes at Abu 
Ghraib” (Anderson). Similarly, Susan Sontag contends in “Regarding the Torture of Others” that “the 
horror of what is shown in the photographs “cannot be separated from the horror that the photographs were 
taken.” 
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photographs centrally within a larger discursive and perceptual network through which 
practices of humiliation became standard operating procedure (legal, condoned, 
encouraged). As the title of the film suggests in its military parlance, these photographs 
are embedded with (and embedded in) a whole apparatus of procedures that meant to be 
accepted as routine and “standard.” His use of photographs in combination with his other 
filmic practices (namely direct-address interviews and elaborate reenactments) challenges 
the extent to which such documents can and cannot be separated from the events they 
depict. Morris operates under the premise that to whatever extent photographs are 
capable of exposing a particular event, they are equally adept at concealing it. In doing 
so, his film explores the ways in which the perpetrators were also the victims of more 
expansive forces. The film restages the standard questions asked of photography: What is 
the relation between photographs and the events they depict? Do photographs provide 
evidence? Evidence of what? What do photographs expose and what do they conceal? At 
the same time, the film also confronts the question of digitality: Are digital photographs a 
different kind of photographic document? What “extra-visual secrets” (as Caitlin Benson-
Allot has put it) do digital photographs hold?  
Like much of Errol Morris’s filmmaking and writing, Standard Operating 
Procedure is essentially an epistemological project. In a review of Morris’s collected 
essays on photography, Believing is Seeing, Kathryn Schulz observes that more than 
photography itself, “Morris is chiefly interested in the nature of knowledge, in figuring 
out where the truth – in both senses – lies.” Photographs, for Morris, are the ideal 
documents for investigating where the truth lies within our perceptual practices.  
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Morris joins the likes of Chris Marker, Andy Warhol, and even Ken Burns in the 
coinciding traditions of cinematizing photographs and photographizing cinema that begin 
with Eadweard Muybridge. Morris utilizes recent developments and dramatic shifts in 
moving-image technology to explore the meaning of recent developments and dramatic 
shifts in still-image technology. Standard Operating Procedure reproduces, reenacts, and 
reanimates these photographs and pro-photographic events in order, once more, to test the 
epistemological limits of photography. The raw materials of this documentary consist of 
1) the photographs themselves (often depicted in animated, dynamic arrays), 2) direct-
address testimony from (paid) witnesses and experts (via Morris’s infamous patented 
device, the Interrotron)71 3) highly-stylized reenactments (or “impressions” as Morris has 
called them) using actors and often shot in excruciating detail with a Phantom camera at 
1000 frames-per-second, and 4) a haunting movie score by Danny Elfman. 
These four defining elements of the film are the very aspects that many critics 
found aesthetically over-indulgent and thus inappropriate in Morris’s treatment of the 
subject. Indeed, many critics took issue with Morris’s techniques and their connections to 
his overarching philosophical approach to the Abu Ghraib photographs. They found the 
film too sympathetic toward the perpetrators and too stylized to achieve the appropriate 
aura of documentary truth. Manohla Dargis in the New York Times excoriates “the level 
of fetishistic detail” Morris achieves, “whether he’s showing us beautifully backlighted 
                                                
71 The Interrotron is basically a teleprompter screen positioned over the camera lens. For 
interviews Morris sits elsewhere in front of another camera. A live video feed of his face is then projected 
onto the interviewer’s teleprompter screen so that when the interviewer interacts with the (mediated) 
Morris, he or she looks directly into the camera. When Errol Morris was asked in an interview if he named 
the device, he responded, “No, it was named by my wife…She liked the name because it combined two 
important concepts – terror and interview.” 
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dust motes dancing in the prison air or an exquisitely photographed pearl of blood 
dangling from a brutalized prisoner’s, or rather actor’s, nose.” Paul Arthur, in his 
ArtForum review of the film, argues that the film's style "belongs to a film genre that 
provides titillation through horror.” “To employ this rhetoric in a documentary about 
actual horror,” he says,” is obscene, yielding familiar aesthetic thrills as a substitute for 
specific meaning" (112). Maggie Nelson echoes Arthur in The Art of Cruelty, where she 
writes, “One need not immerse oneself in horrific images or a debate about their 
epistemological status in order to apprehend and protest barbarities” (18). Many critics 
agreed that the film was too focused on philosophical abstractions rather than political 
practicalities, citing other Abu Ghraib documentary films like Alex Gibney’s Taxi to the 
Dark Side (2007), whose aesthetic practices, according to Arthur, never supersede or 
distract from the film’s central “inflamed political indictment” (112), or Rory Kennedy’s 
Ghosts of Abu Ghraib (2007), which unravels the military procedures and paper trails that 
justified and enacted the practices at Abu Ghraib.72 Moreover, many reviewers accused 
                                                
72 Films like Kathryn Bigelow’s The Hurt Locker (2009) and Sam Mendes’s adaptation of 
Anthony Swofford’s memoir Jarhead (2005) as well as Colby Buzzell’s blog-turned-memoir My War and 
journalist Sebastian Junger’s book about a forward operating base in Afghanistan, War, are often praised 
for focusing on the everyday drama and personal struggles of individual soldiers. They are praised, in other 
words, for their material realism and even more so for not being “political.” These works value and are 
valued for what is perceived as the ideological neutrality of individual struggle. The personal suffering of 
individuals is meant to let the (American) viewer/reader off the hook. These works reveal the impact of the 
war on a few U.S. soldiers’ lives at the expense of other lives and demographics of the war. Here, we make 
heroes duty-bound soldiers. We are meant to sympathize with their burdens at the expense of others’ 
burdens – namely the occupied and besieged civilian population. It is possible, however, to see something 
else at work in war text like the The Hurt Locker and its alien and alienating subtext. It is essentially a 
space travel movie set in Iraq (thus, perhaps it has more in common with its Oscar rival, Avatar, than one 
might think). The scenes of Jeremy Renner’s Sgt. William James trying to communicate, astronaut-like, 
with Iraqi citizens while in his bomb suit represents a kind of impossibility of communication (not to 
mention a cute reference to William James’s philosophy). Despite the efforts of James, the streets of Iraq 
remain and alien place, he is separated by the suit that is meant to protect him. Like the oil-well firemen of 
Werner Herzog’s bizarrely fascinating sci-fi Gulf War documentary Lessons of Darkness (1992), The Hurt 
Locker projects an imperial/anthropological perspective, where bomb diffusing is the work of itinerant 
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Morris of being an apologist for the perpetrators at Abu Ghraib.73 For these reviewers, 
Morris fails to adequately protest the atrocity. He’s too generous to both the photographs 
and their takers. He beautifully cinematizes these horrifying images and thus the 
horrifying acts they point to.  
These criticisms, however, fundamentally misread the approach of Standard 
Operating Procedure and, in doing so, betray their own limited view of documentary 
rhetoric itself, of what documentary should be and what it should do. It is ironic that a 
filmmaker as obsessed with the pursuit of truth as Morris is – as obsessed with recovering 
“what happened” through a rigorous gathering of facts – is accused of making a 
documentary that doesn’t look “documentary enough” to garner the proper amount of 
outrage.74 Morris famously has, after all, freed a man (Randall Adams) from prison 
                                                                                                                                            
space rangers armored up for a hostile planet. Although perhaps a generous reading, this alienation, it could 
be argued, serves not to reiterate the entrenched orientalist perspectives of the West so much as it opens up 
a critique of that perspective by admitting the futility and absurdity of the context in which occupier and 
occupied encounter each other. The film is an effort to point out our failure to make other lives grievable 
even as it fails to make its grieving mean anything. 
73 For criticism of the kind see, for example, Manohla Dargis, ““We, the People Behind the 
Abuse,”” New York Times, April 25, 2008, www.movies.nytimes.com/2008/04/25/movies/25stan.html; 
Richard Schickel, ““Standard Operating Procedure, Too Much Style?,”” Time, April 24, 2008, 
www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1734936,00.html; J. Hoberman, ““Errol Morris Lets Torturers Off 
Easy,”” Village Voice, April 22, 2008, www.villagevoice.com/2008-04-22/film/get-out-of-jail-free/; Paul 
Arthur, ““The Horror,”” Artforum (April 2008), www.artforum.com/inprint/id=19738. 
Alex Gibney’s Taxi to the Dark Side (2007) investigates the CIA’s use of torture in the War on 
Terror. It focuses on an Afghan taxi driver named Dilawar who was beaten to death by American forces 
while in extrajudicial detention. It won the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature. Ghosts of Abu 
Ghraib (2007), directed by Rory Kennedy (daughter of Senator Robert F. Kennedy), also investigates the 
creation of the political and legal precedents that formed the framework for torture at Abu Ghraib. In 
addition to featuring interviews with a number of soldiers from Abu Ghraib, the film also features 
testimony from former prisoners at Abu Ghraib. 
74 It should be noted that, in collaboration with Philip Gourevitch, Morris also published a book 
was published at the same time the film was released. It originally shared the title Standard Operating 
Procedure, but was later republished as The Ballad of Abu Ghraib. In it, Gourevitch uses the hundreds of 
hours of Morris’s interviews as a primary source to investigate Abu Ghraib prison. The book has three 
sections: “Before,” “During,” and “After.” It gives a deeper, more perceptive account than a film could of 
how Abu Ghraib prison came to be what it was and the resulting fallout. Notably, unlike the film, it 
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through a dogged documentary investigation of which way a milkshake fell.75 When 
reading Susan Sontag’s Regarding The Pain of Others, he got hung up on a brief portion 
where she discusses Roger Fenton’s photographs of the Crimean War. Sontag argues that 
Fenton’s photograph of cannon balls on the road was “obviously” staged. Morris was 
annoyed by the assumptive word “obviously” and dove into an exhaustive exploration of 
which of Fenton’s two photographs came first, “cannon balls on the road” or “cannon 
balls not on the road.”76 Morris eventually concluded that Fenton did stage the 
photograph because of five pebbles that appear to roll down the hill when flipping back 
and forth from one photograph to the next. Gravity gave it away. All these obsessions – 
milkshakes, cannonballs, and Sabrina Harman’s thumbs-up – reiterate Morris’s 
overarching epistemological trajectory. He want things to “add up.”  
In 1999, the renowned filmmaker Werner Herzog, delivered a manifesto at the 
Walker Art Center called “The Minnesota Declaration: Truth and Fact in Documentary 
Cinema,” which helps to reveal the paradox at the center of Morris’s documentary 
methods. In the manifesto, Herzog (who once held a bet with Morris that famously 
resulted in Herzog eating his own shoe) argues that there are superficial truths and deep 
truths in cinema.77 Herzog ironically locates superficial truth in realist cinema practices: 
“Cinéma Vérité is devoid of vérité. It reaches a merely superficial truth, the truth of 
                                                                                                                                            
includes conversations with Ivan Frederick and Charles Graner, two key figures of the scandal that are 
absent from the film (an aspect explored further later in this chapter). 
75 See his 1988 documentary The Thin Blue Line. 
76 He even traveled to the spot where Fenton took the photographs. See Morris’s New York Times 
blog, Zoom, as well as his book Believing is Seeing: Observations on the Mysteries of Photography (New 
York: Penguin, 2011). 
77 As a motivational dare, Herzog bet Morris that if Morris ever finished his first feature film, 
Gates of Heaven (1978), Herzog would eat his own shoe. The film was eventually finished and, as 
promised, Herzog boiled and ate a shoe, an event that was itself filmed and turned into a short documentary 
by Les Blank titled Werner Herzog Eats His Shoe (1980) – an homage to Charlie Chaplin’s The Gold Rush. 
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accountants.” Herzog then states his thesis for deep cinematic truth: “There are deep 
strata of truth in cinema, and there is such a thing as poetic, ecstatic truth. It is mysterious 
and elusive, and can be reached only through fabrication and imagination and 
stylization.” The paradox of Morris is that he believes that when things “add up” (the 
accountant’s truth) it can lead to a deeper, “ecstatic” truth. He likes facts. He finds very 
little satisfaction in the explanation that Fenton might have successfully documented 
some “emotional” or ecstatic” truth by manipulating his photo in placing all those 
cannonballs on the road. At the same time, and in equal measure, Morris readily turns to 
cinematic practices of “fabrication,” “imagination,” and “stylization” for crafting his own 
documentaries.  
To call into question the practice of hiring professional actors, paying 
interviewees, inserting stylized reenactments, and scoring the film with a ‘Hollywood’ 
soundtrack is certainly critically valid. We might rightfully wonder what the added 
documentary value is, for example, of the reenactment in Standard Operating Procedure 
of Saddam Hussein frying an egg filmed from a decidedly fantastical beneath-the-pan 
perspective on a Phantom camera.78 The comparisons critics make between Morris’s 
work and other strong documentary efforts on the subject also raise reasonable questions. 
The other Abu Ghraib documentaries, especially Gibney’s and Kennedy’s, are powerful, 
effective endeavors to elucidate what happened at Abu Ghraib and how it happened, as 
are the great journalistic efforts by Mark Danner, Jane Meyer, Scott Horton, and Seymour 
                                                
78 The paradox of the Phantom camera is that it shoots more frames per second than ever before in 
order to produce the most detailed slow motion that has ever been achieved - it generates thousands of 
images in order to slow the filmic experience to an almost-photographic stillness. Its name suggests that it 
creates ghosts or at least captures them. The more frames it shoots per second the closer it gets to appearing 
as a still image, moving. 
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Hersh. However, as Caetlin Benson-Allot has succinctly observed, where these other 
documentaries “use their media to expose atrocities,” Standard Operating Procedure 
“focuses on how atrocities become media files” (40-41). This is the key distinction that 
Arthur, Nelson, Hoberman, Dargis, et al., fail to account for. Its not that the files will lead 
us to the atrocities, but that the files are inextricable from the atrocities. As Linda 
Williams rightly argued in her essay on the film, Standard Operating Procedure focuses 
on “the digitally framed, proliferating pictures themselves whose status as evidence is 
continually interrogated” (34). The film asserts that these photographs cannot provide a 
transparent window onto the events of Abu Ghraib. Quite the opposite: they hide more 
than they reveal.  
The aesthetic critiques of Standard Operating Procedure are premised on the idea 
that a good documentary is one whose aesthetic gives the impression that no aesthetic 
choices were made. Stylized reenactments and musical scoring (especially when they 
announce themselves too prominently, as they do in this film) are perceived as an 
aesthetic overindulgence unbecoming of documentary, which distracts the viewer from 
the ‘proper’ outrage toward the crimes the documentary is exploring. This is not a new 
critique.79 Morris has made a film about digital photographs using nonstandard 
documentary procedures. All documentaries, even more documentary-looking 
documentaries than this one, are constructed out of modes of reenactment: testimony is a 
form of reenactment; editing is a form of reenactment; assembling an archive filmic-ly is 
                                                
79 Pare Lorentz’s government-sponsored documentaries about The Depression in the 1930s, which 
were scored by Virgil Thompson and included cinematographers such as Stacey and Horace Woodward, 
had all the trappings of Hollywood production and were the cause of much debate from the right and left as 
the modern syntaxes of American documentary and propaganda were being established. 
   170 
 
a form of reenactment; and, in this case, the photos themselves are already staged and 
reenacting certain practices of detainment and interrogation. Morris knows this and his 
film performs this knowledge.  
Standard Operating Procedure opens with various snapshots of the sunrise over 
the outer walls of Abu Ghraib prison and ends, predictably, with a similar snapshot of a 
sunset. More than serving as heavy-handed bookends to the film, these mundane, ‘artsy’ 
images (like any generic postcard image any tourist might take) become more haunted as 
the film progresses. These banal photographs occupy the same digital storage space as all 
the iconic images of Abu Ghraib. They are part of the same set of images as Lynndie 
England holding a prisoner by a leash and pyramids of naked prisoners. The same people 
who used the camera as an instrument of humiliation also took these benign, pedestrian 
images of beauty. Like the Parisian Arcades of Walter Benjamin’s flaneur, which 
flattened history into an anachronistic collection of artifacts and objects, the digital 
cameras of Abu Ghraib situate images of torture, tourism, and leisure into one un-curated 
array of binary data. Morris takes some pleasure in the perverse juxtaposition this 
flattening creates: in this picture, a beautiful sunset beyond the walls of Abu Ghraib, in 
that picture, soldiers goofing around during some down time, in the next picture, a 
bloodied prisoner tied to his cell bunk.  
Morris makes the flattening effect of digitality evident from the opening credits. 
The sunrise pictures flash on screen as Tim Dugan, a former civilian interrogator from 
CACI Corps and a primary witness in the film, tells us that Abu Ghraib was no vacation. 
The last sunrise photograph shrinks away and joins a dramatic animated thumbnail array 
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of all the Abu Ghraib photographs as the opening credit sequence begins. This is the first 
of several moments where the film visualizes digitality for us. This animated array of 
photographs, which appears as something out of Minority Report or perhaps debris 
floating in space provides, as Linda Williams describes, a “striking picture of cinema’s 
attempt to contain the elusive multiplicity of the digital” (XX). The film presents the 
photographs as data. Morris creates a cinematic version of the ether in which the binary 
data and the photographs appear to float and constellate in space – a digital ballet. Morris, 
through cinematic techniques far afield from the “Ken Burns effect,” reveals the 
photographs, not as simply illustrative visuals, but as digital entities that are 
simultaneously photographs as such and something qualitatively different from analog 
artifacts. What exists in the photograph is more than the picture we see. In addition to the 
signature of light, the film unfolds the extra-visual information embedded in the photo-
files: the signatures of the device, the time, and the exposure settings. According to Brent 
Pack, an Army Investigator interviewed throughout the film, the traditional mysteries of 
the photograph are a distraction. For him, definitive evidence is available from the 
photograph. The digital photograph is an unlockable and literal document: 
Photographs are what they are. You can interpret them differently, but what the 
photograph depicts is what it is. You can put any kind of meaning to it, but you 
are seeing what happened at that snapshot in time. You could read emotion on 
their face and feelings in their eyes, but it’s nothing that can be entered into fact. 
All you can do is report what’s in the picture.  
 
Pack’s understanding of photographs is more purely evidentiary than Morris’s is. 
Where Morris builds upon the image with testimony and reenactment to provide a depth 
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to the image that it does not itself have, Pack sees the photograph as only the data and 
metadata contained in its file – its surface and metasurface. 
The film is structured around the following primary sources: the photographs and 
cell phone movies taken by U.S. soldiers working at Abu Ghraib prison; interviews and 
first-person testimony with those who were involved, including among others Specialist 
Lynndie England, Specialist Sabrina Harman, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, Brent 
Pack, and Tim Dugan; and, finally, the letters from Sabrina Harman to her wife, Kelly.  
The photograph of a hooded Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, the detainee they called 
‘Gilligan,’ standing on a box with wires connected to him, is now perhaps one of the 
most famous photographs in the world.80 It epitomizes the use of the camera as a torture 
device. In this case, Faleh was forced to pose on the box and told that he would be 
electrocuted if he fell off (unknown to him, the wires were not connected to anything). 
This ‘softening’ technique was organized by Sergeant Ivan Frederick who, along with 
Charles Graner, was one of the main ringleaders in staging these acts, specifically with 
picture-taking in mind.81 Morris shows us another, less famous photograph of this event 
taken by Sabrina Harman. In her photograph we see Graner looking at his camera at a 
picture he has just taken. He is most likely looking for the very first time at one of the 
most iconic photographs in history – at the photograph of ‘Gilligan.’ Here a soldier has 
photographed a soldier looking at a photograph. Standard Operating Procedure shows 
this act occurring throughout the Abu Ghraib photographs. Each of the “naked pyramid” 
                                                
80 For more on the confusion over the identity of the prisoner they called Gilligan, see Morris’s 
New York Times blog post, “Will the Real Hooded Man Please Stand Up,” (15 Aug 2007). 
81 Frederick’s and Graner’s testimonies are both notably absent from the film. Graner was still in 
prison and was not allowed to testify. Frederick had just been paroled during production of Standard 
Operating Procedure and presumably did not want to talk. 
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photographs, for example, shows another soldier holding another camera taking a 
photograph from another angle at the same time. These meta-photographic moments 
become emblematic of the not only the staging of torture for the camera, but of the 
challenges that digitality brings to our changing conceptions of war photography.  
 Morris moves us toward the ‘Gilligan’ photograph and its context by starting with 
snapshots of the MP’s leisure time: lounging around, sleeping, engaging in crude 
sophomoric antics (acting out various sex acts on each other with a banana and some 
toothpaste) in the jail cells that were their living quarters. The leisure photographs serve 
several purposes: they help Morris disprove the notion that Abu Ghraib scandal was the 
result of a “few bad apples.” He undoes the possibility of a monstrous notion of them and 
returns them, as he says, to the “realm of the human.” Throughout the film, Morris does 
not want to deny their imperfections and even their culpability, but he also wants to 
reveal the extent to which these soldiers were scapegoats, and, in a sense, themselves 
victims of a much larger military-political shaming machine. In another sense, the leisure 
pictures that precede the ‘Gilligan’ photograph, serve also to recall how toxic life in Abu 
Ghraib was – where the antics of leisure and the ‘antics’ done to the prisoners become 
entwined – they exist in the same digital milieu of the camera’s memory card. 
Throughout the film Morris seems to contend that photographs do provide 
evidence, but very limited evidence. The film treats the photographs as a point of entry, 
but in order to know more we must move beyond the frame of the image and beyond its 
framing in the public sphere. The film strives to explore the before and the after of the 
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image – the context and the motivations behind their existence. He believes that the 
photograph alone is not enough.  
In addition to the ‘Gilligan’ photograph, the film also focuses heavily on Manadel 
Al-Jamadi, whose death during CIA interrogation at Abu Ghraib was ruled a homicide by 
medical examiners. Mark Swanner, the CIA agent later found to be responsible for Al-
Jamadi’s death, was never charged and received only a letter of reprimand. Sabrina 
Harman, however, by taking a photograph of Al-Jamadi’s body (by making visible that 
which was meant to remain invisible) was charged with tampering with evidence when 
she and Charles Graner took the now-famous photographs of each other smiling over the 
body, thumbs up. The photographs simultaneously serve as evidence of the crime and a 
distraction from it. These are the epistemological conundra that Morris is keen to 
investigate. They are both the revelation of and distraction from ‘what happened’ at Abu 
Ghraib. Sabrina Harmon’s thumbs up, which might be taken to epitomize Abu Ghraib’s 
perverse combination of plucky best intentions and sadistic torture, becomes for Errol 
Morris, like many of Abu Ghraib’s images, a more complicated epistemological-
photographic situation. Harman explains her thumbs-up pose to us as something that you 
do ‘for the camera’ – a habitual and artificial pose that stems from the self-consciousness 
one feels in front of the camera. For Harman, it’s what you do when you don’t know 
what to do. She explains in the film that she took the pictures in order to collect evidence 
of the abuses. She saw herself as a crime scene investigator who was documenting this 
homicide in order to prove what was going on inside Abu Ghraib, a claim that is 
supported by the letters she wrote to her wife.  
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Standard Operating Procedure reveals that many of the Abu Ghraib photographs, 
often the ones that seem the most graphic and offensive, actually fall within the legal 
boundaries of ‘standard operating procedure’ for the treatment of detainees. It’s not the 
pictures that are damning so much as the military and intelligence apparatus that made 
them possible. Many of the photographs don’t depict any illegal acts – simply routine 
humiliation techniques – and, in the case of Harman, the photograph that seems 
particularly horrific turn out to be more evidentiary than sadistic. Her “thumbs up” is not 
an index pointing to her wrongdoing, but rather a distraction from a murder. 
The film, in these instances, is somewhat sympathetic to Harman (and, in other 
places, Lynndie England). Some have argued that the Interrotron makes her sympathetic 
because it allows her to directly address viewer. But it is not the Interrotron that creates 
the sympathy, it is Morris. He is not interested in wholly demonizing the Specialists who 
took these pictures. Rather, the film focuses its indictment on two other parties: 1) the 
powers that put into place this particular set institutional practices that were used 
throughout the U.S. detainment industry and 2) our very assumptions about what these 
photographs – or any photographs – show us. If anything, the Interrotron is the last stop 
in a concentric circle of interrogation practices that mark the Abu Ghraib scandal. Most 
of the Abu Ghraib images depict the standard procedures (forced nudity, stress positions, 
etc) used to ‘soften’ prisoners for interrogation and most of the Specialists who are 
interviewed in the film have been interrogated throughout the post-scandal investigative 
and legal process. While much is made of the power of the direct address that the 
Interrotron enables, our contact with Harman, England, Pack, Dugan and the others is 
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also indirect. The apparatus suggests an immediacy while also being inescapably 
mediated. Morris makes this apparent when Specialist Roman Krol approaches the 
Interrotron to look at a photograph that Morris is holding up. He backs away and tilts his 
head to the side as he studies the image. To the viewer, Krol approaches the camera and 
us, tilts his head at us. This moment, quite intentionally, ruptures the facade of the direct-
address interview. Krol breaks an invisible plane to inquisitively study a photograph and 
as he approaches, squinting, looking, he appears to be puzzling over us, the people on the 
other side of this screenic encounter.  
 
Wafaa Bilal’s Disruptive Technocorporeality  
If Morris literally restages the Abu Ghraib photographs as cinematic objects, Iraq-
born artist Wafaa Bilal restages the modes of looking that enable the taking and the 
seeing of those photographs. Broadly speaking, Bilal’s cyber performances explore the 
entanglement of bodies and media technologies within digitally mediated visual 
environments. His projects over the last decade have sought to both enact and challenge 
the modes and practices of witnessing twenty-first-century conflict. Drawing from video-
game interfaces and interactions, surveillance technologies, robotics, mass media, 
internet cultures, and social networks, Bilal constructs plainly oppositional situations in 
which his body must “suffer” media phenomena. His critique and exploration of global 
media phenomena and Western ways of witnessing take place at the intersection of two 
perceivable surfaces: the skin and the screen. His work has involved modifying both skin 
and screen by implanting his body into technologically mediated environments and, 
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conversely, implanting technologies (surgically) into his body.82 The most significant 
aspects of Bilal’s performances, sometimes despite his authorial intentions, arise out of 
accidents and failures – the bodily, technical, and legal glitches that inevitably beset his 
projects. I locate in these contingent strands of these performance pieces a continuation of 
the disruptive frames that I have elucidated elsewhere in this chapter. Bilal introduces an 
art practice that turns contingency and failure into elucidatory sites for thinking about the 
technocorporeal conditions of postmodern witness.  
This section, then, examines the contingencies that emerge from the human-
machine interactions and interventions that Bilal and other artists construct. I will focus 
here mostly on Bilal’s 2007 cyber-performance Domestic Tension, aka “Shoot an Iraqi,” 
in which he lived for thirty days in a confined space under attack by a remote-controlled 
paintball gun. I will also touch on some of Bilal’s other related installations including 
Virtual Jihadi (2008), …and Counting (2010), and 3rdi (2010-11) as well as work by 
Joseph DeLappe and Anne-Marie Schleiner.  
Domestic Tension (2007) reenacts the Iraq War’s spectacle of humiliation.83 For 
the performance, Bilal confined himself for 30 days in a gallery space at the Flat File 
Galleries in Chicago, during which time people from across the globe could tele-interact 
with him via chat, webcam, and remote-controlled paintball gun. People had 24-hour web 
                                                
82 The latter tradition, often referred to as human enhancement, body modification, or body 
hacking has a much deeper history that will not be adequately explored here. Bilal’s body modifications 
represent a brief foray into this tradition. For more on this, see the work of the Cypriot-Australian 
posthuman artist Stelarc and also the French feminist plastic surgery artist Orlan. Relatedly see also the 
work and theory of Quinn Norton, who also happened to be the partner of the late Aaron Swartz, hacker 
wunderkind and influential information freedom advocate. 
83 Bilal wanted to call the piece “Shoot an Iraqi,” but the owners of the FlatFile Galleries thought 
it might be too racially inflammatory (Bilal 24). 
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access to the space where they could, with the click of the mouse, aim and shoot at Bilal 
with the paintball gun, transforming the virtual interaction into a very physical one. Bilal, 
who wore goggles and a keffiyeh, was “an available target” for most of that month (Bilal 
2). Over time, the space became saturated in yellow paint. Bilal often stayed below the 
gun line or took cover behind strategically placed plexiglass in front of his computer 
desk. The entire month was streamed live on the internet via the webcam mounted on the 
paintball gun. The image was grainy and without sound, echoing with the media 
aesthetics of the Gulf War. And like Rovner’s grainy Gulf War photographs, the lo-fi 
quality, according to Bilal, was meant to “heighten the sense of remoteness and 
detachment” of mediated conflict. Over the thirty-day period, Bilal’s site received 80 
million hits and 60,000 shots from people in 128 countries (xvi).  
In a cyber-performance that is both fascinating and frustrating, Bilal returns us the 
question posed in the opening lines of the film Three Kings discussed in the second 
chapter: “Are we shooting people or what?” We are shooting Wafaa. Or what? We are 
choosing not to shoot? Choosing to watch passively? Choosing to aim the gun away from 
him? This project fascinates, because in its media-microcosm, it restages the various 
media conditions of the Iraq War from Predator drones and other robotic weapons to the 
gaming and hand-held visual cultures through which soldiers modeled, recorded, mixed, 
edited, and mashed their war experiences. This project frustrates because in a way it 
requires us to shoot at the same time that it condemns our shooting. It risks being overly 
didactic, in other words, by inviting the viewer to shoot – to engage in violence – in order 
to condescendingly “teach” the viewer about the violence of their spectatorship. At its 
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best, though, it is a performance that provokes a crisis in the viewer and causes them to 
question their own spectatorship of war. It imbricates comfort zones with conflict zones. 
The performance showcases the interference created by the proximity of these disparate 
yet telepresently intimate zones of safe distance and dangerous presence both for the 
expatriate Iraqi artist in Chicago and the millions of visitors who trafficked this site of 
remote interaction and violence.  
He wanted the project to address both cybergaming culture and the robotics of 
drone warfare, both of which, he argues, foster a “curious detachment that attends 
American spectatorship” (xiii).84 I am very skeptical, however, of such directly causal 
arguments whereby technology becomes a pathogen in a perceptual and moral disease. 
Rather, I think, as Carol Becker argues in the introduction to Shoot an Iraqi, that Bilal 
“created an axis of action to intercept daily life” (xix). I see Domestic Tension offering a 
more nuanced screenic encounter. By transforming a virtual interaction into a physical 
one, Domestic Tension not only offers a provocative reenactment of modern 
technological warfare, internet cultures, gaming cultures, and social network self-
                                                
84 This project and Bilal’s framing of it is indebted Harun Farocki’s famous Vietnam-War-era 
film installation, Inextinguishable Fire (1969). On its surface, the film protests the production and use of 
napalm by the U.S. Military, but on another level it protests the “curious detachment…of American 
spectatorship” that Bilal is also interested in. At the beginning of the film, in the immediacy of second-
person address, Farocki asks the viewer, “How can we show you the injuries caused by napalm?” If we 
show you pictures of napalm burns, you’ll close your eyes. First, you’ll close your eyes to the pictures. 
Then you’ll close your eyes to the memory. Then you’ll close your eyes to the facts. Then you’ll close your 
eyes to the entire context.” In what becomes an escalating experiment in disrupting the detachment of the 
spectator, Farocki uses first-person testimony, self-harm performance art, and reenactment to make the 
realities of napalm known to the “you” of the audience. The film begins with Farocki reading a statement 
from a Vietnamese individual describing the experience of being burned by Napalm. Next, Farocki pulls up 
his sleeve and burns himself with a cigarette, stating, “A cigarette burns at 400’ C. Napalm burns at 3000’ 
C.” The rest of the film takes place in a simulated Dow Chemical plant where actors play corporate 
scientists who are indifferent to the consequences of the products they produce. At one point, the scientists 
watch television coverage of the war and complain of boredom. The film emphasizes the everyday 
complicity of students, engineers, scientists, and casual observers who could resist the production of 
weaponized material, but do not. 
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commodification, it also invites contingent disruptions. It creates the possibility for a 
range of chance interventions and cybercultural expressions from troll rants and racist 
diatribes to serious discussions and thoughtful engagement. It becomes a site of 
contingency and cyber-activism. At one point in the performance a cadre of enterprising 
hackers modified the paintball gun into a fully automatic rapid-fire device – cyber-
attacking the code in order to better attack Bilal. In response, another group of hackers 
responded by forming a “shield” for Bilal by taking control of the gun and turning it to 
the left (xvii).  
Domestic Tension reenacts and restages the corporeal, visual, and technological 
conditions of the war spectacle, thus highlighting the interpenetration of screens and 
bodies and their evolving interconnections in the context of war. Bilal disrupts the frames 
of the Iraq War by restaging its mediascapes – restaging the bodies that mediate and the 
bodies that are mediated by the screens of war via a network of surface effects that 
encompasses the detained, disarticulated, and dead bodies of war, the screens of war, and 
the human sensoria of the globalized electronic masses. Moreover (to return once more to 
Butler) Bilal, by dramatizing (and in fact gamifying) the sensory conditions of mediated 
war, creates a small opening in which we might consider the precariousness of another 
life through mediated perception (Butler, Frames 52). 
Like Domestic Tension, Bilal’s more recent works pose many of the same 
questions, risk on-the-nose didacticism, create potential spaces of disruption, and, most 
importantly, put the body at risk to media technologies. In each of the following 
performances, Bilal configures his body in relation to media technologies in ways that not 
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only stage a basic critique of contemporary media culture, but also invite the glitches and 
accidents that reveal the most about those interactions.  
In his video game intervention, Virtual Jihadi (2008), he modified the game The 
Night of Bush Capturing, an Al-Qaeda-made modification of the popular video game 
Quest for Saddam.85 In the original Quest, players fight stereotypically mustachioed 
Iraqis with the ultimate goal of killing Saddam Hussein. The Al-Qaeda mod reverses the 
premise, making the goal to kill George W. Bush. For his intervention, Bilal placed an 
avatar of himself as a suicide bomber in Al Qaeda’s mod of the game. The work drew 
controversy and the original exhibition at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute was shut down 
by the school’s administrators. Those who opposed the exhibition saw Bilal’s work as 
pro-terrorist project and failed to see it as nuanced attempt to create an alternative 
narrative through a hybrid of autobiographical details and the game’s narrative. Bilal’s 
stated goal was to investigate the inherent racism within Western media depictions of the 
Arab world and the conditions under which terrorist recruitment becomes an option.  
…And Counting (2010) was a 24-hour tattoo project in which dots of visible and 
invisible (UV) inks placed cartographically on Bilal’s back represented American and 
Iraqi dead respectively. Inspired in part by the death of Bilal’s brother by a missile at a 
checkpoint in Kufa, Iraq, the project was meant to bring awareness to the imbalanced 
visibility and invisibility of American and Iraqi deaths respectively. The 5,000 dead 
American soldiers were tattooed as permanent visible red ink dots and the 100,000 Iraqi 
casualties were tattooed as dots of green UV ink, which is invisible unless seen under 
                                                
85 Wafaa Bilal’s website, Virtual Jihadi, 2008, http://wafaabilal.com/html/virtualJ.html (accessed 
15 Jan 2011). 
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black light. The dots were placed cartographically on Bilal’s back near the Iraqi cities 
where the casualties took place.  
In the cyborg experiment 3rdi (2010-11), a camera was surgically implanted in 
the back of Bilal’s head that transmits one image per minute to a website. The piece was 
commissioned as part of the Told/Untold/Retold exhibition at the Arab Museum of 
Contemporary Art in Doha, Qatar. The side effects (both biological and political) of this 
project were in many ways more central to the projects significance. Notably, Bilal’s 
body eventually rejected the camera implant and it had to be removed or he would risk 
serious infection. Furthermore, his employer, New York University, citing concerns 
about student privacy, requested that the device be turned off at work (after all, anyone 
standing behind him could be photographed and publicly broadcast). 
Bilal’s work offers examples of an art practice that is critically engaged with the 
media aesthetics of war and, in particular, seeks to transform the screenic milieux of the 
Iraq War into modes of resistance. Bilal and other artists, hackers, modders, and activists 
attempt to think about (and with) war media by penetrating its screen space, if only 
fleetingly, through tactical media interventions. These artists interface with the screenic 
and, as Rita Raley argues in Tactical Media, seek out ways to “evolve the virtual effects 
of war into a mode of resistance” (71). They are screen modifiers. Conversely, other 
artists have responded to the militarized screen by disconnecting from it and resettling the 
images in non-screenic spaces. In other words, they engage the screens and digital objects 
of war by transposing them to more durable substrates, engaging in practice of screenic 
displacement. These works intervene in digital aesthetics of war by inserting them into 
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analog, material environments. They defamiliarize the screen by resituating its images 
elsewhere. They are screen displacers.  
Screen-displacing artists seek a sustained, un-flickering response to the war screen 
as we can see in several artists’ responses to the digital snapshots of abuse at Abu Ghraib: 
Richard Serra’s crude charcoal sketch of Gilligan on the box at Abu Ghraib with “STOP 
BUSH” scrawled on it like a hurried piece of graffiti or a cave painting; Susan Crile’s 
delicate chalk and pastel renderings of the Abu Ghraib photographs where light white 
lines and vast negative space are punctured by the dramatic bold colors of an 
interrogator’s black gloves or a prisoner’s green hood; Fernando Botero’s painted 
recreations of the Abu Ghraib photographs, where his comically rotund figures take on a 
moral and emotional weight in their excess; Martha Rosler’s reboot of her Vietnam era 
collages Bringing the War Home, where conflict zones, comfort zones, and consumption 
zones collide when, for example, American soldiers are pasted into the idyllic domestic 
space of a magazine-ad living room; and, lastly, Jenny Holzer’s Redaction Paintings, 
which make a public spectacle of various redacted government documents related to 
torture, detainment, and the “war on terror.” Each of these works creates an intervention 
that, rather than entering the screen frame through cyber art practices, reframes the screen 
in a different milieu. They are decidedly off screen objects that think about the screen. 
There are more artists and works that speak both directly and indirectly to Abu Ghraib.86 
The practices of screen-modifying artists like Bilal, on the other hand, have sought a 
                                                
86 Art critic Tyler Green wrote a series of brilliant columns on this in his former blog for 
ArtsJournal, which he was gracious enough to send me through email correspondence. In the posts, he 
discusses Bruce Nauman’s 1981 ‘hanging chairs’ sculpture, Martha Rosler’s “The Gray Drape” (2008), and 
Gerhard Richter’s “Uncle Rudi” (1965) to explore what it means to make and consume art in the context of 
Abu Ghraib and the American torture infrastructure. 
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more embedded approach that addresses, reframes, and thinks through (and with) 
emerging militarized modes of perception and as such paradoxically return to indexicality 
with a vengeance. Such tactical art practices seek to interfere with, disrupt, or otherwise 
interface with the screens of war. Rather than displace the screenic, they place themselves 
within it. Bilal’s Virtual Jihadi along with work by artists like Joseph DeLappe and 
Anne-Marie Schleiner, have experimented with the tactic of video game intervention, 
which utilizes game space to disrupt, if only fleetingly, our acquiescence to the screenic 
space of war.  
In dead-in-iraq (2006), DeLappe entered the online first-person shooter America’s 
Army, a tax-payer-funded recruiting and publicity tool for the U.S. Army.87 As a neutral 
non-participant, rather than play the game, DeLappe, under the screen name “dead-in-
iraq,” proceeded to type the names of dead American soldiers in the game’s chat box. If 
his avatar was killed he would simply resume typing upon regeneration. Over the course 
of the project, DeLappe logged the name, rank, service branch, and date of death of over 
4000 American casualties of the Iraq War. Some of the players that encountered dead-in-
iraq in the gamespace were indifferent, some were curious observers, and others went so 
far as to protect his avatar. Many of the players who encountered DeLappe’s project 
within the game, however, became angry or defensive. To them, dead-in-iraq was not 
only breaking the social contract of the game by not playing, but he was also politicizing 
their fun. By interrupting the game with the names of the dead, he momentarily punctured 
a riskless and regenerative military fantasy.  
                                                
87 Joseph DeLappe’s website, dead-in-iraq, 2006, 
http://www.unr.edu/art/delappe/gaming/dead_in_iraq/dead_in_iraq%20jpegs.html (accessed January 10 
(2011). 
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In Velvet-Strike (2002), Schleiner, along with Joan Leandre and Brody Condon, 
created an intervention in the game Counter-Strike, a mod of the popular first-person 
shooter Half-Life.88 Instead of the usual “spray paints” players use to tag territories or 
mark kills within the game, Velvet-Strike invited players to create and use spray paints 
with often humorous or provocative counter-military messages including a soldier and an 
insurgent kissing. Like dead-in-iraq, Velvet-Strike garnered interest in the press and in 
some corners of the art world, but many players within the game’s online community 
were dismayed by the intervention into their game. Rather than see Velvet-Strike as a 
challenge to the burgeoning post-9/11 militarized discourse, they saw it as an attack 
aimed directly at the game itself.  
These artists address the medial entanglements of the screenic by creating a glitch 
– an ephemeral moment of interference – that attempts to temporarily disrupt the 
accepted screen world and, in doing so, disrupt the ideology that underwrites it. By 
engaging video-game interfaces and interactions, surveillance technologies, robotics, 
mass media, internet cultures, and social networks, such art practices construct situations 
that fleetingly expose the screenic entanglement of bodies and media technologies within 
digitally-mediated visual environments. The interventions are aimed less at the games 
themselves and more at the perceptive practices that structure the waging and witnessing 
of modern war. These interventions invite a critical dissonance that allows us to not only 
see the game, but more importantly to see ourselves gaming in the context of virtual war.  
                                                
88 Velvet-Strike website, 2002, http://www.opensorcery.net/velvet-strike/ (accessed January 15, 
2011). 
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As Rita Raley has observed, such interventions are inherently temporary, 
ephemeral, and aleatory. “Tactical media,” she says, “signifies (sic) the intervention and 
disruption of a dominant semiotic regime, the temporary creation of a situation in which 
signs, messages, and narratives are set into play and critical thinking becomes possible” 
(6). They are tactical, not strategic, because their outcomes are temporary, uncontrollable, 
unpredictable, and most importantly, unsustainable. Their most elucidatory moments can 
arise out of accident and failure. They are rooted in contingent potentiality. They are 
timely, but they do not last; all that remains are secondary objects such as screenshots, 
videos, photographs, and bits of code. What, then, do these tactical media interventions 
accomplish? Are they part of real political change or just fleeting commentary? Are they 
a mode of resistance or a gesture toward resistance? What kind of action is cyber 
intervention? 
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CODA 
No Human Occupant: Toward Autonomous Tactical Weapons and 
Anonymous Tactical Media 
 
The distributed and windowless drone, devoid of any interior, requires no 
human sightline for its flight. In an operational sense, its trajectory is not 
visual. Geometries of looking, whether from a cockpit or a control tower, 
have been replaced by networks of sensing.  – Jonathan Crandall 
 
In all likelihood, this project has investigated a disappearing object. The screen is 
becoming either more or less than what it was throughout the twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries. Jordan Crandall, a drone performance artist, makes an astute paradigmatic 
observation in the epigraph above: there is a perceptual shift occurring from networks of 
looking to networks of sensing. The trend is toward lessening the screen’s presence as 
much as possible in favor of making the world itself an interface – to expand and extend 
sensory space beyond the virtual window. When I embarked on this project, the screen 
interface was in the midst of proliferating, atomizing, and evolving at a hyper-accelerated 
rate; it has become a daily, ubiquitous portal of multimedia human-information 
interaction. A new genre of often sloppy journalism has emerged that is devoted to wildly 
speculating about all the horrors and corruptions society’s screen-attachments will inflict 
on our children and on our brains. However, given the rate of technological change, what 
seems to be the zenith of the screen may already be its denouement. What was once 
something to be passively watched, then something to be interacted with via the 
peripheral tools of mice and keyboards, then something to be touched directly, is 
becoming more natively integrated into the human sensory apparatus. Our metaphors are 
getting more primordial: we’ve moved from command-line terminals to desktops, and 
recently (and quite biblically) to tablets. Like Moses, we receive messages from 
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proprietary clouds. One day we may not need to negotiate these human-computer 
mediations through metaphor at all: we will connect directly as holy consumer-
commodities. The screen is dead, long live the interface.  
The Tangible Media Group at MIT envisioned this thinning of the screen more 
than a decade ago when they helped create the well-known scene in Steven Spielberg’s 
Minority Report (2002) in which Tom Cruise swipes, pinches, and tosses bits of 
information around an interactive, transparent screenspace.89 Such gestures, which were 
for a brief moment the stuff of cinematic sci-fi visions of the year 2054, have become the 
mundane gestures of everyday screen interaction 40 years early. The Tangible Media 
Group has strived to create user interfaces that are, according to John Underkoffler, 
“space soluble and network soluble” (Underkoffler). In other words, they seek an 
interface design that allows computations to be tangible and manipulable in three-
dimensional sensory space as well as easily transportable from platform to platform. This 
design goal stems from our embeddedness in a media-information environment of 
ephemeral ubiquity rather than tangible scarcity. Information that was once hard to get 
but easy to touch is now easy to get and hard to touch. Interface designers like the 
Tangible Media Group provide a vision of interface design that puts us back ‘in touch’ 
with information. It makes information appear as human-oriented objects rather than 
making humans comport into machine-oriented objects. That is the illusion anyway.  
At about the time when Tom Cruise was performing those iconic gestures in 
                                                
89 Relatedly a joint Disney Research and Carnegie Melon University team have produced a demo of their 
Touché system, which transforms everyday objects into haptic, gesture-controlled surfaces. As Cory 
Doctorow recently reported on BoingBoing, the system uses “capacitive coupling to infer things about what 
your hands are doing. It can determine which utensil you're eating your food with, or how you're grasping a 
doorknob, or even whether you're touching one finger to another or clasping your hands together.”  
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Minority Report, Lev Manovich was declaring the primacy of the screen in The Language 
of New Media: “We may debate whether our society is a society of spectacle or of 
simulation, but, undoubtedly, it is a society of the screen” (94). He follows this 
declaration with a question: “What are the relationships between the physical space 
where the viewer is located, her body, and the screen space?" (94-95). Despite the likely 
disappearance of the literal screen surface, I, too, have posed and continue to pose this 
question and add to it a concern not only for the viewer’s position, but also for the 
position of those who are (and that which is) screened. I have attempted to abide such 
questions in these pages through a close reading of photographs, mainly, but also other 
surfaces of war. Here, in the coda, I want to consider how we keep asking these 
questions.  
The title of the coda, “No Human Occupant,” is the message stenciled on the 
fuselages of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The message is put there, one imagines, 
in case of mishap – in case some passerby stumbles upon the wreckage of a crashed 
drone in the middle of a Yemeni desert. The message alerts the passerby not to attempt to 
rescue anybody because there is no body there. But it also serves as a reminder of the 
increasing tele-agency and machine-agency of the screenic era. Drones are the model 
‘picture’ of the screenic today just as the F-117 stealth fighter was for Virilio a model 
‘picture’ of the screenic during the Gulf War. They indicate not only new military tactics, 
but new military strategies of tele-agency. 
As such robotic tactical weapons become increasingly autonomous (and media 
activists become more tactical), how do we continue to describe and understand screenic 
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entanglements? As weaponized networks move from a man-in-the-loop to man-on-the-
loop model, where, as Patrick Crogan has observed, the human merely “monitors” (rather 
than enacts) “the execution of the robot’s now realtime ‘perceive and act vector’”, what 
and who is animated by and granted agency in these configurations (Crogan)? How do 
we grapple with the ethical and political challenges of such trajectories? How do we 
disrupt and resist such trajectories? 
Donna Haraway observed in 1985 that “the ubiquity and invisibility of cyborgs is 
precisely why [they] are so deadly. They are as hard to see politically as materially” (12). 
For her, being deadly and hard-to-see is not only reason to fear cyborgs, it is part of their 
appeal as key figures in the ironic political myth she is constructing. This paradox still 
holds true for contemporary hacktivists, media interventionists, and other tactical media 
practitioners. The very ideological and technological systems they seek to disturb and 
disrupt are often deadly and hard-to-see. For that very reason, tactical media practices 
(like those of Wafaa Bilal, Joseph DeLappe, and Anne-Marie Schleiner, which I 
discussed at the end of the last chapter, among many, many others) are “as hard to see 
politically as materially.” Although tactical media interventions are ephemeral, 
temporary, and aleatory modes of action, which may only offer what Rita Raley, in 
Tactical Media, describes as a “hollow laugh at power,” they at least make laughter 
possible – the laughter that potentially “forges a social bond and a political consciousness 
held in common” (2). New screenic modes of warfare, particularly the increasingly 
autonomous networks of weaponized robots, pose serious political and ethical conundra 
that are only beginning to seep into public discourse. One possible response to this 
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emerging war machine may be the disruptive laughter of tactical media interventions, the 
kind of laughter that interrupts the status quo and opens the possibility of critical thought. 
Raley points to these potentialities in her definition of tactical media: 
Generally taken to refer to practices such as reverse engineering, hacktivism, 
denial-of-service attacks, the digital hijack, contestational robotics, collaborative 
software, and open-access technology labs, 'tactical media' is a mutable category 
that is not meant to be either fixed or exclusive...tactical media signifies the 
intervention and disruption of a dominant semiotic regime, the temporary creation 
of a situation in which signs, messages, and narratives are set into play and critical 
thinking becomes possible (6). 
It is unfortunate that the term ‘disruptive’ has very recently become a popular buzzword 
to describe all kinds of standard tech industry practices. Every Silicon Valley consultant 
and media guru traffics in the language of ‘disruption’; every startup company describes 
their work as ‘hacking.’ The term ‘disruptive’ has ironically lost much of its disruptive 
capacity as it gets appropriated as a virtue of venture capital. Still, the concept as Raley 
uses it to describe certain modes of artistic and political engagement is meaningful. It is 
and should be ‘disturbing.’ I want it to retain that subversive meaning here, the idea of 
glitching the system. In these closing pages I want to look at the military’s ‘meta-
strategy’ for the screenic era – its fantasies – and counter them with the potential 
disruptiveness of tactical media.  
•   •   • 
This dissertation began with an excerpt from Richard Brautigan’s poem “All 
Watched Over By Machines of Loving Grace,” an ironic title all too fitting for this 
current era of omni-surveillance, where so many people are not only “all watched over” 
but also watching all over, officially and unofficially, insidiously and innocently, 
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intentionally and accidentally, everyday from everywhere.90 Recently the United Air 
Force Center for Strategy and Technology released a breathtaking “trailer” on YouTube 
for its Blue Horizons project, a multi-year future study. The tagline for this trailer is, 
incredibly, “Meta-Strategy for the Age of Surprise.” If tactical media artists like Bilal, 
DeLappe, and Schleiner are seeking small openings for impermanent tactical 
interventions in the dominant screenic regimes of war, the Air Force, here, is seeking a 
broad universal strategy to control those screenic regimes. Over fast-paced graphics 
depicting a timeline of technological innovation through the centuries, the following 
message appears on screen: 
We can predict broad outlines, but we don’t know the ramifications. Information 
travels everywhere; anyone can access everything — the collective intelligence of 
humanity drives innovation in every direction while enabling new threats from 
super-empowered individuals with new domains, interconnecting faster than ever 
before. Unlimited combinations create unforeseen consequences. 
The Air Force, it seems, has been reading Virilio and Gilles Deleuze. The video 
predicts an unpredictable era – an era of known unknowns and unknown unknowns (to 
invoke once more the former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld). It predicts, perhaps, 
the end of (or rather amplification of) what I have called here the screenic era. Echoing 
Ray Kurzweil’s theory of the coming Singularity, this “Age of Surprise” is a vision of 
Big Data on hyperdrive where everything moves at unfathomable rates at an 
                                                
90 One artist whose work explores the potential reversals of surveiller and surveilled in the context of 
military secrecy is Trevor Paglen. His work involves photographing and mapping restricted military 
installations, secret surveillance satellites, drone bases, and other ‘black spots.’ His work stands as a 
counter-image or reverse surveillance of military surveillance technologies. Like Michal Rovner’s 
photographs of Gulf War television screens that I discussed in the second chapter, Paglen’s photographs 
maintain a literal and figurative distance from their objects. There never seems to be enough detail; the 
images themselves are restricted. In a sense they perform the very culture of restriction and secrecy they 
seek to picture.  
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unfathomable scale.91 In this future-scenario tactical media interventions by “super-
empowered individuals with new domains” are the main threat. Blue Horizon seeks a 
(meta) strategy to cope with what Gabriella Coleman and others in the hacker community 
have referred to as “ultra coordinated motherfuckery” (Coleman). This motherfuckery is 
the official threat in the “Age of Surprise,” but is also a key virtue of tactical media – it 
creates unpredictable, disruptive, and disturbing potentialities of political and screenic 
transgression.  
As I write this coda, several events have pointed to this emerging fear. Internet 
prodigy and information activist Aaron Swartz has committed suicide while in the midst 
of being federally prosecuted for gaining access to an MIT computer closet to download a 
massive dataset of JSTOR articles. Similarly, Andrew Auernheimer, aka weev, a well-
known grey-hat hacker and troll, will soon face sentencing from federal prosecutors for 
exposing a security flaw in AT&T’s iPad user database when he scraped data from 
114,000 AT&T customers. Bradley Manning recently provided stunning testimony 
during his court martial on his motivation for leaking the State Department documents 
and Apache helicopter footage (which I discuss in more detail later on) that were released 
on Wikileaks. At about the same time, the New York Times profiled its own battle against 
hackers in China who are possibly linked to the cyberwar and cyber-intelligence wings of 
the Chinese military. This led other major American companies and news outlets, 
including Apple, to publicize similar cases of massive data theft at the hands of hackers 
                                                
91 Kurzweil defines the Singularity as “a future period during which the pace of technological change will 
be so rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly transformed. Although neither utopian 
nor dystopian, this epoch will transform the concepts that we rely on to give meaning to our lives, from our 
business models to the cycle of human life, including death itself” (7-9). 
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in China, leading the White House to ask the Chinese government to play nice and agree 
to “acceptable norms of behavior in cyberspace” (Landler). This news comes after two 
years of increasing public understanding of large-scale cyber weapons like Stuxnet, 
Conficker, and Flame, which were developed and deployed by or in partnership with the 
United States military complex to disrupt Iranian nuclear development among other 
things. Meanwhile, Congress, the press, and other groups are increasing pressure on the 
Obama Administration to release memos related to drone strikes and drone target 
adjudication procedures, particularly in relation to the extrajudicial drone assassinations 
of American citizens who are linked to terrorist groups. Drones, in the meantime, remain 
the United States’ standard weapon of choice for fighting an expanding, secretive 
unofficial war even as there is no real understanding of the collateral damage or the 
potential blowback of this strategy.  
I offer this brief microhistorical chronicle of recent events because they point to a 
highly screenic moment in which political hacktivism, anarchic disruptive practices, 
state-sponsored cyberwar, and the proliferation of robotic warfare intersect in interesting 
and troubling ways. Amid over-zealous federal prosecution of activists, a shroud of 
mystery over drone targeting procedures, and the mythologization of the Chinese hacker 
threat, we face new questions about how to meaningfully resist new modes of power, 
how to use new forms of resistance against traditional modes of power, and how to create 
meaningful political and social relations under these emerging technological 
configurations. Additionally, to look at this moment as Paul Virilio would, we might 
consider the new accidents and disasters that loom up from these emerging technological, 
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social, and political configurations.   
Over the last few years, the United States military has been testing a new 
surveillance system – a “machine of loving grace” called Gorgon Stare – that can track 
and transmit real-time movement across an entire town.92 The system consists of a 
spherical array of nine cameras attached to the belly of an aerial drone. Each $17.5 
million pod weighs 1100 pounds and shoots at two frames-per-second at half-meter 
resolution, creating live three-dimensional geo-intelligence of an area. What it currently 
lacks in frame rate it makes up for in coverage. It utilizes tagging and other metadata in 
conjunction with ESPN-like instant replay software to organize different views and 
disperse them to various screens such as the tablets of soldiers on the ground and the 
centralized databases of Air Force analysts. The goal of this technology is to supplement 
the perceptual limitations of physical battlespace with a corresponding dynamic screen-
based representation. Even though the system has thus far proved buggy and unreliable, 
its very existence reveals a long-enduring military fantasy of total vision – to integrate 
and suture the optical world and the screen world in order to create a more perfect, 
totalizing picture.  
Such a system is rooted in a first-person screen subjectivity that exposes, 
dominates, and annihilates its ‘other’ while limiting its own exposure. It is a disembodied 
point-of-view that sees but cannot be seen, that targets but cannot be targeted, that shoots 
but cannot be shot. More Sauron than Gorgon, this omniscient eye that can see everything 
– that spies, targets, and shoots – is yet another construct of human and machine 
                                                
92 See Ellen Nakashima and Craig Whitlock, “Air Force’s New Tool: ‘We Can See Everything,’” The 
Washington Post (02 Jan. 2011): A1. 
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operations situated within the larger screen ecology of war. It is but one screen cluster 
within the imbricated screen-space of war that includes the weaponized screens of 
targeting and surveillance, the news screens of information and entertainment, and the 
videogame screens of fantasy and training. The screen has become a domain of war – a 
key battlespace of its own, distinct from but inseparably interfaced with ‘real’ 
battlespaces of war where target acquisition, televisual news spectacle, and video game 
graphics intersect and entangle.  
As this dissertation demonstrates, examples of the screenic entanglement of war 
and media technologies are not difficult to locate. The handheld footage provided by 
embedded television reporters shares the same intense proximity to battle as that of 
soldiers’ homemade YouTube videos, which in turn recreate the perspective of first-
person shooter video games (in several YouTube videos of patrol missions, for example, 
United States soldiers have explicitly recreated the first-person video game perspective 
by attaching their digital camcorders to their helmets).93 This intersection of self-
produced social media, corporate entertainment media, and large military targeting and 
surveillance apparatuses can be found in the visual similarities between the “AC-130 
Gunship” level in the video game Call of Duty, for example, and the Wikileaks 
“Collateral Murder” footage taken from the onboard targeting screen of a U.S. Apache 
attack helicopter from a 2007 mission over Baghdad.94 In Call of Duty, players acquire 
and destroy targets from an aerial perspective. Likewise, in the Wikileaks video we 
                                                
93 For collected examples of this see Iraq Uploaded: The War That Network TV Won't Show You, MTV 
News Documentary (2006) and Mark Glaser, “Your Guide to Soldier Videos from Iraq,” PBS MediaShift 
(01 Aug. 2006). 
94 http://collateralmurder.com 
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witness, through a similar onboard targeting screen, the slaying of about a dozen people 
including two Reuters news employees with the Apache’s 30-millimeter cannons. The 
game and the footage share the same black-and-white, cross-haired perspective and the 
squelchy audio of seemingly casual radio communication by the pilots and gunners as 
they carry out their destruction. Furthermore, they share a mode of seeing structured by 
the same military fantasy of weaponized vision. Of course, despite their aesthetic 
similarity, they are not the same. Equating the game to the Apache footage both 
trivializes war (“it’s just like a game”) and trumps up the game (“it’s just like war”). 
There is, after all, a significant and practical difference between war-like games and 
game-like wars. Games, though ideologically troubling at times, are for fun and 
entertainment. And wars, though sometimes fun and definitely entertaining, are for state-
sanctioned systematic destruction and death in the name of ideology. The videogame and 
the Apache do, however, share a screenic kinship; they live in the same media ecology. 
Game-makers strive for the most intense version of war’s reality in their games while 
war-makers strive for the game’s reality in war. This aesthetic and ideological kinship, 
and the ways that we address it and are addressed by it, has been the focus of this 
dissertation.  
The screen, in all of these contexts, is more than a surface of representation; it 
belongs to and creates the event. Under these medial conditions, the distinctions erode 
between the screens on which war is waged and the screens on which it is witnessed. For 
example, the “Collateral Murder” video, like the Abu Ghraib photographs, serve not only 
as potential proof of a crime, but is also the very screen through which the crime took 
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place. The virtual screen world in these cases is indelibly linked to – and determinant of – 
events in the ‘actual’ world.  
The boundaries between war fantasies and war acts, between information and 
propaganda, between document and spectacle come under question. Military technologies 
like Gorgon Stare raise important questions about the phenomenology of the war screen. 
How do we address this transmedial screen phenomena? What are the consequences of 
this evermore distant and robotic weaponry? What is the nature of virtual war or netwar 
in relation to the notion of a lived, embodied world? What are the modes of protest or 
resistance to a war machine increasingly comprised of autonomous robotic systems and 
cyborg constructs? Do drone operators dream of electric sheep?  
How do we address these entangled screens of war? And how do we respond to the 
address of the screen? As I have argued, these are questions of an inherently ecological 
nature. The phrase ‘media ecology,’ though perhaps overdetermined, is, as Matthew 
Fuller elaborates in Media Ecologies, a concept that perhaps best describes the complex, 
layered, “multiple relations of media dimensionality” that structures our “life in media” 
(including our wars in media) (x, 5). The interpenetrated nature of the screen world, 
especially in the context of war, requires an ecological concept of the surface, that I have 
called ‘the screenic’ – a transmedial, ethico-aesthetic concept referring to the 
transformation of complex medial, technological, bodily, and social operations into a 
surface of perceivable events. As I have attempted to picture in these pages, the screenic 
is the concept that addresses the interpenetration of bodies, machines, and images of war 
across various media junctures that integrate and disintegrate human sensoria within the 
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expanding nexus of screen networks. The screenic, then, is a kind of ecology of the 
surface where we address and are addressed by a host of technocorporeal and 
technosensory concerns, where the screen can serve as a site of weaponization (through 
surveillance, targeting, and tele-control), of record (through documentary and 
journalism), and of resistance (through hacktivism, art, and other tactical interventions).  
Perhaps one path of resistance is the “hollow laugh at power” that Rita Raley 
locates in tactical media. Perhaps it’s the laughter, or rather the ‘lulz,’ that offer a 
tentative obstacle to the momentum of militarized networks.  
In a New Yorker essay titled “For Laughs,” about the conceptual artist Francis 
Alÿs, Peter Schjeldahl writes, “Most artists are still what artists have always been: people 
who make things. But the past half century has seen an increase, in number and in 
prestige, of artists as conceptual performers: people who chiefly do things, whatever their 
auxiliary output of pictures and objects” (84-85). Of course, "making" and "doing" are 
not as mutually exclusive as Schjeldahl suggests here, but his distinction does point to 
two different kinds of art objects: for makers the object itself is the work and for doers 
the objects are the remaining record of the work, not the work itself. Videogame 
interventionists (like Bilal, DeLappe, and Schleiner) are, at the end of the day, like Alÿs, 
doers insofar as their work is more event than thing. The ‘work’ is impermanent save for 
an archival trail of text, code, screenshots, and clips. This kind of "doing" is what gives 
tactical media art its disruptive and aleatory qualities – the qualities of laughter and 
mischief. The regimes that hackers and tactical media artists tackle are often serious and 
somber – not “for laughs” – but the nature of their work is mischievous. They break the 
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rules of the game and create little glitches in the screenworld. At about the same time that 
Schjeldahl published “For Laughs,” a network of hackers with connections to the 
amorphous Anonymous collective calling themselves Lulz Security, or LulzSec, carried 
out a series of short-lived but highly publicized hacks that exploited and exposed security 
loopholes on several high-value sites including the U.S. Congress and the Central 
Intelligence Agency. LulzSec portrayed themselves as a band of merry hacksters who, 
like Alÿs, did it “for the laughs,” or in their case “for the lulz.” Lulz – which is modified 
internet-speak for LOLs or “laughs out loud” – in addition to laughter, also connotes the 
perhaps more radical idea of “lulls,” a break in the flow of things. If there is no way 
outside of the techno-military screen world, perhaps the lulls and lulz of tactical media 
intervention become a gesture of resistance that, though it cannot break the frame, does 
manage, for a moment, to crack the surface. Somewhere between Alÿs and LulzSec, the 
screenic interventions of artists and hacktivists seek ways to penetrate the weaponized 
surface – to create lulls in its illusive continuity; to be the wilier, regenerative Prometheus 
in the face of the Gorgon’s stare. 
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